CONTESTED TRANSITIONS

A Review of Swedish Support to the Education of South Africans:

Final Report

Joel Samoff

Zelda Groener

Ihron Rensburg

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Prepared for the Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority

Revised 12 September 1994

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1. INTRODUCTION

The inauguration of Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela as President on 10 May 1994 marked the end of era, indeed the end of a way of life, for South Africa. Or did it?

The majority of South Africans finally became citizens in their own country. Exercising their franchise, they elected a new parliament and selected as president an extraordinary human being who led both struggle and reconciliation, much of it while incarcerated. The new constitution guaranteed the fundamental equality of all citizens and promised not only equity but redress for the discrimination and injustice of the past. The imagination, persistence, and resilience that characterized opposition to minority rule could now be turned to reconstruction and development. New leaders, new rules, and a new agenda.

Yet much remained the same. Even as the new ministers moved into their offices, with a few exceptions, most senior civil servants, nearly all white, continued in their posts, sheltered in part by what seemed to be the very stately pace of the public service machinery. Although the new government had guaranteed their jobs but not their positions, the senior civil servants' professional association threatened to sue to block or delay their replacement. While the racially differentiated houses of parliament and homeland governments—in fact largely a facade, since the black legislators had never had either broad authority or significant autonomy—were dissolved, their racially differentiated education departments continued to operate the schools. In their initial responses to workers' protest under the new regime, the police seemed nearly as heavy handed as they had been under the old. As one commentator noted, the democratic movement had secured political power but was still a long way from controlling state power.

How could it be otherwise? Those responsible for operating the machinery of state in April were needed to continue operating it in May. Even if the basic legislation and administrative regulations can be changed quickly (and often they cannot), reeducating and replacing civil servants, devising and adopting new work patterns, and reconstructing the administration will take much longer. That is especially so where a government of national unity and a spirit of reconciliation bar abrupt and wholesale dismissals and seek to soften the impacts of dismantling apartheid. Citizens, too, need to learn about the rights and obligations of citizenship, drawing on their experiences of militant opposition to shape the public policy agenda and hold their leaders accountable as the country mobilizes for reconstruction.

This, then, is a period of transition for South Africa. As we shall suggest shortly, there are in fact several overlapping transitions being negotiated simultaneously. Each is sharply contested. None is likely to follow an unswerving path. Both the level of anticipation and excitement and the potential for frustration are high.

The transitions within South Africa make it timely for the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) to review its education aid program and to reconsider its guidelines. This report is part of that process.

Sweden has a long and distinguished history of support to the struggle against racism and minority rule in South Africa. Working with South African organizations, SIDA has provided expertise and financial assistance to a wide range of projects, initially outside the country and more recently within it. With the establishment of majority rule in South Africa, humanitarian assistance to people and organizations struggling to regain control of their society will be succeeded by development cooperation.

To facilitate its review and reconsideration, SIDA asked us to evaluate support to the education of South Africans during the three year period, 1991/92-1993/94 and to recommend guidelines for future Swedish involvement in South African education. Along with attention to current and projected policies in education and training, that charge requires as well systematic and careful attention to the broader political context for education and training policy and to the policy making process itself.

Drawing on our prior studies of and involvement in education in South Africa, we began our work in mid-1993. After a review of relevant documents and consultations in South Africa in July-August, 1993, we prepared our initial report, *Anti-Apartheid and Development: A Review of Swedish Support to the Education of South Africans* (September 1993). Early in 1994, at SIDA's request, we prepared a slightly revised version of that report and developed a set of interim recommendations for Swedish education assistance to South Africa, *Anti-Apartheid and Development: Interim Recommendations*.

This, then, is our third and final report. As such, it both builds on and follows its predecessors. To limit its length, we have not included here all of the text of the preceding two reports. As appropriate, we will refer to points covered in those documents. At the same time, to avoid sending readers back and forth among the reports, we have incorporated major themes and findings from our earlier work.

Specifically, we have not included here the detailed overview of the education system, the history of negotiations and crises, and the review of the education policy process that we presented in our first report. Nor have we reproduced here the evaluations of recipients of Swedish education assistance during the years 1991/92 and 1992/93. Instead, we have sought to bring those stories up to date. At the cost of some repetition, however, we have included here the information necessary to be sure that this final report is complete in itself.

Our findings and analyses, therefore, are based on our on-going studies of an involvement in South African education, on the quarterly reviews of South African education commissioned by SIDA and prepared by the Education Policy Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand, on interviews conducted and documents collected in South Africa by Joel Samoff in Stockholm in July, 1993, and May, 1994, by Joel Samoff and Zelda Groener during their visit to South Africa in August, 1993, and by Joel Samoff, Zelda Groener, and Ihron Rensburg during their visit to South Africa in July, 1994.

We sought to consult broadly, though the time available was limited. We sought as well to make South African education the living subject, rather than the observed object, of our work. To strengthen the South African voice in our evaluation, we favored seminars and discussions over individual interviews. Our general approach was to meet with a small group (sometimes 2-3 people, occasionally 15-20), outline our concerns and queries, and discuss the participants' own involvement in and perspectives on South African education. To the extent that we succeeded, we contributed to the vibrant and energetic education debate in South Africa rather than simply reporting on it.

Our canvas was wide. Our discussions in South Africa included more than sixty people in August, 1993, and well over a hundred in July, 1994. In between, individually and collectively we communicated with many more. We spoke with recipients of Swedish assistance, senior education officials, community activists, leaders and members of organizations, politicians, researchers, and representatives of other external agencies, and many others informed about and involved in education. Most people we met more than once, many in 1993 and again in 1994. Our initial report was circulated among the people and organizations we met. It generated a few written responses and many more comments during our 1994 visit. Our intention is that this report and its information and analysis will have even wider distribution.

We begin this report with a comment on perspectives and terminology (Section 2) and a review of the recent developments that constitute the initial context for education and education policy in post-apartheid South Africa (Section 3). We turn then to an overview of the current situation, which we characterize as a series of overlapping but not entirely congruent *contested transitions* (Section 5). Sorely neglected in the past and featured prominently in the policy proposals of the democratic movement, adult education warrants separate attention (Section 6). To complement the contextual information, we comment briefly on the South Africa education aid programs of other external agencies (Section 7). The next three sections focus specifically on Swedish education assistance: overview (Section 8), review of recipient organizations (Section 9), and general evaluation (Section 10). Finally, we consider broad guidelines (Section 11) and other specific recommendations (Section 12) for that assistance. For quick reference, we have summarized our major proposed guidelines and recommendations (Section 13). Included in the Appendices are a list of abbreviations (Section 14.1), our Terms of Reference (Section 14.2), summary information on Swedish education assistance to South Africa (Section 14.3), lists of the people consulted during our August 1993 (Section 14.4) and July 1994 (Section 14.5) visits to South Africa, descriptions of other agencies' support to education in South Africa (Section 14.6), and documents and publications we reviewed (Section 14.7).

We wish once again to record our appreciation for the cooperation we received during those visits. We are especially grateful to our South African colleagues who found time amidst their demanding schedules to help us understand better recent developments in education and the roles and impacts of Swedish assistance.

Beginnings are important. Our starting points for this work were and remain a shared commitment to the goal of an egalitarian and democratic society and the understanding that achieving and protecting equality and democracy require a continuing struggle against their enemies. That struggle will be transformed, but not ended, by the demise of apartheid, an objective yet to be achieved. Hence, we remain firmly convinced that the struggle against apartheid will need to continue for many years to come and that therefore reconstruction, democracy, and equality must all be integral elements of the South African development agenda.

2. IMPORTANT ISSUES ARE OFTEN NOT WHAT THEY SEEM

It has become fashionable to characterize the current period in South Africa as one of transition from the anti-apartheid struggle to national development. That is, we believe, a false dichotomy. Racism and segregation do not disappear when particular discriminatory laws are discarded. Democratic elections cannot instantaneously sweep away the culture and practices of authoritarianism. Racial integration—despite some limited progress still a future goal—is only the first step toward non-racialism. Opposition to racial discrimination and resistance to authoritarian patterns surely must continue to be active currents in the South African maelstrom. Development, however defined, must incorporate and build on an imaginative and energetic confrontation with the legacies of apartheid, not displace it.

Since this phraseology—"it is time to shift from anti-apartheid to development"—is so widespread, it is important to spend a moment considering how the words we use shape our understandings.

2.1 A FALSE DICHOTOMY

As we have noted, we reject the increasingly widely asserted dichotomy between *anti-apartheid* and *development* activities. Quite simply, the legacies of apartheid will require active confrontation for many years to come. Programs and projects in South Africa that do not incorporate that confrontation will retard, not accelerate, development and reconstruction.

There is an additional reason to reject the assertion that it is time to set aside the anti-apartheid struggle and to concentrate on development. That claim reflects a particular, and particularly narrow, understanding of societal change. As well, accepting that assertion uncritically risks devaluing and disabling the vibrant participatory community life that has been at the core of the struggle against minority rule.

This is not the place to review the literature on development, or to debate the multiple and often incompatible meanings attached to that term. It is worth recalling, however, that not very many years ago the major sources of external funds for development activities did not consider education to be a developmental activity. Development in that understanding had to do with directly productive projects. Cattle dips, poultry farms, seed nurseries, and artisan's workshops were deemed appropriate uses for development assistance, but not schools or literacy classes. The widespread acceptance of human capital theory has now relocated at least basic education within that understanding of development, but the lesson remains clear. By counterposing production and distribution, that perspective on development requires a choice between growth and equity and explicitly assigns the higher priority to growth. When it is used in that way, the term *development* can be employed as a filter for foreign assistance to exclude programs that seek to mobilize the populace, to inform and energize democratic participation, to challenge racism and sexism, to enfranchise and empower the poor, and more generally to transform the structure of power and patterns of social relationships.

In short, development and challenging and resisting apartheid and its legacies are a common struggle, not alternatives. And the determination of what is developmental must itself be the result of an organic process rooted in specific settings, not specification by appropriately certified experts.

2.2 WORDS MATTER

A careful and sensitive review of education in South Africa regularly trips over differences in how understandings and activities are described. Often, those differences turn out to be substantive and not simply semantic.

Capacity Building As we have noted above, the catchy phrase "from anti-apartheid to development" is both seductive and deceptive. So, too, is the term "capacity building." After all, on what grounds could anyone oppose the development of South Africans' capacity to chart and reach their desired future? Yet the transition from *organizational development* to *capacity building*, however subtle and inconsequential it may initially appear, carries great significance for those whose efforts, often at great personal risk, have enabled community organizations to play a central role in challenging minority rule.

On the South African ground, *organizational development* is a primary responsibility for all participants in the democratic movement. Community organizations must extend their reach to include new participants, renew and reinforce their connections with their membership, and institutionalize responsiveness and accountability.

Although these two terms, capacity building and organizational development, might be used synonymously, *capacity building* has come to focus less on the links between a community organization and its base and more on the ability of the organization's staff to keep records and maintain accounts. Community activists do of course need to be able to prepare budgets and manage money. But from their perspective, to focus on those skills in a generic manner, with little or no attention to organizational context, risks undermining rather than strengthening the organization's principal purpose—say, literacy, or tenants' rights, or school management and oversight—and even the commitment to non-racial, non-sexist, democratic governance within the organization.

Hence, when we refer to capacity building, we do not limit our attention to the technical skills that contribute to effective and efficient organizations. The capacities to be developed must also include those required for democratic governance and accountability, empowering the membership, and challenging racism and sexism both within and outside the organization.

Non-Governmental Organization A parallel shift in terminology is manifested in the widespread use of the terms non-governmental organization (NGO) and more recently, community based organization (CBO). Previously, within the democratic movement it was more common to refer to service organizations and to community, mass based, and popular organizations. At first glance, these too may seem to be inconsequential changes. In practice, however, they reflect both the influence of the external agencies in specifying the terms and constructs used to characterize the South African situation and pressure to depoliticize activist groups. For many community workers, adopting NGO as the preferred descriptor undermines the critical and militant orientation of their organizations and presupposes an uncritical relationship with government.

Integration A rather more subtle transition in terminology is reflected in references to race. Historically, the South African democratic movement has advocated a policy of non-racialism. In South Africa, as elsewhere in Africa, those in power have sought to combat the demand for a non-racial society by proposing multi-racialism. Once they can show that the students or teachers in a particular school include people from different groups, for example, they claim to have achieved their objective. Yet in that school race might well continue to play an important, though perhaps not readily visible, role in student selection or promotion or in assignment of responsibilities to teachers. The school might thus be integrated but not non-racial. For that, along with integration an explicitly anti-racist program is needed.

We make this point here because we find that in many of the documents we have reviewed, especially those prepared or commissioned by the external agencies, initial steps toward integration are assumed to have achieved the goal of non-racialism. Racial integration—multi-racialism—is, quite simply, not the same as non-racialism. And until non-racialism has been accomplished, anti-racism must remain on the education agenda.

Historically Black Consider too the common references to the "historically black universities" of South Africa. From the perspective of multi-racialism, the blackness of those institutions is biological. Designed to accommodate students officially classified as African or Coloured or Indian, those universities now admit all South Africans. Hence, they are "historically black," meaning that although they were intended to enroll black students, they now have fair-skinned students. From the perspective of non-racialism, however, the blackness of those institutions has to do more with society than with biology. They were designed to be derivative and inferior responses to broad demands for access to white institutions. In this sense, that at least some of them are now partially integrated does not make them less black. They will continue to be "black" and not solely "historically black" until discriminatory patterns of higher education have been discredited and, until [illegible] of [illegible], a principal means of [illegible] South African society.

Since many of these issues have become [illegible] of negotiation. At the same time, we recognize that [illegible] are themselves contested terrain, reflecting relationships of power as well as changes in reality.

3: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION

3.1 SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION TO 1993

In our earlier report we described the key features that characterised education until the end of 1993. In short, we described these as a combination of several events and processes:

- struggle and conflict between proponents and opponents of apartheid education
- continuing crises afflicting all educational subsectors
- perennial, tortuous, interrupted, but incomplete education negotiations
- unilateral reform [illegible] by the apartheid government and [illegible] in apartheid education, as reflected in access, content, pedagogy, facilities, and staffing
- the emergence and consolidation of an anti-apartheid education coalition, initially within and around the National Education Co-ordinating Committee (NECC), and subsequently within and around the ANC Education Department, the National Education Conference (NEC), and the National Education and Training Forum (NETF), through which this movement sought to assert its politics and hegemony
- contestation over education policy frameworks and strategies between the democratic movement as characterised in the emergence and evolution of the NECC initiated National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI), and the ANC initiated Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD) and its A Policy Framework for Education and Training and Implementation Plan for Education and Training (IPET), and the apartheid state, as characterised in its Education Renewal Strategy (I and II) and A Curriculum Model for Education in South Africa
- the evolution of alternative, small-scale progressive people's education projects, adult education and literacy programs initiated by the NECC, and several hundred local community based organisations.

What was most remarkable about this earlier period were the dynamism, urgency, sense of purpose and popular support with which the democratic movement contested the apartheid state as it pursued the radical transformation of apartheid education.

We continue this discussion by describing the key features and events that dominate the education sector in the current period, a period which we understand to be one of a contested transition to a non-racist, non-sexist, democratic education. These are:

- a changing center of gravity in education within the democratic movement
- a perceived impasse in the education transformation project of the democratic movement

- continuity of the old education system and management
- the unclear role, but continuing evolution of education policy forums
- the unfolding constitutional specification of the division of responsibility for education between national and provincial education departments
- reorganization and consolidation within the anti-apartheid education coalition, and
- the assertion but not yet the actualization of the political dominance of the ANC's *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP), *A Policy Framework for Education and Training*, and the *Implementation Plan for Education and Training*.

For this overview we rely on our own experiences and research, on our interviews and discussions, and on the documents we have reviewed. The quarterly reviews of education, commissioned by SIDA and prepared by the Education Policy Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand, offer both current, detailed information on events, institutions, and people, and useful insights. To minimize disruptions in the presentation, we do not cite documents directly.

3.2 MUDDY WATERS

In our initial report, we likened the education policy process to a swirling river, with a main current and several eddies and cross currents. While for the present that metaphor continues to be appropriate, the river has become even muddier than it appeared a year ago.

The central issues, of course, are who will set education policy and how. We shall address the education policy process more fully below in Section 5.1.3. Here, it is important to recognize three sharply divergent pre-election perspectives on what was likely to happen once the new government took power. Anticipating a clear majority, the educationists within ANC, its electoral allies, and the democratic movement more generally assumed that once their representatives assumed office, they would make the key decisions. In short order, the basic principles of the ANC's guiding document, *A Policy Framework for Education and Training*, would be adopted, and the new minister and senior officials would look to the ANC Education Department and the CEPD for guidance on how to proceed. With that expectation, the CEPD oversaw its own sequel to the earlier National Policy Investigation. Task groups were quickly assembled, papers written, and a series of documents, termed implementation plans, were prepared to hand to the new education leadership.

The education establishment, however, lodged primarily in the Department of National Education and the Department of Education and Training, though unsure about what exactly would occur after the election, assumed it would be needed, and therefore, central for some time to come. Its own efforts to guide the transition took the form of initial steps toward integrating the multiple education authorities and the preparation of reform education policy and curriculum documents. The Education Co-ordination Service would develop the architecture and perhaps itself become the model for a single national ministry of education. The *Education Renewal Strategy* and *Curriculum Model for South Africa* would serve as guides to implementation.

Some educators within the democratic movement and the education establishment, and some associated with neither, expected negotiation to play a much greater role after the April elections. Indeed, the ANC itself had outlined this path, in part by announcing well before the elections that it anticipated becoming not the government but the leading party in a government of national unity. The ANC also actively supported a slew of negotiating forums that were intended to include representatives from all corners of South African society. On the eve of the election, the ANC proved willing to negotiate even constitutional and electoral arrangements to secure the participation of the Inkatha Freedom Party. From this perspective, neither the ANC nor the education establishment would have its way. Instead, each major policy would have to be broadly debated and negotiated. Both those committed to radical transformation and those opposed to nearly all changes would have to concede and compromise, the radical transformers to make any progress at all and the radical resisters to avoid reaching the sort of impasse that would permit the majority to sweep them aside.

As of late 1994, the course of the river has not changed much. Let us explore why not, and what that portends for the future.

3.3 THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT AND THE ELUSIVENESS OF STATE POWER

3.3.1 The Changing Center of Gravity

Despite nearly two decades of opposition and several years of critical analysis and lengthy plans, the democratic movement seemed unprepared to seize the initiative under the new government of national unity. Having analyzed what was wrong with apartheid education and debated a good deal about what should replace it, the democratic movement turned out to have devoted surprisingly little attention to how to get there. It proved to be especially poorly prepared to deal with a situation in which its allies were formally in power but in practice still negotiating for control. In large part, that reflected a shift within the democratic movement from an emphasis on politics to an emphasis on plans.

Student uprisings in the mid 1970s—prompted by apartheid state education reforms that among others sought to institutionalize Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in African schools and continuing into the early 1980s as a formidable opposition to Bantu Education seized the initiative in education away from the apartheid state. But critical as these were, they were unable to set and lead a new agenda for transform education. It was not until the formation of the National Education Crisis (now Co-ordinating) Committee (the NECC) in 1985, a student teacher-parent led anti-apartheid education movement that held popular legitimacy through its rootedness in local communities, that this protest became focused, co-ordinated and directed at the establishment of an alternative, democratic, critical, empowering, non-racist, and non-sexist education. The NECC thus became the political center of a national initiative to chart a new education agenda, and at least for a while, the NECC was expected to become a shadow education ministry. At the same time, the ANC Education Department in Lusaka, Zambia, was mostly concerned with the education of exiles, primarily ANC cadres, but also others, and was apparently less focused on the development of post-apartheid education policy.

The unbanning in 1990 of the ANC and other organizations, including the NECC and several student, teacher and youth organizations active in education struggles, opened a new and vigorous phase of policy development for a democratic South Africa. It is also during this phase that the ANC under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo formally entered into political and constitutional negotiations with the apartheid regime. There were two important consequences of this process,

First, the ANC increasingly assumed the leading role. Until 1990 the internal Mass Democratic Movement, including the United Democratic Front (UDF), the NECC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) held the initiative and led the anti-apartheid opposition. Once it was unbanned, the ANC became the election, the ANC proved willing to negotiate even constitutional and electoral arrangements to secure the participation of the Inkatha Freedom Party. From this perspective, neither the ANC nor the education establishment would have its way. Instead, each major policy would have to be broadly debated and negotiated. Both those committed to radical transformation and those opposed to nearly all changes would have to concede and compromise, the radical transformers to make any progress at all and the radical resisters to avoid reaching the sort of impasse that would permit the majority to sweep them aside.

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Student uprisings in the mid 1970s—prompted by apartheid state education reforms that among others sought to institutionalize Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in African schools—and continuing into the early 1980s as a formidable opposition to Bantu Education seized the initiative in education away from the apartheid state. But critical as these were, they were unable to set and lead a new agenda for transform education. It was not until the formation of the National Education Crisis (now Co-ordinating) Committee (the NECC) in 1985, a student-teacher-parent led anti-apartheid education movement that held popular legitimacy through its rootedness in local communities, that this protest became focused, co-ordinated and directed at the establishment of an alternative, democratic, critical, empowering, non-racist, and non-sexist education. The NECC thus became the political center of a national initiative to chart a new education agenda, and at least for a while, the NECC was expected to become a shadow education ministry. At the same time, the ANC Education Department in Lusaka, Zambia, was mostly concerned with the education of exiles, primarily ANC cadres, but also others, and was apparently less focused on the development of post-apartheid education policy.

The unbanning in 1990 of the ANC and other organizations, including the NECC and several student, teacher and youth organizations active in education struggles, opened a new and vigorous phase of policy development for a democratic South Africa. It is also during this phase that the ANC under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo formally entered into political and constitutional negotiations with the apartheid regime. There were two important consequences of this process,

First, the ANC increasingly assumed the leading role. Until 1990 the internal Mass Democratic Movement, including the United Democratic Front (UDF), the NECC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) held the initiative and led the anti-apartheid opposition. Once it was unbanned, the ANC became the central point of reference, often taking on directly the roles and tasks of organizations the Mass Democratic Movement (for example, the UDF and SAYCO). The political center of gravity thus shifted effectively away from the internal movements to the ANC, itself partly rooted within the country and partly returned from exile. Exceptions to this trend were the labor and the local government sectors, where respectively COSATU and the local civic associations (later to amalgamate into the South African National Civic Congress, SANCO) maintained leadership and initiative. While in education the NECC and its allied organisations continued their work and appeared not to hand over the leadership and initiating role to the ANC Education Department, in practice their leadership and initiating role declined. Indeed, their active participation in building the new ANC Education Department contributed to the transfer of NECC legitimacy and authority to it.

Second, the principal focus of attention shifted from mobilization to planning. Until 1990, most of the democratic movement's efforts were directed at vigorous anti-apartheid protest and opposition and building a grassroots, popular, and democratic movement. Although some effort was directed at developing transformative political, social, and economic policies, the period since has seen the emergence of a vigorous process of policy development for a democratic, non-racist, and non-sexist South Africa. That transition was particularly clear at and after the appointment of John Samuel, whose background lay more in education policy and administration than in political mobilization, as ANC Director of Education. Quickly the focus shifted substantially in the direction of policy development, particularly after the ANC established the Centre for Education Policy Development in 1993.

In effect, the ANC Education Department subsumed two sets of activities. The NECC had by the end of 1990 launched its own National Education Policy Investigation, and had momentarily (1990-1992) assumed the national role of an independent mass based education policy center. By 1993, however, the center of gravity of education policy development had shifted toward the ANC Education Department. As well, with the establishment of the ANC Education Department inside South Africa and the appointment of its new head, the ANC Education Department officials who returned from Lusaka—then still largely focused on the education of exiles—became less central in the development of ANC education policy and in the activities of the ANC Education Department more generally. It is at this point that the ANC Education Department and the Centre for Education Policy Development displaced the NECC as a shadow education ministry, with both the senior official (John Samuel) and some support personnel of both organizations waiting to assume government posts following the election.

This shift in the centre of gravity within the democratic movement did not result from confrontation between opposing camps of activist-educators and planner-educators. Rather, it unfolded as the appropriate course of action given the widespread assumptions about what would happen after the majority rule election. Apartheid was in its terminal phase. It was essential, therefore, to shift attention from mobilizing against it to preparing for what was to follow. Indeed, to fail to plan for post-apartheid education would leave the initiative in the hands of the education establishment, the creators and maintainers of apartheid education.

3.3.2 Reorganization and Consolidation

As we have noted, the assumption of power did not occur as the democratic movement expected. The situation is both too complex and changing too rapidly for us to analyze it in detail here. Accordingly, we limit our attention to the major factors in what we consider a stalled transition from apartheid to post-apartheid education.

First, Sibusiso Bhengu, the new Minister of Education, was drawn neither from the ANC's core leadership nor from among the militant education activists. The former rector of the University of Fort Hare, he had not been centrally involved in the earlier education mobilization, the NEPI debates, the creation of the CEPD, and the preparation of the two key orienting documents, *A Policy Framework* and the human resources development section of *The Reconstruction and Development Programme*. That he fell ill not long after he assumed office made it even more difficult for the new minister to assert a quick initiative and set a clear political direction.

Second, the appointment of education's senior civil servant was shrouded in mystery and confusion. Widely expected to be named the education ministry's Director-General and apparently the new minister's initial choice was the ANC's Director of Education. While that appointment could have provided direct continuity with NEPI, the CEPD, IPET, and other preparatory work, it was apparently sharply criticized within the ANC, the new minister's transitional advisory group, and the ANC parliamentary education group. Perceiving his political support and thus his effectiveness weakened, the ANC's Director of Education effectively withdrew from active participation in the transitional process. Though widely identified in the press as the Director-General designate, the eventual appointee was not confirmed in his position until the beginning of August. Chabane Manganyi, former rector of the University of the North and Director of the Joint Education Trust, was thus unable to assume direct authority during the minister's illness. Indeed, for a brief period an official of the Department of Education and Training (DET) became the Acting Director-General of both the DET and the new Ministry of Education. Like the minister, Manganyi had not been centrally involved in the development of the ANC's *Policy Framework*, the ANC/CEPD implementation plans, or the *RDP* human resources chapter.

Hence, it remains to be seen to what extent these policy and implementation documents together with the personnel who had developed them would be central to the education strategy of the new Minister and Director-General. Note, too, that both new senior officials have backgrounds in higher education. Most of the work within the democratic movement on the education agenda for post-apartheid South Africa, however, has focused on basic education, adult education, a national qualification scheme to integrate education and training, and preschool education. It is too soon to gauge whether or not the new leaders own backgrounds will influence those priorities.

These events also leave unclear the roles of the ANC Education Department and the CEPD, as well as of the NECC and its allied organizations, in the evolution of the new education ministry and its policies. Will the new leaders rely on the CEPD and its policy documents? Will they seek to rejuvenate grassroots participation through the popular democratic mass organizations? Or will they seek advice and political support elsewhere? And how will provincial ministers and departments of education relate to the ANC, the CEPD, and the NECC and its allied organizations?

Third, the conservative, white-dominated public servants' organizations and several former white directors-general have launched an open challenge to the ANC's effort to transform a white-led bureaucracy that implemented apartheid into an administration that is democratic, transparent in its operations, and committed the implementation of the goals of the *Reconstruction and Development Programme*. We expect this battle over the leadership within the bureaucracy as well as its overall transformation to be protracted, perhaps lasting the entire life of the Government of National Unity. This situation clearly calls for an overall strategy that identifies key intervention points within the bureaucracy and that incorporates, in increasingly large numbers, those within the democratic movement and in the wider South African society who are politically and technically equipped to advance the goals of the RDP.

Fourth, an apparently very narrow and restrictive interpretation of the provisions of the interim constitution regarding the public service has dramatically delayed the appointment of new senior civil servants. It was widely assumed that as in most other countries the new ministers and other political appointees would select their own senior staff persons. In practice, however, all ministers have found it difficult to designate their own professional advisors and assistants. Although a few, not including education, have ignored the formal obstacles and made their own appointments, most have found their assumption of office severely circumscribed by their inability, at least in the short term, to displace or replace the apartheid bureaucracy. Even the appointment of a transitional advisory team has proved to be problematic. In education, we were told, the new minister was criticized for designating his own strategic management team. In practice, apparently most members of that team were obliged to retain their former positions in order to continue to be paid. Clearly, however, setting in motion the process that will formally dismantle apartheid education cannot be the responsibility of unpaid volunteers, part time personnel, or a borrowed staff. As several of our interviewees commented, "through the elections we may have taken political power, but they [the entrenched civil servants] still have state power."

Fifth, the national leadership's apparent acquiescence in this narrow interpretation, emanating from the Public Service Commission and, it was reported, the Ministry of Public Service Administration, suggests the absence of a carefully prepared personnel strategy on the part of the ANC and the democratic movement more broadly. As they assumed office the new leaders might have carried with them a clear sense of which officials were to be replaced immediately, who was to be reassigned, and who was to take their places. Apparently, they did not. And as we have noted, the situation in education was further troubled by the complications of the designation of the senior officials.

Sixth, the implementation plans prepared to guide the new education leadership may have become so extensive and so detailed—the combined *Implementation Plan for Education and Training* runs to more than 400 pages—that they were not immediately useful. As a former minister of education in Zimbabwe stressed, a new leadership needs a very few, very high priority targets for immediate action. There was as well a further complication in this regard. Rooted in extensive preparatory work, most of the implementation plans assumed that education would be managed by a strong, integrated, national ministry. Consequently, most do not address fully the needs and structure of an education system where primary authority lies at the provincial level.

One interpretation of this situation is that at least in the short term the apartheid bureaucracy has effectively been revitalized by the way appointments have been handled and particularly by the absence of a clear strategy for taking control of the bureaucracy. One consequence is that education, which has for so long been the center of public focus and the anti-apartheid struggle, is for now hardly visible in the national agenda. Whereas the period before the national elections was marked by the energy, dynamism, populism, and urgency of the education democratic movement, the post-election period is remarkable for its uncertainty and the absence of a visible, energetic, and purposive leadership.

We referred earlier to a shifting center of gravity within the democratic movement. As we have noted, the events of the immediate post-election period suggest that those shifts have not to date facilitated the assumption of authority and the transformation of apartheid education. Indeed, the democratic movement may find that it has de-emphasized consultation and mobilization without achieving the desired goal: the development of concrete plans and programs needed to replace apartheid education and the ability to implement them. What we have termed a stalled transition risks becoming a stalled transformation.

For the present, open conflict in education—a key feature of the education system up to the national elections—has remained at a minimum. We believe that this situation, the absence of open and protracted conflict in the education sector, is unlikely to continue in the absence of dramatic and substantial change to the apartheid education system.

3.4 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

In our initial report we reviewed the formal division of authority for education under apartheid among multiple, racially differentiated departments and the practical control over most decisions and resources by departments directly controlled by whites. We noted as well the government's efforts to control the trajectory of education reform as it anticipated the transition to majority rule. As the transitional election approached, even the government recognized the importance of creating a single national education ministry. Its effort to control that consolidation led to the establishment of the Education Co-ordinating Service.

Significant compromises made during the drafting of the Interim Constitution, however, will have a dramatic impact on the governance of education. The Interim Constitution specifies a two-tier national and provincial system of governance, with the possibility of a third tier at the local level.

Schedule 6 of the Interim Constitution, "Legislative Competences of Provinces," includes

> Education at all levels, excluding university and technikon education.

That is, notwithstanding the earlier expectation that the multiple education authorities would be integrated into a strong national ministry, with the exception of universities and technikons, education has become the responsibility the nine provinces.

Section XXI of Schedule 4 of the Interim Constitution, which lists 33 basic constitutional principles, indicates that the national government will have responsibility for establishing minimum standards, administering national finances, and assuring uniformity across the country as a whole. It also provides that

> The level at which decisions can be taken most effectively in respect of the quality and rendering of services, shall be the level responsible and accountable for the quality and the rendering of the services . . . . [§XXI.1]

Implementing that principle, the Interim Constitution specifies that where a national and provincial law are consistent, both apply, but where they are inconsistent, provincial law will apply over an Act of Parliament, except for matters that "cannot be regulated effectively by provincial legislation," for matters that to be performed effectively, require "uniform norms and standards that apply generally throughout the Republic," where "it is necessary to set minimum standards across the nation for rendering public services," where "it is necessary for the determination of national economic policies, the maintenance of economic unity, the protection of the environment, the promotion of inter-provincial commerce, the protection of the common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital or labour, or the maintenance of national security," and where "the provincial law materially prejudices the economic, health or security interests of another province or the country as a whole" [§126.(3)]

A subsequent section (§247) of the Interim Constitution, titled "Special provisions regarding existing educational institutions," further constrains the government's authority in education.

> (1) The national government and the provincial governments . . . shall not alter the rights, powers and functions of the governing bodies, management councils or similar authorities of departmental, community managed or state aided primary or secondary schools under laws existing immediately before the commencement of this Constitution unless an agreement resulting from *bona fide* negotiation has been reached with such bodies . . . .
> (2) The national government shall not alter the rights, powers and functions of the controlling bodies of universities and technikons under laws existing immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, unless agreement resulting from *bona fide* negotiation has been reached with such bodies . . . .
> (4) In order to ensure an acceptable quality of education, the responsible government shall provide funds to departmental, community-managed or state aided primary or secondary schools on an equitable basis.

In short, provinces are responsible for nearly all of education, provincial legislation is generally to take precedence over national legislation, and the government is obliged to negotiate changes to institutions that have their own governing bodies (including universities, technikons, and the schools granted some autonomy during apartheid's terminal phase in an effort to entrench white privilege and control). Although the Interim Constitution does envision circumstances in which the national government will assert its authority, its language also facilitates challenges to that authority in the Constitutional Court.

Quite simply, no one yet knows how all this will work. Like the civil service obstacles to new appointments discussed above, the ANC and the democratic movement seem to have been unprepared to deal effectively with the restrictions on the authority they thought they would have once they assumed power.

For the present, a National Council of Education Ministers under the leadership of the Minister of National Education has been established. Yet as of August, the proclamation to empower the provincial ministries of education, to dissolve, unite, and integrate the multiple apartheid education departments, and to reallocate their responsibilities, resources, and personnel to the appropriate national and provincial education authorities had not yet been issued. The transformation of the old and the transition to the new education system is thus occurring at a much slower pace than originally anticipated. As that occurs, the existing apartheid education departments continue to exist, manage, and control education systems and budgets. This seems likely to be the case, at least until early 1995. For now then, provincial ministers of education who seek the quick transformation of apartheid education rely on their own willingness to move things along, but also on the willingness of the old apartheid bureaucrats to take direction from them.

We shall note below differing interpretations of who has authority over what in education. The actual locus of authority may well be determined more by practice than by constitutional or legislative provisions. Certainly that determination will be contested.

3.6 THE EVOLUTION OF EDUCATION POLICY FORUMS

The period since the opening of political and constitutional negotiations in 1990 has seen a continuing, though diminished, role for the NECC, but also the establishment of several new actors and education policy forums. In our earlier report we described specifically the historical evolution of ANC Education Department inside South Africa. We also reported on the creation of the Education Delegation and the Joint Working Group on Education (JWGE) under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk, the National Education Conference, and the National Education and Training Forum. We also reported on the leadership of the ANC-NECC education alliance in the creation of these policy forums and on the conclusion of the work of the Education Delegation and the JWGE and its dissolution into the National Education Conference. Here we review the evolution of the National Education Conference and the National Education and Training Forum.

Several questions guide this consideration of these education policy centers. How successfully have they coordinated a broad alliance of actors in the education opposition? How have they sought to incorporate regional and local constituencies? To what extent have these forums involved and facilitated mass participation? To what extent have they legitimized mass organizations and mass struggles, as well as national policy negotiations? How effective were they in laying the foundation for the assumption of power by the ANC and its allies?

3.6.1 The National Education Conference

To recall, the NEC was established to consolidate a broad anti-apartheid education coalition beyond the ANC-NECC education alliance, with the intent of presenting a wider challenge to the apartheid government and apartheid education. The principles that bound together these movements were their common commitment to establish a non-racial, non-sexist, people-based, democratic education system. In its evolution the NEC added to these principles, (1) a common commitment to establish an integrated, multiple path, accessible lifelong education, (2) the development by parents, teachers and students of a code of conduct to govern practices in educational institutions, specifically directed at regulating student boycotts and teacher strikes, seen then by some NEC participants to be primary contributors to the "decline in a culture of learning and teaching in schools," and, arising from that, (3) the development of a supportive culture within educational institutions to encourage learning and teaching.

In order to assess its achievements and map the way forward, participants in the NEC held a national workshop in July, 1993. This workshop was of a lower profile than the NEC's founding conference. Following criticism, especially from the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), about the NEC's "unilateral interventionist role," which SADTU claimed had scant regard for the conditions of service of teachers, and the NEC's lack of contact with regional and local grassroots educational constituencies, the NEC resolved to establish regional structures and a visible secretariat. However, these recommendations were never completely implemented and in practice evaded rather than addressed much of SADTU's criticism of the NEC. The NECC and its allies attribute most of the failure of the NEC to realize its potential to the apparent lack of commitment on the part of movements such as the black consciousness Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) and the conservative National Association of Professional Teachers Organisations of South Africa (NAPTOSA). The former was deemed to lack the internal organizational capacity to play a full role in the NEC, while the latter was perceived to be more concerned with denouncing what it termed the "disruptive campaigns" of its rival SADTU than in consolidating a broader alliance within the NEC. Also, SADTU considered the NEC "an ineffectual and powerless forum" that seemed to have little impact on government or education constituencies. Thus, individual member organizational factors combined with the NEC's own failure to evolve into a dynamic, grassroots based movement limited its role and impact in the education sector.

But what future role for the NEC? The NECC regards the NEC as having failed to realize its potential and as having an unclear future. We were told that the only remaining role that the NEC could play was in the further development and implementation of the code of conduct for educational institutions. However, even here there has been sharp criticism of the manner in which the NEC code of conduct was being defined. That code of conduct, it has been charged, has been developed away from, rather than within educational institutions. Equally important, it has been argued, the code of conduct had been established more to stop activism in the education sector, and to cripple grassroots based struggles, rather than to build democratic and disciplined grassroots and institution based alliances among educators, students and parents. But for even for this obstacle to be overcome and the NEC to be revitalized, recasting the role of the NEC will be required. In the post-election period, though, agreements between the founding organizations may be difficult to reach. As one observer pointed out to us, agreements were possible before the elections largely because of the common commitment of NEC participants to the elimination of the political structures of apartheid education. What is to be its role once the opponents to apartheid have assumed office? In any event, in the current period the NEC has not appeared as a leading contestant in the education stakes. In fact, the NEC has been remarkably silent both in terms of its own internal processes, and in terms of the national and provincial educational events.

3.5.2 The National Education and Training Forum

To recall, South Africa's transition to majority rule was preceded by the establishment of several major negotiating forums. Among them, the NETF was initiated by the ANC-NECC education alliance as a broad-based transitional forum with the primary intent of stopping unilateral and preemptive government reforms of education. The NETF was thus created to change education practices and to extend the influence of the ANC-NECC alliance and of the much broader NEC. To this end, government education departments and the private sector were invited to join the participant organizations of the National Education Conference to establish the NETF. Collectively these participants identified three mission aims for itself: to resolve immediate crises through active interventions, to transform the existing segregated education system into an acceptable unified national system, and to develop the policy framework for an integrated national education and training system. For the achievement of these goals, the NETF relied on the willingness of both the apartheid government and the nineteen apartheid education bureaucracies to implement the NETF's decisions. The NETF identified five areas for active intervention: (1) ensuring that schools would open and function normally in 1994, (2) restructuring the existing education system, (3) reforming the curriculum, (4) modifying the financing and budgeting system, and (5) reorganizing the civil service. The NETF was organized in three levels: first, a plenary structure involving all 26 of its participants; second, an executive committee consisting of representatives from the business sector, the state, the NEC, organized labor, teacher organizations, the Committee of University Principals, the Committee of Technikon Principals, college rectors, and staff and union associations from the tertiary education organizations; and third, working groups and sub-groups. One group was charged to deal with immediate crisis matters, and included sub-groups concerned with textbooks, rationalization of teachers, overcrowding in schools, the provision of bursaries and loans in tertiary education, and teaching and learning in schools. A second group focused on restructuring the education and training system, with sub-groups dealing with curriculum, finance and the budget, and the reorganizing the civil service. A third group provided liaison with the *Education Co-ordination Service*, the agency responsible for overseeing the state's effort to reform the 19 education bureaucracies.

Like the NEC, the NETF has experienced serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate. Dwindling participation, inadequate participant organizational commitment, absence of a coherent approach to ensure that organizational inputs are coordinated, disagreements over the proposed lifespan, and an unclear general vision have all contributed to the declining influence and role of the NETF. Strikingly, the June 1994 plenary meeting of the NETF was never held. Like the NEC, the future role of the NETF remains unclear. Several founding participants, most notably the several apartheid education departments, are now in the process of being dissolved. The creation of an advisory structure to the new education ministry, similar to the NETF, is now planned. Participants in the NETF point though to the establishment of the curriculum and textbook sub-groups as one of few major achievements of the NETF. The curriculum sub-group is responsible for considering medium and long-term curriculum reform, while the textbook sub-group is responsible for reviewing textbooks and specifying necessary revisions. This sub-group is also responsible for developing interim supplementary course materials.

We found that while several participants in the NETF were unclear about the future of the NETF. They agreed, however, that the NETF ought to be replaced by an inclusive national education council with a clearer definition of its role, participants, operating procedures, and relationships with national and provincial education ministries and administrations. Others argue that the NETF could itself become such a council.

Several participants expressed concern about the current role of the NETF. A major part of its founding rationale, they stressed, had been to provide a setting where democratic forces could hold the state accountable and insist that its practices be clearly visible to all concerned. Instead, it is becoming a forum to legitimize the white dominated apartheid bureaucracy and its apartheid education policy papers, especially the successive versions of *The Education Renewal Strategy* and the *Curriculum Model for South Africa*. That is, since the old administration is now the new administration, it can present its policies to the NETF as the policies of the new government and seek their approval on that basis. Strengthening those initiatives, we were told, is the inability of some member organizations of the NEC, particularly the NECC and its alliance members, to keep pace. Specifically, these mass organizations lack the policy capacity to consistently counter and stay ahead of the old education establishment that can rely on the vast infrastructure of the government to stay ahead.

Thus, even though the democratic movement took the lead in setting up both the NEC and subsequently the NETF, it has apparently been unable to sustain a coherent program and intervention strategy to maintain its initial political leading role in these forums. As the NEC disintegrates, the NETF is slipping into the sphere of the education bureaucracy that to date remains largely staffed and dominated the whites who administered apartheid education.

3.5.3 National Policy Forums and Mass Organizations

It is important to understand the purpose for and the historical context within which these structures emerged. Within that, it is also important to recognize that their very creation has removed some of the leadership, political legitimacy, and authority from mass organizations. New national structures, such as the Education Delegation and the *Joint Working Group on Education* (1990), the NEC (1992), and NETF (1993) came into existence somewhat at the expense of grassroots structures. Hence, several key characteristics of the earlier period—

especially, building and consolidating mass organizations and deepening accountability to membership through regular reporting and renewal of leadership mandates—have declined in importance. Though unintended, this process continues. The creation of NEPI and the preparation of the ANC's policy framework have exacerbated this development. A technocratic process of policy making and crisis resolution—through the NEC, NETF, NEPI, policy framework, and IPET, along with myriad national large-scale NGO initiatives such as the Joint Education Trust (JET) and the Independent Development Trust (IDT), which is not even marginally accountable to the democratic education movement—assumed legitimacy at the expense of grassroots movements. The NECC points to the constitutional negotiations on provincial powers as an example of the ascendence of large national organizations over small community groups. Here, the political players reached agreement on the distribution of powers between national and provisional government apparently with little attention to its impact on education and struggles to transform and direct it. Schooling thus became the responsibility of provincial government without the participation of the education constituency in that decision.

The political environment for the education transition is also problematic for the democratic movement. The pressure for a quick-fix and visible action on the RDP may result in a technocratic solutions-based approach replacing a participatory and transparent means-ends approach. This in turn further reinforces the prevalent technocratic orientation that has already compromised mass organizations and their campaigns. Approaches to addressing the RDP in the post-election period reflect this challenge to the democratic movement as it seeks to lead and direct the reconstruction and development process.

In the run-up to the national and provincial elections in April of 1994, the RDP was the principal document around which the African National Congress had mobilized popular support for its project of transforming apartheid South Africa into a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic society through a transparent and people-driven process. The document's popular appeal was based both on its promise of radically improved living conditions and some land and economic redistribution and on the critical values that were principal elements in the anti-apartheid struggle: people-centeredness, transparency, non-racialism, non-sexism, and democracy. Thus, in the run-up to the elections the RDP was, like the Freedom Charter, a document owned by the people through both their mass based organizations and the promise of the RDP for a better and meaningful life. The transformation of South Africa was in the vision of the RDP to be achieved by the masses through their grassroots organizations rather than solely through the technical expertise of professionals employed by the government. In this manner the RDP was to remain a living document in the possession of the people, and the bureaucracy, however reconstituted, would be held accountable to the populace. As well, the *RDP* was a document that emanated not solely from the African National Congress. The back cover of the *RDP* shows the photographs of the presidents and chairpersons of the principal partners in the drafting of the *RDP*, the African National Congress, COSATU, the South African Communist Party, the South African National Civic Congress, and the National Education Co-ordinating Committee, thereby confirming the introductory statement of the ANC's president that the RDP was the outcome of lengthy consultation among the ANC, its alliance partners, and several mass organizations.

How, then, is the RDP to be taken forward and implemented in the post-election period? We have encountered several views in our discussions with members of parliament, the education bureaucracy, mass organizations, provincial ministers and their officials, and university based educators. Clearly, a significant challenge in the post-election period for the drafters of the RDP is how to ensure that the RDP remains a genuine mechanism that enables the democratic movement to lead and guide the post-apartheid reconstruction. There have already been and will continue to be efforts to attack and subvert the RDP. The South African press widely reported an initial attempt to distort and undermine the RDP by several officials of the

Development Bank of South Africa, an institution expected to play a major role in implementing it. At least as great a danger for the democratic movement is the dilution of the RDP as it is captured by forces opposed to fundamental change. That is likely to take the form not of outright opposition to the RDP but rather efforts to interpret and reshape it, thereby detaching it from the dynamism that has characterized its genesis and dissemination.

Note here the differing perspectives on the status of the RDP following the election. Since the RDP was the election manifesto of the victorious party, some expected the RDP to become government policy. But since what has taken office is not a government of the ANC and its allies but a government of national unity, the RDP must be integrated into a policy that reflects the interests of the other parties that share power. The process for achieving that is the preparation of a government white paper on the reconstruction and development programme.

Here, then, is a setting in which the major elements of the RDP can be diluted and diverted with the outcome ultimately sanctioned by government and therefore by the ANC itself. As in its original drafting, the process may heavily influence the content. The mass organizations that have been fundamental to the life of the RDP may find themselves marginalized as experts and bureaucrats do the drafting. If so, then the progressive commitments of the RDP may be neutralized by those charged to draft it, interpret it, write its legislation, implement its provisions, and eventually evaluate and revise it.

Yet another challenge to the RDP will take the form of attempts to use its authority to legitimize activities that may have little to do with the RDP's major issues. Similarly, since nearly every undertaking in majority rule South Africa can be characterized as contributing to reconstruction and development, funds designated for implementing the RDP risk losing a coherent focus. Several education officials explained to us, for example, that they expected to finance what would normally be considered core activities from RDP funds. In this interpretation, proposals for more teaching staff, more classrooms, more textbooks, adult education activities, and early childhood care and development programs and the like are to be presented to the RDP office for funding. Presumably, that office will be blamed if the proposed expansions do not occur. In this interpretation, as the RDP becomes a source for purchasing textbooks, it risks losing its role as a vehicle for transforming apartheid education through mass participation and popular access and control. That is especially problematic as literally hundreds of leaders of the democratic movement have assumed positions in government. The dynamism and robustness of South Africa's civil society, a principal feature of the anti-apartheid struggle and a foundation for South African democracy, may be difficult to reestablish.

We have surveyed the current situation of the RDP as a window onto the broader transition in South Africa. That the content and process of the RDP are being challenged is not itself problematic. And surely it is a step forward that leaders of the democratic movement have assumed government responsibilities. At the same time, the immediate post-election RDP experience is a reminder that constructing a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic society is not simply a matter of handing policy statements over to government officials to implement. Rather, that transformation requires active, energetic, and sustained mass participation and dynamic, critical, and persistent popular organizations.

To conclude that mass organizations and popular participation have reached their limits and may now in the post-election period be in decline would be a mistake. The several campaigns launched in the education sector during 1993 and in the first quarter of 1994 by SADTU, the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), the South African Students Congress (SASCO), and the Union of Democratic University Staff Associations (UDUSA) are a stark reminder of the vibrancy of these organizations and of mass action. The organizational and leadership vacuum that has come with the departure of key leaders of the democratic movement into the Government of National Unity combined with the gross inequities in educational provision, access, and success and the undemocratic practices and governance which pervade the education system may facilitate the re-invigoration of mass based organizations of the democratic movement and facilitate a (re)eruption of the crises and confrontations that characterized education prior to the national elections.

3.6 WHAT DOES AN OPPOSITION DO WHEN ITS ALLIES HAVE COME TO POWER?

In the most fundamental sense, the anti-apartheid movement has won. Apartheid is being dismantled. Segregated schooling is to become ancient history. But not yet.

In this transitional setting, now that many of their leaders have become the government what are the roles of the organizations that came into existence to challenge the old order? Can they find ways to maintain their critical edge and popular advocacy? to engage their allies now in public office and hold them accountable? to press for transformation in the context of unity and reconciliation?

Mass organizations in the education sector, particularly the NECC, SADTU, and COSATU, have experienced a significant loss in membership to the national and provincial parliaments which for several resulted in a leadership gap. Earlier we described how the changing center of gravity in the democratic movement and the changing form of the policy process weakened the NECC, and perhaps to some extent SADTU. Although intended to strengthen their voices, over time the NEC and the NETF have contributed to the declining impact of many of the mass organizations in the education sector.

During our visit the NECC held a national summit to review its goals and role for the period of the government of national unity (we discuss the NECC more fully in Section 9.2). Some participants (and others outside those discussions) argued that the NECC had played its role and should now close down. While the NECC itself, together with key allies, COSAS, SADTU, SASCO, and UDUSA, were agreed on the importance of maintaining the NECC as a progressive alliance of education mass movements, clearly a good deal of work is required to re-establish the NECC's activist role and dynamic leadership. The head of the ANC's new policy unit, Cheryl Carolus, stressed the essential role of the NECC as an alliance and forum for the development of coherent education policy interventions by the democratic movement.

The evolution and role of the ANC Education Department remains for the present unclear. Significantly reduced in size, education will become, we were told, a section of the ANC's new policy unit, rather than a separate department. Its broader role is likely to be a function of (1) the evolution of the CEPD which was specifically established to provide policy support to the ANC Education Department and which effectively took on many of its responsibilities, (2) the role and influence of the strategic management team established to support the new minister of education, (3) the eventual role, authority, and impact of the ANC education parliamentary group and the National Assembly's Standing Committee on Education, and (4) the reorganization of the ANC as a whole. Several of the people with whom we spoke argued that the maintenance of a separate, independent political and policy role for the ANC is vital for supporting and sustaining the democratic forces and the democratization process inside Parliament and inside the national and provincial education ministries. At the same time, it is also apparent that the role of the ANC outside of government is itself evolving, especially since the ANC in government is not *the* government but rather must negotiate major policies with the other major parties. The challenge for the ANC outside government is to find strategies that permit it to respond to popular demands, to lead the alliance of mass organisations, and to be simultaneously critical and supportive of the ANC in power.

Inside the national parliament members of the NECC, SADTU, COSATU have together with members of the ANC constituted an education parliamentary group that forms the major block within the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Education (a total of 16 of its members). Historically, South African parliamentary standing committees have played no major independent role in drafting or revising legislation or in challenging the government. The Chair of the Standing Committee on Education, the former Director of the Education Policy Unit at the University of Natal, projects a much more active role for his committee. Already the education group has identified several goals for itself, including establishing direct accountability to the electorate and the democratic movement, active participation in the preparation of legislation, an oversight role of the Minister of Education and the civil service, and establishing a capacity to develop education policies independent of the civil service. Still in its founding stage, the education group has a long way to go to accomplish this transformation of the old legislative process. But it is likely to become a significant vehicle for national education initiatives and a key access route for the democratic movement to government and the legislative process.

The future of the several hundred education NGOs is rather less clear. On the one hand, we found that despite the hiatus in the national education leadership several local NGOs were continuing energetically to maintain their momentum and to change education practices. For these NGOs carrying out their day to day tasks were more important than a political cue from the education movement leadership and government. To be sure, they would prefer a broader enabling environment, including additional resources that would permit them to increase the scale of their work.

On the other hand, we were struck by several NGOs that seemed to be at an impasse in their work. Some expected the government to assume responsibility for their programs and were waiting for that to occur, generally with little clear sense of exactly how that would take place. Others, finding it both essential and difficult to increase the scale of their programs in the absence of government funding, seemed to be in at least temporary disarray. As we suggested above, the preparation of detailed implementation plans may have been disarming. The IPET process suggested that once the plans were complete, someone else would assume responsibility for the next steps. When that did not occur, some of the NGOs floundered, reluctant to proceed as before and waiting for new arrangements to emerge. Especially in adult and preschool education, there were two further dispiriting factors. Since much of the planning focused on strong central leadership lodged in the national education ministry, the provincialisation of responsibility for education proved disorienting. As well, assumptions about savings from integrating the multiple education authorities appear to have been far too optimistic. In practice, there are likely to be very limited resources available for expanding adult and preschool education.

We continue this discussion, particularly as it affects adult education organisations below (Section 6). Suffice for now to note that while some education NGOs seem to be making a successful transition, others are experiencing confusion and in some cases debilitating crises as they work to define their future role and location.

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4 [illegible]

[illegible] a very partial and selective understanding.

[illegible]

It is important therefore to distinguish among intended policy, [illegible] policy, and implemented policy. [illegible] not necessarily lead to changes in practice.

A third form of public policy is implemented policy: [illegible] actions that may or may not correspond with what is announced. The challenge for policy analysts here is to read the policy not from the words of the policy makers but from the decisions they make and implement. Official rules, for example, may require teachers to allocate a specified number of hours each week to a particular topic. The lack of appropriate books, or the press of other demands, or the teachers' own lack of relevant background, or some other factor may mean that year after year students deal with that topic for less than half the specified time. That is the policy in practice. Contrary to the common image of centralized policy making, implemented policy may be determined locally, informally, and unofficially.

Another distinction is generally considered important here, that between public and private policies and policy initiatives. But that distinction both clarifies and distracts. It clarifies in that it requires the recognition that the initiative for many policies lies outside officialdom and that non-governmental policies can and often do have major public significance and consequences. It distracts in that it reifies the boundary between public and private, a frontier that is generally quite permeable and often indistinct and ambiguous.

Policies result from non-decisions as well as decisions. That is, often the most sharply contested decisions are those that determine what is on the agenda. Some perspectives, some interests, and some policy preferences are effectively rejected by exclusion: they are never formally considered. The orientations of decision makers and in part of the decision making process itself function to insure that some voices are barely audible and that some proposals are perceived as so extreme that they do not warrant serious attention.

Our point here is a simple one. Much of education policy in practice is made in settings distant from the offices of those formally charged with setting policy.

In our interviews we regularly encountered what might be termed the rational model (or perhaps more accurately, the handing over model) of policy making: policy analysts develop, compare, and assess clearly specified alternative strategies for addressing problems and working toward agreed goals. In that model, having gathered the relevant evidence, policy analysts rank the alternatives, evaluate their projected effectiveness and feasibility, and make recommendations. They then hand over the conclusions to decision makers for action. Regularly people told us, "We have developed the plans and handed them to the minister. The next steps are up to him. There is nothing more for us to do."

In practice, however, information is always incomplete and often contradictory. That different participants in the policy process have competing and perhaps incompatible objectives compounds the problems of limited and imperfect knowledge about available and potential alternatives. The setting for implementation is more often ambiguous and chaotic than clearly ordered. Because everyone agrees that education is one of the most critical public activities, nearly everyone has a strong opinion on what should be done. Policy making is necessarily a political process that must address conflicting interests and differential power. Effective policy making requires at least as much attention to implementation—and thus to the prospective implementers—as to philosophy, goals, and plans. The very political character of public policy making—bargaining, negotiation, alliances, shifting coalitions, and the like—is its strength, not a disability to be remedied.

As we noted in our initial report, external assistance agencies also influence education policy. That funds, often substantial sums, are available for some purposes and not others may shape both the agenda and how it is pursued. One example is the pressure to shift support for students in tertiary institutions from bursaries to loans, pressure reflected in the expectations associated with major allocations by the European Union.

Understood critically, policy making is an on-going process that takes place at multiple levels simultaneously. Some are inclined to regard the official adoption of a policy document as the end of the policy making process in a particular domain. While documents of that sort may be very important, they remain partial, often ephemeral, and inherently vulnerable resolutions of policy debates. Unattended and unprotected they may be distorted, deflected, or simply ignored. Those who view policy making as a series of skirmishes with clear end points are likely to be outflanked by others who understand policy making as continuous activity. Similarly, those who consider policy to be the province of designated decision makers are likely to find their preferred courses of action overwhelmed by the small scale and local level initiatives of a mobilized populace and energetic interest groups.

The participants in making education policy are thus numerous and not all officially labeled as such. For the present, it is those who are able to take decisive action who wield the greatest influence. In that regard, the democratic movement faces a dual challenge. First, in the short term, it must find ways to continue its overlapping circles of consultation, for they provide both ideas and legitimacy. Indeed, those interactions (in fact, often contestations) are at the core of what will make citizenship and governance in South Africa politically as well as racially different from the past. As the democratic movement encourages and nurtures that participatory process, it must also find ways to generate concrete policy proposals capable of immediate implementation. Second, over the longer term, as it works to wrest control over it, it must find handles and levers to modify and redirect the entire education and training system. Even before it has reached broad agreement on agenda and directions, it must find the fulcrum and set in place the lever to move the education universe.

As we shall suggest below, education policy has been and continues to be a principal arena of contestation.

5. CONTESTED TRANSITIONS

As it debated the content and institutions of education for post-apartheid South Africa, the democratic movement fostered a broad, generally inclusive, and often chaotic consultation process. At the same time, it apparently presumed a much more orderly transition to whatever new education system emerged from the debates. That was not to be.

The heady days after South Africa's first majority rule national election found a mountain of paper claiming to specify what was to be done, confusion about who, exactly, was in charge, and operating authority still vested in the officials who managed the apartheid education system. Instead of a more or less straightforward transition from one regime to another, the democratic movement found it had to deal with a series of overlapping but not entirely congruent transitions, each sharply contested. An apparently relatively simplistic and generally uncritical understanding of the policy process combined with surprising inattention to experiences elsewhere, especially Zimbabwe and Namibia, to disorient and perhaps incapacitate the democratic movement, at least briefly. Its inability to seize the moment enabled the old guard to dig in its heels, solidify its position, and delay change.

Powerful forces mitigate against very rapid transformation. Conservators of a society's values and customs, education systems are, and are intended to be, bastions of stability. Even when pressed, they change slowly. Teachers, principals, inspectors, curriculum developers, and many others have spent years learning how to do things the way they do and internalizing the appropriateness of their pedagogical and professional strategies. Even more important, education plays a pivotal role in organizing and allocating power and privilege. Those who have benefitted from their preferential access to education will seek to protect that pathway for their children. The dynamic forces for change in South Africa confront a powerful and resourceful resistance.

Above we reviewed the context for education policy reform over the past year, extending the historical survey presented in our initial report. Here we shall attempt to organize recent events in terms of several contested transitions that characterize education and training in contemporary South Africa. We are of course reporting on a situation in flux. The details as they were in July, 1994, are likely to have changed only a few months later. Some individuals will have assumed new roles, while others will no longer hold prominent or influential positions. Issues that earlier seemed pressing will have been assigned a lower priority. Still, transforming the education system and reconstructing the society will not be accomplished instantly or easily. It is for that reason that we focus on the overlapping arenas of contested transitions rather than on the political configuration at a particular moment.

5.1 *ARENAS OF CONTESTATION*

5.1.1 Who is in Charge? National Education Governance and Management

Put simply and sharply, an immediate task for the democratic movement is to take control of the education machinery—its key decision points, administrative apparatus, and daily procedures. Since that will be neither rapid nor easy, in the short term the democratic movement must find, to use John Samuel's insightful characterization, levers and handles for moving it. The challenge is to find ways to move the old guard, even while relying on it to manage the system.

In the South African context there are several compounding factors. Until the formal integration of the separate education authorities has been completed, the old racially differentiated departments retain operating authority and fiscal responsibility. Senior officials in the entrenched bureaucracy have made it clear that they will not yield power readily. Although the transitional arrangements negotiated prior to the election protect their jobs but not their posts, in practice they are able to use civil service regulations to remain in office and to delay reassignment and reorganization.

The newly appointed education minister, who had not been a central participant in the democratic movement's national education dialogue, fell ill shortly after assuming office. Having communicated his intention to appoint as the ministry's senior civil servant the ANC Director of Education, he withdrew that appointment under political pressure widely reported to be from within the ANC parliamentary education group. Procedural delays prevented the individual subsequently designated for that Director General position from assuming office immediately. In the interim, a senior civil servant from the Department of Education and Training became the Acting Director-General. At the same time, the transitional advisory team appointed by the new minister—appointments without statutory authority and budgetary support for which the minister was apparently chastised—remained unsure of its role, authority, responsibility, and influence.

That a government of national unity had assumed office also complicated the situation. While some understood that arrangement to be significant primarily at the level of the cabinet and senior government executive officials, others thought that every action at every level of government had to be acceptable to all of the unity partners. What, then, was the role of the electoral manifesto of the victorious party, *The Reconstruction and Development Programme*? Sometimes the ANC seemed to regard the *RDP* as the basis for government policy. At other times, however, the *RDP* was treated as one, clearly very important, contribution to new policy among many. If the *RDP* is the foundation for government policy, its major principles, supported by nearly two-thirds of the electorate, need no longer be the principal subjects of discussion. Rather, what was to be debated was how best to implement those principles. From that perspective, the implementation plans coordinated by the CEPD became guides to action. But if even basic principles are still to be negotiated, then the *RDP* was simply a starting point. From that perspective, the CEPD's implementation plans were only one set of ideas about how to proceed, not the plans to be implemented.

As we shall explain shortly, the provincialization of education further complicated matters. Much of the authority previously located in the separate education administrations was to be transferred not to the new national ministry of education but to the nine provincial governments.

Although the democratic movement's insistence on linking education and training seems to have framed the transitional process, that, too, complicated the effort to secure control over education governance and management. Unifying authority over education and training required negotiations, in part through an inter-ministerial task force, with the Ministry of Labour, which may prove reluctant to proceed as rapidly or as far as the democratic movement hoped.

In this confused arena, the roles of several of the major institutions were themselves being debated. We noted above the uncertain future of the NEC and the NECC. What was to become of the CEPD? While some thought it ought to be incorporated as a research unit into the new ministry, others insisted on the vital importance of a non-governmental education policy research institute able to serve the needs of the ANC and the democratic movement more generally? Similarly, while some argued that the National Education and Training Forum had served its purpose and should be dissolved, others believed that it had a continuing role, both as a meeting ground for all groups concerned with education and as a vehicle through which the democratic movement could continue to pressure the government.

Again, who is in charge? Clearly, the contest for power in education was and is being waged on several fronts simultaneously. While some of the individual issues noted here may be resolved in the coming months, that contest is likely to continue for some time to come.

5.1.2 Provincialization? The Locus of Authority and Responsibility

Until the eve of the election, nearly all of the debates about the post-apartheid education system assumed South Africa's multiple education authorities would be integrated into a single national institution. In practice, however, the political compromises written into the new constitution assign responsibility for education to provincial authorities, with the exception of universities and technikons. At the same time, the constitutional principles assign to national government responsibility for (among other things) national standards and maintaining and protecting national unity and the uniformity of government functions.

What does that mean for education? Who will report to whom?

Consider the reassignment of the personnel and facilities of the racially differentiated education authorities. The staff and buildings of the white Cape Education Department, for example, must be reassigned to the four provincial governments (Eastern Cape, Western Cape, Northern Cape, and Northwest) into which the former Cape Province has been divided. What is to be the national role in that process? What parts of the former (for the present, still functioning) white education system remain under national authority?

Or consider the flows of public finance for education. If the provinces are to operate the education system, they must have the resources to do so. We inquired how, exactly, that is to work. Some national officials with whom we spoke clearly expected to have a national education budget under their control. They would, they assured us, retain responsibility for allocating funds to the provinces. Other officials projected a per capita allocation system. In that, once the total education budget was decided at cabinet level, each province would receive a portion of the available funds in proportion to the number of students, or perhaps students, teachers, and facilities, in that province. Still others told us that each province would receive a block allocation for all its functions and would have the authority to determine how much to spend on, say, health, education, and roads. Where, then, are the points of leverage for influencing education spending? Will the nine provincial education ministers be arguing with each other about their shares of the total? Or will those provincial education ministers be arguing not with their counterparts in other provinces but with the other ministers in their own province about the spending on education?

Consider, finally, the appropriate locus for new education initiatives. To date, the national education system has paid relatively little attention to adult education. Accordingly, much of the effort to increase the priority assigned to adult education has focused on creating an appropriate adult education unit within the national ministry, expected to insure adequate attention and resources. The campaign to expand access to preschool education has had a similar focus on the national level. But if the provinces are to be responsible for adult and preschool education, why expect the critical roles to be located in the national ministry? Clearly, there is the potential here for very divisive conflicts over authority and resources, not only within and among levels of government but also among the education organizations as they seek to work at these different levels.

For the present, no one is very clear on exactly how the provincialization of education will work. Recall that the decision to assign this authority to the provincial level was the result of a political negotiation, not a strategy to improve education. Recall, too, that with the forthcoming establishment of local government, there may yet be further delegation of authority to the local level and to individual schools.

In principle, decentralization is attractive to the democratic movement, since it can facilitate greater local involvement in and control over education. At the same time, decentralization makes redistribution more difficult. Especially where communities are expected to contribute their own resources, they will be reluctant to do so if they see that their funds are to be used to the benefit of other communities. In practice, then, decentralization may help affluent, that is, largely white, communities protect their privileges. Decentralization may expand and entrench, rather than eliminate, inequality.

This, then, is a second arena of contestation. Ostensibly narrowly defined education issues, for example, curriculum, or classroom organization, or in-service education for literacy teachers, may well need to be argued out not only in their own terms, but also in terms of the appropriate locus of authority. The most important decision about curriculum content may turn out to be the decision about who makes the decision.

5.1.3 Rhetoric vs. Practice: Education Policy Making

Education policy is the focus of a third contested arena. The democratic movement has labored mightily to influence and set post apartheid education policy. From NEPI through IPET hundreds of people have contributed to debates and documents. That effort has framed many discussions and has kept visible a vision of an integrated and open education system. It has regularly challenged the decision makers and administrators of apartheid education, forcing them to develop their own reform proposals in their effort to retain the initiative. Yet, to date the extensive policy activity of the democratic movement has apparently had relatively little impact on schools and what happens inside them. For the present, it remains the education bureaucracy, still heavily informed by the philosophy and values of apartheid, that specifies curriculum, pedagogy and the like. That the democratic movement continues to find it difficult to translate its hundreds of statements about what-should-be into a few high priority instructions about what-is-to-be done is likely to prolong the dominant role of veteran education officials.

That dominance does not remain unchallenged. To hold on to power, those who oppose change scramble to propose reforms. At the school level there have been occasional but nonetheless dramatic departures from official education policy. One committee of the NETF has apparently become the vehicle for modifying textbook content and selection.

In the excitement of the transition to majority rule it is tempting to interpret those challenges as a transition in control and to locate the center of education policy initiative among those who have been most active in challenging Bantu Education and its successors. *A Policy Framework for Education and Training*, prepared by the CEPD for the ANC, drawing on the work of NEPI and the NECC, was certainly intended to assert that initiative. But for the present, the former Department of National Education and the complex cluster of education departments and authorities continue to exercise the major influence in determining what is to be taught, how that is to be taught, and to whom. At the same time, more or less visibly external agencies also have major influence on present and future education policy.

5.1.A The ANC Inherits the Government of National Unity

A fourth arena of contestation is largely internal to the democratic movement. After more than three quarters of a century of opposition, decades underground, and a brief period of transitional negotiations, the ANC and its allies (COSATU and the SACP) won a resounding electoral victory this year. Even before that victory, however, the ANC had apparently already decided that circumstances required a spirit of reconciliation and a government of national unity. Consequently, notwithstanding its massive electoral success, the ANC is the senior partner rather than the government of South Africa. In that circumstance, what is the role of the ANC? Specifically, how does the ANC, as party, work to influence, shape, and advance the decisions of the ANC-led ministry of education? And what are the appropriate roles of the ANC, COSATU, NECC, and other democratic movement education activists who are now members of parliament and those no longer in opposition but also not government officials?

At issue here are both policy and process. The Policy Framework and the RDP are ANC policy documents. One possibility is that the ANC in government will adopt them as government documents. Currently, that seems unlikely. As we have noted, the government has ordered the preparation of new education and educational white papers, apparently to have them be different from the Policy Framework for education and the RDP. While these documents may have at their core the principles of the Policy Framework and the RDP, they will need to accommodate the interests and concerns of the other parties that share power.

An alternative strategy is for the ANC, and its allies outside government, to be the principal advocates for the Policy Framework and the RDP, regularly calling on government to adopt them in whole or in part. That sets the stage, however, for a potential confrontation between the democratic movement outside government and the ANC, and its allies inside government and between the ANC outside government officials and other ANC members of parliament.

As well, the institutional and organizational base for that pressure is significantly weaker now than it was not long ago. Many of the most prominent leaders in the democratic movement are now members of parliament or in government or anticipating joining government. As noted above, the NECC is no longer able to provide a strong voice, either on its own or on behalf of students, teachers, staff, and other organizations. As a national structure, the ANC plans to dismantle its Education Department and reorganize its functions into a small policy unit. While the future of the CEPD remains unclear, it is constituted as an independent institution. It seems more likely to undertake policy research than to assume responsibility for political advocacy. What, then, is the voice of education within the democratic movement? From what platforms does it speak?

Although its authority remains largely undefined, the ANC education group finds itself in an intermediary position. The new ministers might call on this group to provide informed advice and assistance and to assist them in exploring and explaining the important commentary. Indeed, that this has not already occurred is another reflection of the confusion within the ANC and the democratic movement about how to proceed from winning an election to taking control over the machinery of the state. The members of the ANC education group report they have been criticized in public meetings and within their own organizations for what the government has or has not done. Yet they perceive themselves to be quite distant from the centre of power. Pressed to defend government, they respond "We did not make those decisions." Their mandate is to play an advocacy role, to be active participants in developing education policy, and to provide a vehicle for articulating critical concerns and complaints. The ANC's history of lively debate and its considerable parliamentary majority may provide room for this group to become a critical voice. To the extent that its members articulate popular discontent, however, there will be pressures to tame that critique.

The contestation here is clearly reflected in the situation of the students. Those who for years offered the most active challenge to apartheid education, indeed whose protests and boycotts fundamentally shook apartheid itself, are not guaranteed a voice in the new setting. They will have to demand to be heard and may find it necessary to construct their own public address system.

5.1.5 Schools, Teachers, and Adult Education

The institutions of the education system itself are also sites of contested transitions. Both those most poorly and those best served by the schools will seek to use the opening provided by decentralization to assert and protect their interests. Advocates and opponents of fundamental transformation will energetically join the debates about the appropriate roles for teachers in post-apartheid South Africa. At the same time, teachers' unions will be the focus of efforts to move them along the path between a more extensive involvement in broad issues of education policy on the one side and a more restricted concern with wages, hours, and working conditions on the other. The democratic movement's vision of an integrated education and training system, with multiple entry and exit points and transferrable credentials, is very distant from current practice and priorities. Each proposed step toward that vision will be resisted, probably less on philosophical or policy grounds than in terms of practical difficulties and costs.

5.1.6 Struggles on multiple fronts

Making public policy is a far less orderly and rational process than is commonly assumed. Alliances and coalitions regularly overwhelm well supported rationales and carefully constructed plans. Our concern here has been to suggest that the movement from apartheid to post-apartheid education involves a series of transitions, overlapping but not identical, and all contested. Many issues—for example, the extent and form of community control over schools, or the reform of pre-service and in-service teacher education—will be addressed in several arenas simultaneously. Apparently definitive decisions may prove ephemeral as groups unhappy with the initial conclusion work to raise the issue again in a different setting. Determining what is to be discussed will often influence outcomes more than the contents of the issues actually debated.

We do not regard it as problematic that policy making is somewhat disorderly and that transitions are contested. Policy making—including setting broad objectives, planning, decision making, and policy analysis—is necessarily a continuing *process*. Its fluidity can permit a broad and inclusive discussion of national goals, enable people from different regions and strata to talk to each other, and empower disadvantaged and underrepresented groups. The process of decision making may be more consequential for the society than the decisions themselves. Where decision making is a broadly participatory and continuing process, democracy is invigorated and the government's legitimacy is rarely in doubt. Where participation in decision making is limited, objections and discontent are more easily transformed into rejection of governmental authority and clandestine or overt disregard and violation of law.

That there are multiple, contested transitions does carry implications for Sweden's education assistance to South Africa. SIDA's guidelines, negotiations, and decisions must be appropriate to a changing, perhaps rapidly changing, environment. As well SIDA must maintain a high tolerance for ambiguity.

5.2 FROM ELITE EDUCATION TO EDUCATION FOR ALL

With few exceptions, education in South Africa has been the privilege of a minority. The commitment of the democratic movement is to education for all. For that, an integrated education and training system is envisioned, with multiple access, crossover, and reentry points. That is surely an ambitious vision that will take some time to achieve.

For the present, then, visionary aspirations and broad popular expectations for rapid improvement confront both an entrenched opposition to the radical transformation of education and the practical demands of simply maintaining the existing education system. What is to be the education agenda?

For nearly everyone, the immediate focus is on expanded and effective access. When asked about priorities, citizens, educators, and officials stress school construction and classroom rehabilitation. In part reacting to prolonged school-based protests and boycotts, the public education discourse also emphasizes the culture of learning—the reinforcement of the individual and collective sense of the importance of learning, both in and out of school. In his early speeches the new president emphasized free mass education and, apparently somewhat to the surprise of the education community, announced a school meals program. Notwithstanding years of debates within the democratic movement about what is to be done, it is this immediate action agenda that commands widespread attention.

Expanded access of course requires desegregation as well as more schools. What might be termed the *liberal education agenda* calls for the desegregation of white schools, the rationalization—institutional and administrative integration—of the multiple education authorities, and the redistribution of resources in favor of black education.

Those are indeed necessary initial objectives. But eliminating discrimination and facilitating access, which will surely be difficult to accomplish, will not in themselves make education in South Africa education for all. Much of the current public discussion about education reform presumes that although there must be substantial changes in curriculum, pedagogy, and the like, primarily to eliminate values and distortions of apartheid, the basic operating philosophy and orientation of the education system, both in and out of school, are universal. That is, once the content and practices of education are no longer discriminatory and deprecating, what teachers do, how classrooms are organized, the interactions among learners and their instructors, the functions and styles of examinations, and the like will continue to look very much as they do now.

Put sharply, education in South Africa, as in much of the world, is organized to be increasingly selective. Each level, every institution, and often every classroom has procedures for selecting who is to proceed further and who will not. Effectively, those procedures are designed and used to exclude some would-be learners.

A commitment to education for all makes the opposite presumption. Its primary operating principle is to draw people into the education system, to include rather than exclude. This distinction between education as a filter with an ever narrower opening and education for all is not simply a matter of perspective, for it affects every dimension of the education system.

Taken seriously, education for all means more than opening the school doors to populations previously denied access and creating new programs for those not in school. Where education is primarily concerned with identifying, selecting, socializing, and sorting an elite, there is a clear rationale for weeding out those who do not do well or who seem unlikely to do well in the future. But where education is for all, schools and out-of-school programs are primarily concerned with fostering success, not filtering out those who do not succeed. Indeed,

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6.1 WHAT IS ADULT EDUCATION?

The term adult education is used by different people to mean many different things. Some understand adult education to mean basic literacy programs, while others focus on vocational training, or on non-school or nonformal education. Still others are concerned with what they term popular, or community, or continuing education. We find most useful an inclusive understanding: *the education of adults, which can have many purposes, can take place in a very wide variety of settings, and can be formal, nonformal, or informal.*

Often, the different usages make it difficult to be sure what, exactly, is the subject of South African discussions about and documents on adult education. For example, NEPI organizes the broad terrain of educating adults into adult education, adult basic education, and human resources development, each the responsibility of a separate working group and the subject of a separate volume. While many of the mass and community based organizations, including their national coalition, still refer to themselves as literacy organizations, COSATU recommendations refer exclusively to adult basic education and training. The ANC *Policy Framework* refers to adult basic education and further education. Strategies for educating adults are also included in separate chapters on general education and rural and farm schools. The *RDP* refers to adult basic education and training and further education and training. Some years ago, human resources development generally referred to vocational training, understood broadly. Currently, some documents (for example, the *RDP*) use human resource development as the generic term for all education and training, including as well arts and culture, sport and recreation, and youth development.

The education priorities established by the democratic movement also influence what is meant by adult education. In its debates and recommendations the democratic movement has increasingly sought to organize the education and training system to permit multiple points of entry and exit. To achieve that, it has emphasized nationally established qualifications and transportable credentials. In such a system, individuals could pursue part of their education in one setting and part in another, perhaps with an intervening period in employment. Their late entry and re-entry would be facilitated by standardized and universally acceptable credentials. One consequence of that arrangement, however, is that education that is not associated with a national qualification and transferable credential has been largely excluded from the education policy frameworks and recommendations. Among the casualties of this approach have been in-house adult education and training programs in community organizations and trade unions, organizational skills training, leadership training, and popular education, such as civic education and environmental education. Even more dramatic is the relative inattention to intensive and short adult literacy programs and to focused mass education campaigns.

Since many of these forms of adult education are provided by service and community organizations, this exclusion results in the general omission of this popular, non-governmental sector from the policy frameworks and recommendations. Effectively, they become marginalized because they do not fit well into what has become the common categorization of adult education: adult basic education, further education, and human resources development and training.

6.2 ADULT EDUCATION UNDER APARTHEID

6.2.1 The Practice

The government is the largest provider of adult education in South Africa. Among the agencies that have offered adult education programs are the several racially segregated departments responsible for education, the former Department of National Health and Population Development, the former Department of Manpower, the former South African Defence Force, and the former South African Prisons Service. The Department of Education and Training and the education departments of what were officially termed the homeland governments conducted literacy classes, nigh school courses, community education, and vocational training. The former Department of National Health and Population Development provided primary heath care, AIDS education, and community health education. The former Department of Manpower provided a legal framework, advice and funding to employers for training workers. The former South African Defence Force provided formal adult education to army recruits and their adult family members. The former South African Prisons Service provided literacy, formal adult education, and vocational training for prisoners.

The provision of government adult education evolved over the years. Like schooling, government provision of adult education was determined by apartheid policies. When the government created separate departments of education for Whites, Africans, Coloureds, and Indians, each had its own division for adult education, thereby dividing adult education along racial lines.

Although in this proliferation of providers government provision of adult education may appear to be extensive, in fact it is quite inadequate. That is clear in a comparison of the number of adults with little or no education with the number enrolled in adult education programs. Literacy statistics are rarely precise and are perhaps particularly unreliable for South Africa. From the available information, it seems reasonable to estimate the number of functionally illiterate adults at approximately 10 million, essentially all of them black (the ANC *Policy Framework* estimates that 15 million black adults, over one third of the population, are illiterate). According to the NEPI report on adult education, as many as 15 million adults lack formal basic education. What is especially striking is that NEPI also reports that in the DET there were 29,840 primary and adult literacy center enrollments and 37,227 secondary enrollments in 1991. That is, far fewer than 1% of the adults without basic education participate in those adult education programs. And the ANC *Policy Framework* reports that less than 1% of the education budget is allocated to adult basic education. The absence of adequate adult education provision for South Africa's black population reflects and perpetuates a significant political-economic inequality.

In addition to government adult education programs, the private sector provides literacy, adult basic education, and vocational training programs. Trade unions provide organizational skills training for union leadership, shop steward training, leadership training, and training in negotiating skills for workers and union officials.

To supplement the limited public and private sector provision of adult education, community organizations have organized a wide range of adult education programs, including literacy classes, community education, vocational training, organizational skills training, and preparatory courses for adult educators. In addition to their community activities, community organizations also conducted in-house adult education and training programs aimed at enabling staff to develop educational, organizational, development, and management skills. While some of these programs have sought to avoid political confrontation, most have had an explicitly anti-apartheid focus and have been central to the activist alliance against apartheid. Their commitment has been both to expanding education opportunities for adults and to fostering community mobilization and democratic participation. When the restrictions on major anti-apartheid organizations were lifted in 1990, some of the foreign agencies that had provided funds for these adult education programs insisted that the aid recipients shift their attention from challenging minority rule to development. Under that pressure, some organizations lost their funding and ceased their activities. Others seem to have refocused their programs sufficiently to maintain their funding, and some groups have sought alternate sources of support as they maintained their effort to develop and expand adult education programs explicitly designed to challenge racism, sexism, an authoritarianism.

To illustrate the spread of provision among government, industry, and community organizations, Agneta Lind's report is instructive. In her review of recent documents on adult literacy work—only a part of adult education—she estimates that 45% of adult learners attend government programs and another 45% participate in industry-funded programs. Of the remaining 10% served by other institutions, half are enrolled in programs offered by activist community organizations.

We return to issues of adult education and provide examples of the initiatives of community based organizations in the discussion below of the World University Service–South Africa (Section 9.6).

6.2.2 The Policy

The breadth and diversity of adult education complicates the specification of exactly what has been adult education policy in South Africa. Indeed, at the national level, the only coherent adult education policy was that most adults did not need education and that those whose employment required some education should not proceed beyond the minimum necessary for their work. Nor was there a central institution that coordinated the provision of adult education by the government, the private sector, unions, and community organizations, or comprehensive adult education legislation. That there was no national agency that funded adult education, or certified adult education programs, or oversaw the training of adult educators clearly reflects the fragmented character of adult education.

Within that fragmented universe, the several government departments involved in adult education each set policies that governed the programs they offered (and for the present, continue to offer), both explicitly and implicitly by supporting some activities and not others. Often, adult education policies were subsumed under other policies that guided the agencies involved in adult education. Similarly, firms, unions, and community organizations each developed their own funding, certification, and training policies. Effectively, the largest providers of adult education programs, for example, General Mining (Genmin), become adult education policy makers.

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training framework that replaces vocational training, locates adult basic education as its central focus, links restructuring the education and training system with restructuring the apartheid labor market, and proposes changes in legislative and institutional arrangements governing education and training.

Both the ANC's policy framework and its implementation plans reflect these influences. Although the ANC's document is entitled *A Policy Framework for Education and Training*, it does not include policy proposals on training. The IPET documents do, however, include recommendations on training.

Following the preparation of the IPET document on Adult Basic Education and Training, in June 1994 the CEPD convened a workshop to discuss "The Transitional Guidelines for Adult Basic Education Courses in Tertiary Institutions." The CEPD also formed an Adult Basic Education and Training Strategic Task Team that planned to discuss with the government, in late July 1994, plans for adult basic education.

Thus, a two-pronged approach emerged. On the one hand, COSATU targeted the National Training Board and its vocational training policies. On the other, the ANC targeted the education departments and their adult education policies.

At the same time, the National Literacy Cooperation (NLC), established as a coalition of mass literacy organizations, is now transforming itself into a formal organization in order to participate more actively in policy and planning for adult education. The NLC has participated in various adult education policy initiatives. (We return to the NLC in our discussion of the World University Service-South Africa, Section 9.6, below.)

6.3.2 The Ministry of Education

While the democratic movement has increasingly insisted on the integration of education and training, the new ministerial structure created after the April 1994 majority rule election continues to reflect the separation between the two. Informally, some commentators refer to the new Ministry of Education as the ministry of education and training, but in practice, responsibility for training lies with the Minister of Labour, whose ministry has taken over the functions of the Department of Manpower and absorbed the National Training Board. Currently, an inter-ministerial task force is discussing where authority and fiscal responsibility for the different sorts of training should be lodged. Those negotiations are not yet far enough along to know exactly where they will lead. It seems likely, however, that a complete transfer of training responsibilities from Labour to Education will meet resistance in both ministries. One would lose authority over one of its major activities and major contributions to the RDP, while the other would have to incorporate a complex, disorderly, and potentially vast new set of activities even as it scrambles to address popular expectations that far exceed its current capabilities.

In this setting, several events have slowed adult education policy development and implementation still further. That the new education minister fell ill shortly after his appointment has necessarily postponed attention to many things. Second, political and bureaucratic obstacles have delayed new appointments. Third, the democratic movement apparently underestimated the magnitude of the task and the time needed to integrate the multiple education authorities and redistribute their responsibilities. Fourth, the relatively late constitutional decision to lodge most responsibility for education at the provincial level has meant that neither the old bureaucracy nor the democratic movement has well developed plans for transforming a racially fragmented education system into a system with primary authority decentralized to the provincial level. Fifth, many of the individuals now central to the development of education policy and programs—including the new education minister, his senior civil servant, and most of the new provincial education ministers and their advisers—were not centrally involved in the education debates of the democratic movement. Consequently, it is not clear to what extent the work of the NECC, NEPI, the ANC Education Department, and the CEPD, will influence the decisions of the new education leadership or facilitate the transformation of the education system.

The fluidity of the current situation was highlighted in the reports we received about the forthcoming education white paper, due to be tabled in parliament in September 1994. Some involved in its preparation assured us that the white paper would reflect essentially the orientation, understanding, and commitments of the ANC *Policy Framework* and the *RDP*. Others, however, expect the education white paper to be the document of a government of national unity, reflecting not only the concerns and directions of the ANC and its allies, but also the interests of the other partners in government, that is, strong voices to preserve many of the features of the old education system and to maximize provincial control. Nor, in the context of contested transitions, is it clear whether the education white paper, once adopted, will be an effective guide to action or yet another framework within which specific programmatic decisions must still be worked out. It does seem likely, however, particularly in view of the apartheid government's inattention to it, that adult education will have much greater prominence in the future than it has had in the past.

Provincialization complicates the picture, especially for adult education. Quite simply, it is not clear who will do what and with what funds. The education minister in the Western Cape was unclear on how she expected to proceed, beyond consulting with relevant constituencies and organizations. Her PWV counterpart, similarly unclear on longer term plans, looked to a conference of adult education groups to provide some guidance. During his very brief tenure, the Acting Director-General in the Ministry of Education indicated he expected to create two new directorates for adult education at the national level, a Directorate for Adult Basic Education and Community Education and a Directorate for Training. He expected officials in those directorates to take responsibility for policy and curriculum development. At the same time, officials at both the national and provincial levels were clear that they regarded operating the existing school system and expanding its capacity as pressing priorities.

Funding for adult education is equally unclear. Since the initial and probably politically overriding commitment is to basic education and ten years of compulsory schooling, it seems unlikely that government funds for adult education will be expanded significantly in the near future, though the Acting Director-General did anticipate some additional funds from the integration of the education authorities. And how, exactly, will the existing adult education budget—that is, the funds currently allocated to the adult education departments in the separate education authorities—be redistributed? At one extreme, concentrating those funds at the national level in order to establish new capabilities for planning, coordination, and curriculum development could leave little money for provincial initiatives. At the other, dispersing the limited current funding to the nine provinces could mean that neither the center, nor even the provinces, would have sufficient funds to do much more than maintain existing programs, if that.

A cooperative relationship among the national and provincial education ministries and community adult education organizations could enhance the provision of adult education, particularly adult basic education. We found some indications that this sort of relationship is developing. The Acting Director-General acknowledged the contributions of those organizations and noted that DET had engaged a literacy service organization to conduct training programs. The PWV's education minister has convened a planning group, including representatives of the CEPD, the private sector, service organizations, and community based literacy organizations, to organize a conference to examine the adult education needs of that region and to devise strategies for addressing them. Some literacy organizations are also attempting to initiate meetings with provincial education ministers to explore how they will address adult education needs and to forge cooperative relationships with them.

6.3.3 The Ministry of Labour

An initial National Training Strategy, coordinated by the National Training Board, excluded the trade unions from its investigation of the future training needs of South Africa. When its report was published in 1991, COSATU objected and called for a new study. COSATU participated actively in that effort and worked jointly with the National Training Board, then located in the Department of Manpower, to devise a new National Training Strategy, which was published in March, 1994. Notwithstanding its reservations on several important issues, COSATU approved that report in its present form.

As noted above, officials from the ministries of Labour and Education are currently negotiating the location of responsibility for training.

6.3.4 The Reconstruction and Development Programme

The Reconstruction and Development Programme may, but will not necessarily, have a major impact on adult education. That is so for several reasons. Although the RDP could serve as the basis for developing a new cooperative relationship among the national and provincial education ministries, service organizations, and community groups, its status and influence remain unclear. As we have noted, the forthcoming education white paper may reflect more or less faithfully and more or less fully the RDP's principles and commitments. As well, the status and influence of the white paper itself will likely not be clear for some time to come. In addition, the RDP office will have a limited budget of its own. However those funds are allocated, they will surely be unable to meet the expectations of people and organizations at all levels and in all corners of South African society. Both community organizations and one provincial education minister, for example, told us they expected to fund adult education with RDP allocations. Hence, for the short term, the RDP seems more likely to function as a rallying cry and mobilizing strategy than as the coordinator or funder of adult education programs.

7. OTHER EXTERNAL AGENCY SUPPORT TO EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

To supplement our review of Swedish assistance to the education of South Africans we were asked to report on the activities of other external agencies that provide aid to South African education. A few years ago there were few such agencies and limited funding. By the mid 1990s most national and international aid organizations had established or were establishing programs and offices in South Africa, some with very substantial funding. A current list of their activities quickly becomes out of date.

To learn about those activities, we met in Pretoria with representatives of other external agencies in August, 1993, and July, 1994. As well, we reviewed several of the reports commissioned or prepared by other agencies. Fortuitously, two studies undertaken earlier this year provide a more comprehensive picture of foreign support to education in South Africa. The first, prepared by Baudouin Duvieusart and Joel Samoff for UNESCO's Division for Policy and Sector Analysis, *Donor Cooperation and Coordination in Education in South Africa*, analyzes the broad situation and provides detailed information on the major contributors and their activities. The second, prepared by Joel Samoff for Donors to African Education and UNESCO's Section for Policy and Sector Analysis, *After Apartheid, What? A Review of Externally Initiated, Commissioned, and Supported Studies of Education in South Africa*, analyzes the concerns, orientations, themes, and methodologies of those studies.

To summarize the principal findings of those studies without unduly encumbering this review we reproduce below Joel Samoff's overview of foreign aid to education in South Africa (*After Apartheid, What?*, pp. 4-7) and as an appendix (Section 14.4) [illegible] and Joel Samoff's descriptions of the major agency programs (*Donor Cooperation and Coordination*, pp. 13-20).

Several major findings emerge from the analysis of foreign aid to education in South Africa. First, with the exception of a few foreign governments and organizations that have long supported the liberation movement in South Africa (including and especially SIDA), for most external agencies South African education is a relatively recent focus. For many, however, it has quite quickly become a very major interest, perhaps equalling or even eclipsing their involvement in the rest of Africa.

Second, unlike the rest of Africa, indeed most of the Third World, community and other non-governmental organizations have been the principal recipients of development assistance in South Africa. Until recently, most external agencies' formal regulations or informal practices precluded providing aid directly to or through the South African government. With the installation of the new government in May, 1994, development cooperation is likely to shift toward government-to-government relations. At the same time, nearly all of the external agencies interviewed expect to continue to work with voluntary organizations within South Africa, both large and small, for the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding that expectation, many of the smaller organizations fear that their funding will be sharply curtailed or will cease altogether as foreign governments and international organizations move toward direct support to the South African government.

Third, preferred areas for assistance have included policy development and capacity building, especially education and training programs for middle and senior managers. Foreign assistance has also permitted innovations in areas that have been significantly neglected by the South African government, for example adult literacy. External aid has also facilitated a wide range of international interactions, both individual (for example, support for South Africans to study overseas) and collective (linkages with counterpart organizations in other countries).

Fourth, the influence of the external contributors is apparently far greater than their proportional contribution to spending on education. Even with a labor intensive global effort that involved an extensive review of public and private documents and interviews with field and headquarters personnel, it proved very difficult to calculate precisely the total external contribution to South African education. A reasonable and well grounded approximation, however, suggests that education foreign assistance of all sorts in 1993, approximately US$ 150 million, constituted less than 2% of total public and private spending on education in South Africa. Even if that amount were doubled, it would remain a very small portion of total education expenditures. At the same time, it is clear that through their funding of several major analyses and policy reviews (for example, education finance), through their contributions to particular elements of the education system (for example, bursaries), through their active insertion into the policy dialogue (both individual contacts and specialist seminars), and through the prospect that they will be a major source for new funds, external agencies have come to have

Second, even as Swedish assistance enabled numerous South Africans to begin and complete their education in conventional schools and universities, Swedish support was also directed toward innovative education programs, especially those designed to meet the needs of adults. Third, though of course not ignoring its own national interests and priorities, the Swedish International Development Authority has been far more collaborative and generally less prescriptive than most other external assistance agencies. That is not to say there have been no prescriptions, for there have been. Indeed, one major recipient of Swedish support acknowledged SIDA's general flexibility and responsiveness and at the same time expressed frustration at having to accommodate to particular expectations about how aid funds were to be used. Most important in this regard, SIDA has regularly recognized the importance of local control over institutions and resources. That has surely not been an easy or entirely comfortable orientation to maintain, but it is essential if the individual abilities that are to be nurtured and the institutional capacities that are to be developed are South African. Notwithstanding the disparity in resources, SIDA has generally operated in terms of a fundamental equality among collaborating partners.

With the unbanning of the African National Congress and other organizations in 1990, Swedish support was reorganized to fit the new political situation. In 1991 Sweden modified its strategy for assistance to education in South Africa, adopting guidelines for the transitional period leading to majority rule. Table VI in Section 14.3 summarizes Swedish support to the education of South Africans for the fiscal years 1991/92, 1992/93, and 1993/94.

SIDA's current guidelines do not in fact specify mutually exclusive categories. As noted below, important activities cross those categories. Indeed, nearly all of SIDA's education assistance has contributed to the struggle against minority rule, and much of it has supported adult education (understood broadly) and the development of new education policies. While these overlaps are not in themselves necessarily problematic, the boundary ambiguities have led us to organize the next section of this report in terms of the major recipients of Swedish assistance rather than in terms of the guidelines.

Those guidelines emphasize four major sorts of activities.

9.1 *SUPPORT TO PREPARATORY REFORM WORK AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT*

During the transitional period, Sweden has assigned a high priority to the work of the democratic movement to formulate education policy for the South Africa of the future. Assistance has been provided both directly and indirectly through international and South African organizations.

One principal direct recipient of Swedish education assistance has been the African National Congress (discussed in Section 9.1), including the Education Department and the Department of Human Resources Development. A second direct recipient has been the National Education Co-ordinating Committee (Section 9.2), and particularly its People's Education Programme. In 1993/94 SIDA supported the Centre for Education Policy Development, charged with organizing and coordinating the development of new education policy and programs (Section 9.3). Swedish support to a program of participatory research has facilitated the efforts of the Congress of South African Trade Unions to influence and shape national policy in adult education and training (Section 9.4).

The principal channel for indirect support has been the World University Service (WUS), earlier through its international headquarters in Geneva and currently through WUS-South Africa

(Section 9.3). A major effort to map the [illegible] of education policy, the National Education Policy Investigation [illegible], [illegible] in the [illegible] [illegible] was supported through the Education Development Trust in the 1990s.

8.2 SUPPORT TO INNOVATIVE PROJECTS AND INITIATIVES [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Swedish support to the education of South Africans has funded many research and innovation projects, for example the National Education Policy Investigation and the [illegible] Education Programme. The bulk of the assistance provided under this [illegible], is also a [illegible] portion of overall Swedish education aid, has been [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] through the World University Service. Activities supported in this way have [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], the multilingual classroom, and programs designed to [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible].

8.3 SUPPORT TO DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIES, METHODOLOGIES AND PROGRAMMES FOR ADULT EDUCATION

SIDA has a broad definition of adult education. A substantial part of this support has been channelled through WUS (earlier WUS International and currently WUS South Africa) to more than sixty community organisations for their work in literacy, post-literacy and other adult education projects (Section 9.3). [illegible] work on developing policies for adult basic education has also received Swedish support (Section 9.4).

Under this guideline Sweden has also provided bursary support within South Africa (Section 9.5). The African Scholarship Fund, [illegible] Trust, and the [illegible] [illegible] Trust have all been partly funded by Sweden for scholarship programs in South Africa. Swedish aid [illegible] through WUS South Africa has also supported bursary organisations, including the Ecumenical Bursary Fund, the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Trust, the South African [illegible] Education Trust, the South African Prisoners Education Trust, and the South African Medical Scholarships Trust.

8.4 SUPPORT TO (EXTERNAL) SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS

Until a few years ago a major share of Swedish education assistance supported the education of South Africans outside their country (for example, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of total Swedish education aid in 1991/92). As Sweden phases out its external scholarship programs, Swedish support will enable current recipients to complete their programs.

External scholarship programs were excluded from the terms of reference for this review and are not discussed further here.

9. RECIPIENTS OF SWEDISH EDUCATION SUPPORT

We turn now to a review of the activities of recipients of Swedish support to the education of South Africans and to a general assessment of that assistance. For that, several introductory comments are in order.

First, it is important to recall that our charge is to explore the overall impact of Swedish education assistance rather than to evaluate in detail the operations, accomplishments, and problems of individual organizations. That is an inherently difficult task, since a major share of Swedish aid supports organizations that engage in multiple activities and that receive other funds. That arrangement permits a greater degree of local initiative and autonomy than does project-based funding, but its diffuseness and tolerance for ambiguous boundaries make it difficult to establish clear links between a particular allocation and a specific outcome.

Second, while assistance is formally provided to individual projects and organizations, much of the work that receives support is collaborative. We discuss separately in our initial report and below, for example, the African National Congress Education Department, the National Education Co-ordinating Committee, the National Education Policy Investigation, and the several Education Policy Units. Clearly, however, crafting alternative education policies and developing the skills and institutions required to become effective participants in policy making are not the responsibility of a single organization. Indeed, the several organizations that share that responsibility intersect and overlap. For this reason, too, it has proved impossible to attribute a specific result to a particular grant.

Third, as we sought ways to measure the impacts and effectiveness of Swedish support to particular projects and organizations, it became increasingly clear that counting participants and dividing the total allocation by the number of participants to derive the per capita expenditure constitute a sorely limited and limiting approach to evaluating these activities. The number of people reached does of course matter, and we seek to provide some information on that. But what the participants learned and what they have done with that learning matter a good deal more. This assessment dilemma is not limited to out-of-school programs. Schools too are often evaluated in terms of numbers of students, or numbers of students who complete a course or pass an examination. Far less frequently, unfortunately, do evaluators seek to address systematically and critically the quality of learning and its uses.

A general discussion of evaluation philosophies and strategies is beyond the scope of our work, and we have no ready solutions to offer. Had detailed evaluations of individual organizations been our major task, we would have invested a great deal of energy and time in developing an approach organized around each group and its objectives, with the participants in each project serving as its principal point of reference and its primary evaluators. We are convinced that evaluations of that sort should become a more prominent concern of, and integral to, WUS-South Africa's support program.

Our concern here, therefore, is to situate the institutional recipients of Swedish education assistance within SIDA'S overall support program. When we inquire about the participants in, say, a literacy group's activities, we are not primarily asking "how many people has this group reached, compared with other similar groups or with reasonable expectations about what it might do?" but rather, "what can we learn from participation in this group's activities about what Swedish aid has or has not accomplished?"

Fourth, other than the major scholarship programs, Swedish aid to South African education has declined by nearly 30% over the past four years, from SEK 43.5 million in 1991/92 to 31.0 million in 1994/95 (strict comparison is impossible, since the allocations for the current year, 1994/95, have not yet been finally determined (Table VI, page 114). Since total Swedish assistance to South Africa seems to have declined even more precipitously, education's share of that total has increased, from 24% in 1991/92 to [illegible] in 1994/95.

Fifth, the composition of Swedish education assistance has also changed sharply (calculated from Table VI, page 114). By mutual agreement, support to the African National Congress was concluded early in 1994. Consequently, while the ANC received one quarter of Swedish education aid in 1991/92, it will receive no funding in 1994/95. Some of Sweden's aid continues to support what were formerly ANC-managed scholarships and education policy development through organizations now formally independent of the ANC.

Although most of the Swedish support to bursaries is to be phased out, declining support for other education activities means that scholarships continue to claim half of Sweden's aid to the education of South Africans: 42.7% in 1991/92, 52.8% in 1992/93, 54.0% in 1993/94, and 52.4% projected for 1994/95. The share allocated to the major internal bursary organizations (Batlagae Trust, African Scholarship Fund/[illegible] Trust, and Luthuli Memorial Trust) has increased even more sharply: 16.3% in 1991/92, 17.4% in 1992/93, 25.4% in 1993/94, and 28.2% projected for 1994/95. (See Table II, page 47)

The total allocation to the World University Service-South Africa and the organizations it funds increased by 13% during this period (from SEK 21.8 million in 1991/92 to SEK 24.6 million in 1993/94), making WUS-SA by far the largest recipient of Swedish education aid, increasing from 20% of total education support in 1991/92 to 36% planned for 1994/95.

9.1 AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

Two transitions frame the Swedish education assistance allocated to the African National Congress over the past few years. First, a primary concern with the education of ANC members, families, and other South Africans in exile was succeeded by a principal focus on education and human resource development policy for the South Africa of the future. Second, as the ANC redefined its own role, moving from clandestine opposition to South Africa's apartheid government to participation in the 1994 majority rule election to leadership of the new government, education aid formerly routed to and through the ANC has increasingly been directed toward specific activities that are formally independent.

In our initial report, *Anti-Apartheid and Development*, we reviewed the allocations to and activities of the ANC's Departments of Education and Human Resources Development through mid-1992. Since direct support to the ANC was concluded early in 1994, the final months of 1993 saw the further transfer of responsibilities from the ANC itself to other organizations, especially the Batlagae Trust for bursaries and the Centre for Education Policy Development for negotiations, crisis resolution, and policy related activities. Since there were no significant new initiatives during that winding down period (SIDA's education support to the ANC went from SEK 19.0 million in 1991/92 to SEK 2.5 million in 1993/94), we limit our comments here to a summary overview of this part of Swedish assistance to South Africa.

9.1.1 Education Department

There can be no doubt about the critically important role the ANC Education Department has played during the period leading up to majority rule. Education is central to South Africa's future. That is so both because development, however defined, will require understanding, skills, that a critical approach and vigorous education will for many years to come continue to be the most visible and most contested of public policies.

If South Africa's education system is to be negotiated rather than imposed, those who have until now been excluded from policy discussions must be empowered to participate in them effectively. Along with and often coordinating and guiding other organisations, the Education Department has promoted that empowerment. That was a daunting challenge, given the government's constraints, both financial and human, for extended [illegible] of the [illegible] development, even with foreign assistance. Our assessment is that the Education Department's accomplishments were impressive in this regard, especially in [illegible] the [illegible] government's evolving education agenda through successive negotiating arenas.

At the same time, the Education Department was less successful in finding ways to [illegible] broad participation and undertake concrete planning simultaneously. In part that was a function of the need to address immediate crises, perhaps at the expense of [illegible] longer term analysis and policy development. Still, even in the midst of the [illegible], [illegible] principles and practices and decisions about purpose and [illegible] must take place day by day. Both are on-going processes; neither has a clear end point. Accordingly, it was important that the Education Department be able to pursue the general [illegible] at the same time that it [illegible] specific policies that were sufficiently clear, adequately [illegible] and [illegible] supported for immediate implementation. Our assessment is that the Education Department was far more successful in encouraging and facilitating broad discussion and participation than it was in translating the fruits of that discussion and [illegible] into the sort of concrete and practical agenda that the new government could adopt [illegible] immediately after it assumed office. It also seems clear that the Education Department did not fully appreciate the complexities and challenges in gaining control over and transforming the existing education bureaucracy.

As we suggested in our initial report, the demarcation between the ANC Education Department and the CEPD was not sharply drawn. One consequence of the [illegible] of that arrangement was that transfer of staff and responsibilities from the ANC Education Department to the CEPD was in general not disruptive of on-going activities.

On the whole, Swedish support to the ANC Education Department has played a critical supportive and facilitating role. That it was timely and that it left initiative and control largely in the recipients' hands were particularly important.

6.1.2 Department of Human Resources Development

As we noted in our initial report, notwithstanding its broader charter, the ANC's Department of Human Resources Development (DHRD) was primarily concerned with education and training for ANC cadres and members. It seems to have been unable to make the transition from that emphasis on staff development to a focus on national policy for human resources development. Indeed, as we reviewed the policy debates in that arena—discussions that were often lively, imaginative, and critical—we were unable to discern a major role for DHRD. Nor were we able to identify significant collaboration between the Education Department and the Department of Human Resources Development in that regard.

Once again, we are unable to assess fully the impacts and consequences of this part of Swedish education assistance to South Africa. The individual education and training support provided by DHRD with Swedish funding may have had an important role, but the available evidence on who received that training, how it was organised and applied, and what roles those individuals now play does not permit us to do more than note its potential contribution. And as we have noted, SIDA seems not to have played a leading role in the conception and development of post apartheid human resources policy.

8.3 NATIONAL EDUCATION CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

The National Education Co-ordinating Committee has played a central and leading role in the efforts to transform South African education since its inception. As a national, regional and local coalition of student, teacher, parent and worker organisations which organised across schooling and higher education sectors, the NECC galvanised popular support for its efforts to develop a cohesive, focused and mass based attack on Bantu and Apartheid Education. Accordingly, support to the NECC has been critical in assisting South Africans to confront apartheid education and in enabling them to conceive and develop alternatives to it. Earlier in this report we described the evolution of policy initiatives and negotiating forums in whose formation the NECC played a central role. We also described how these forums have affected the centrality of organisations such as the NECC in the evolution of an innovative, alternative and critical education policy. Our observation is that the emergence of these forums and initiatives and its responses to them caused a crisis for the NECC, effectively undermining its continuing role and function in national education policy processes. The unbanning of the African National Congress, the establishment of the ANC Education Department, and the subsequent election of a government of national unity have intensified the uncertainty for the NECC. The increasingly independent actions and policy roles of the NECC's organisational allies, particularly SADTU, have compounded this uncertainty. Whereas from its inception until 1991 the NECC had been the leading innovator and negotiator, in short the education policy center of the democratic movement, that situation changed in 1992, and the organisation had to share those roles with the ANC Education Department, the National Education Conference, and the National Education and Training Forum. As a result, the NECC began to experience a collective identity crisis. Accordingly, the NECC has held a number of workshops to analyse education's evolving political context and its own responsibilities, roles, and functions. Since implementation of decisions taken at those workshops is still at an early stage, here we are concerned with those decisions only as they will affect the future role of the NECC.

Swedish support to the NECC has been provided to enhance its capacity to develop education policies for the new South Africa and to develop innovative and progressive classroom based education policies and programs involving both learners and educators. SIDA funding to the NECC has declined substantially from SEK 1.8 million in 1991/92 to SEK 1.0 million in 1993/94 and proposed for 1994/95. We here review the People's Education Program (PEP) funded directly through the NECC and the National Education Policy Investigation funded through the Education Development Trust (EDT), both projects of the NECC which were specifically supported to advance these objectives. We discuss separately the Education Policy Units, including those previously supported by SIDA and those currently supported by the Swedish Agency for Research Co-operation with Developing Countries (SAREC), that were established by the NECC, like the National Education Policy Investigation, to develop innovative, alternative, and critical education policies for the new South Africa.

9.2.2 The People's Education Programme

In our earlier report we described the NECC's establishment of the People's Education Programme to initiate innovative efforts at classroom level directed at transforming curriculum and curriculum policies. These programs are informed by the values of democracy, non-racialism, and non-sexism, and were developed to promote critical thinking, collective work, and to achieve participation among learners and teachers in the educational process. For the NECC, outcomes of the PEP include both a macro-policy impact through which the organization seeks to influence national education policy and educational practices and a political output through which the organization seeks to create a political momentum and enabling environment for the achievement of people's education practices. Specifically, in order to advance these objectives, the NECC has identified two organizational focuses, first, the generation of classroom subject publications and worksheets for teachers and students, and second the creation of subject associations that directly involve teachers and students in the development of a people's curriculum. We review the achievements of the PEP together with those of the National Education Policy Investigation below.

9.2.3 The National Education Policy Investigation

In our earlier report we discussed the National Education Policy Investigation, a cross-sectoral enquiry into policy options for a future education system that was organized into 12 research groups involving more than 300 people. The results of this initiative, presented as alternative policy options under specified conditions, were published in 1993 in 13 volumes (*The Framework Report and Final Summaries*, and one report for each of the 12 research groups) and also in a single popular version, *Planning Our Future: Education Policy for Change*. We evaluated the role and contribution of that series of publications in *Anti-Apartheid and Development*.

As a follow-up to the publication of these reports, and with the objective of drawing popular participation into the scrutiny of these documents and the development of a popular based education policy, NECC regional, local level and sectoral organizations, in particular COSAS, SADTU, SASCO, and UDUSA, participated with government officials in the review and discussion of the NEPI reports. These local, regional, and national reviews culminated in the National Education Policy Conference, held 2-5 December 1993 at the University of the Witwatersrand, where a national perspective was developed. The earlier agreement to translate the NEPI reports into local languages to ensure popular participation in the discussion was not accomplished, due, the NECC reported, to insufficient resources. However the NECC also reported that it had contracted translation departments of several universities in order to make the NEPI Reports accessible to local communities and individuals. The specific target audience included NECC sectoral organizations, heads of educational institutions, government officials, and education NGOs. Participation of government officials was according to the NECC well below expectations.

NEPI sought to ensure that the interests of local communities would inform the policy guidelines and frameworks that were developed. Time constraints precluded reaching out to all localities. The NECC believes that at a regional level, however, the consultation process gave the organization legitimacy as a full participant in formal policy work.

9.2.4 Evaluation of the Contributions of the PEP and NEPI

The NECC has played a leading and critical role in the initiation, conceptualization, and evolution of what was initially envisioned as an alternative to apartheid education: people's education. This initiative had three major components. First, a political component which initially won space in schools within a period of national political insurrection (1985-90). Second, a subject development component intended to develop worksheets, curricula, and textbooks for people's education. And third, the development of the concepts of people's education into practical policies for the transformation of apartheid education through the establishment of Education Policy Units.

The last four years have for the democratic movement seen a troubling decline in the initial political momentum generated around people's education. This decline is not surprising, especially since the pursuit of solutions to the deep-seated and spiralling crisis in the education sector clearly dominated the activities of the NECC. What is surprising, though, is that the hard fought principles of people's education remain largely in the background of principal policy initiatives such as both the NECC's NEPI and the ANC's policy framework. Finding the principles of people's education in these documents is difficult, and where they can be located, they are buried in a broader concern for "getting the system right and working." It remains to be seen to what extent the principles and values of people's education will inform the new education and training system. In our opinion, people's education as originally conceived may now have run its course. The decision of the NECC to revive people's education may well be important. But creating a political momentum similar to that of the founding period of people's education will be a huge task. For one, the political context of that period—a national insurrection which had been a principal stimulant for people's education—no longer exists. The characteristics of a similarly supportive setting are not clear, nor is creating it clearly within the reach of the NECC and its allies. For another, for the NECC to achieve this goal, both conception and practice, it will have to reconstruct the necessary internal capacity as well as full sectoral organizational support of the earlier era. Many of the observers with whom we spoke regard that as extraordinarily difficult, perhaps impossible.

The subject committees that were created to develop a people's education curriculum have apparently gone into sharp decline. The States of Emergency (1985-1990), which were intended to crush this fledgling initiative at its conception, undoubtedly significantly contributed to this outcome. Again, the NECC's ability to re-establish subject committees—a crucial step if the NECC seeks to change apartheid education practices—will depend on expanding its internal organizational capacity. But also, and perhaps more critically, success will rely on the capacity and commitment of sectoral organizations. However, immediate past and current experiences, which have seen institutional, service conditions, macro-educational policy and education crises issues dominate the agendas of these organizations, do not favor the ability of the NECC to transform educational-philosophical commitment to practice. In our opinion, people's education is thus likely to continue to remain in the background, with neither political momentum nor a curriculum development component.

The ongoing links between the Education Policy Units and the NECC and its people's education project are currently unclear and at best tenuous. The EPUs were initially established by the NECC (in collaboration with a number of South African universities) to advance people's education from a political-philosophy for education to actual educational practices. Hence, from the perspective of the democratic movement, our assessment must be troubling. These institutions have evolved largely independently from the NECC and the NECC from them. The NECC seeks to reintegrate these institutions into its organizational structure as an essential element in its greater people's education project. However, having evolved more or less independently over the last seven years, the EPUs may not find that reintegration or its terms attractive.

The NEPI process also provided an important opportunity for the NECC to translate the people's education project into actual educational practices. As has become clear, NEPI developed policy alternatives, and did not start off fully from the political philosophical principles of people's education. Even so, the NEPI results still provided an important opportunity for the NECC to develop from them its own strategic vision and intervention. To this end the NECC organized, albeit with varying success, local, regional, and sectoral debates and policy forums, which ignited a national education policy discussion. However, in our opinion, the national policy workshop held to develop an NECC strategic vision, did not fulfil its promise. No national strategic plan for education that can be said to be distinctly an NECC initiative has so far been developed. In fact a special summit had to be organized in July 1994, almost two years after the publication of the NEPI reports, to advance this process, for which completion is now projected to be as late as August/September 1994. Clearly, this outcome must partly account for the absence of a visible and compelling national democratic movement education agenda during the first 100 days of the Government of National Unity. That the translation of people's education from a political-philosophical vision of education to actual education practices remains incomplete is thus especially problematic for the democratic movement. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that there is currently little or no commitment by the new education ministry to the greater project of people's education and its translation into educational practice. Even the NECC and its sectoral organizations have yet to clarify their relationship with the education ministry in this regard.

To characterize the evolution to date, people's education was successful as a strategy for energizing and guiding the critique of apartheid education. It provided a vision and a framework for reconstructing education outside apartheid's schools, including providing a platform for innovative and critical approaches to curriculum, materials, and pedagogy. It played an important role in mobilizing participation in efforts to assert community control over education. But it did not become, nor did it lay a practical foundation for, the sort of curriculum or pedagogy that could be directly adopted and implemented by a new education ministry. And it did not serve as a vehicle for translating NEPI into a popularly constructed national education agenda. As its founding context changed, its major role progressively disappeared and its organizational base decayed.

Notwithstanding these most recent experiences, we remain convinced of the important contribution that people's education has made in transforming apartheid education into a non-racist, non-sexist, democratic, and people-driven education. SIDA's support for the NECC—through the PEP and NEPI—have been important in facilitating the present achievements of people's education. The NECC and its sectoral organizations will require significant and targeted support to be able to continue to pursue and to achieve this energizing but elusive vision.

9.3 CENTRE FOR EDUCATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT

In our initial report we described the creation of the Centre for Education Policy Development, a recent recipient of SIDA funds (SEK 4.5 million in 1993/94 and SEK 4.0 million projected for 1994/95). In that report we described as well the evolution of policy working groups which were initially created within the ANC's Education Department and subsequently transferred to the CEPD. Composed of researchers and practitioners, these groups were charged to undertake research and policy development in specified areas of education and training and to assume responsibility for consultation, outreach, and advocacy through the dissemination of their reports and the organization of workshops and seminars. These groups were to be links between education policies and education constituencies. Their starting point was the ANC/COSATU draft discussion document, *A Framework for Lifelong Learning: A Unified Multi-Path Approach to Education and Training.*

With the evolution of the ANC Education Department in this particular manner—a determined focus on the development of education policies to transform apartheid education through the work of the CEPD—the distinction between it and the CEPD became blurred. Most of the work of the ANC Education Department and much of its personnel thus moved into the CEPD, in part the result of a decline in direct funding of the activities of the ANC itself by international agencies such as SIDA, and in part a consequence of the leadership style of the new director, John Samuel. The ANC Education Department became a less central player in the consolidation of the anti-apartheid education movement, and there was correspondingly less emphasis on mobilizing the ANC membership and traditional allies behind a popular and people-based program to transform apartheid education, strikingly a key principle of the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme. For the ANC Education Department, coordination and consolidation of the anti-apartheid education movement was to be achieved through several macro-policy forums in whose establishment and evolution the CEPD had played a central role. In our earlier discussion of the achievements of these forums (the National Education Conference and the National Education and Training Forum) we pointed to a sharp decline in the joint actions and strategizing of the anti-apartheid education movement within them. Suffice for now is to point out that in the quest to develop a set of detailed implementation plans and to create macro-policy forums to influence state education policy, both vital elements for the eventual transformation of apartheid education, less attention was directed to building and consolidating grassroots ANC constituencies and traditionally allied education mass organizations. Thus whatever policies were to emerge from the CEPD, which had by now become a critical element of the success of the ANC, would be more vulnerable to the criticism that they were developed outside the of the context of educational institutions and away from mass organizations. At the same time, it is important to note that the creation of the CEPD and its staffing to develop education and training policy for the ANC was of course not entirely responsible for the eventual trajectory of the ANC Education Department.

Task Teams commissioned by the CEPD participated in drafting what are now the two principal ANC Education Department policy documents. First, in January 1994, the ANC released *A Policy Framework for Education and Training*, a document drafted by the CEPD from the initial ANC/COSATU draft document, *A Framework for Lifelong Learning: A Unified Multi-Path Approach to Education and Training.* Second, the *Policy Framework* and the ANC's *The Reconstruction and Development Programme*, to whose human resource development chapter the CEPD had made substantive contributions, provided the basis for drafting the *Implementation Plan for Education and Training. IPET* provides detailed plans for the new education structures required, identifies existing legislation to be repealed and new legislation to be enacted, and steps needed to implement the proposals of the *Policy Framework* and the *RDP.* Plans are provided in summary reports for adult basic education, curriculum, early childhood development, finance, further education, gender, general education, governance, higher education, library and information services, media in education and training, a national qualifications framework, open learning, science, maths and technology, teacher development and support, training, rural and farm education.

In developing *IPET* the ANC was seeking to build as broad a pre-election coalition as possible, one that stretched across all education subsectors. Accordingly, detailed summary implementation plans were developed for the transformation of each of twenty educational areas. That is, rather than building a coalition around a core set of priorities prior to the election, the

CEPD and ANC have opted to build a coalition on an all inclusive list. There are two significant consequences of this strategy. First, unlike an approach that identifies a limited set of educational objectives which should be achieved to show rapid and visible changes in education, the strategy adopted results in providing to the Government of National Unity and the national and provincial education ministers an all inclusive set of implementation plans for twenty areas. It leaves to them the determination of priorities both across and within the twenty areas. Policy is thus conceived as a handover exercise—specifications are developed and handed over to a new government for its selective implementation—rather than as a as a process in which policy development itself includes contestation over priorities and in which that contestation is expected to continue after the recommendations reach the decision makers. A further potential result of this strategy is that the broad pre-election coalition may come crashing down as each set of practitioners and activists seeks to win government support for its implementation plans. It now seems clear that several of these priorities may be shelved, or only partially implemented, since it is unlikely that significant new funding will be added to the education budget. The need to respond to the pressing demand for expanded access and to particularly vocal school and higher education constituencies may leave several of the implementation plans, especially adult and preschool education, in the planning rather than implementation phase.

A second and equally striking consequence of this strategy is the absence of a detailed plan for transforming the white dominated apartheid education bureaucracy. Such a plan might have identified specific incumbents for replacement or reassignment or sidelining and particular members of the anti-apartheid education movement for short term training and appointment to the administration, remaining mindful of the provisions of the Interim Constitution concerning the tenure of civil servants. Such a plan also might also have specified an institutional reorganization strategy, guided as much by the importance of increasing the transparency and accountability of the new administration as by functional divisions of responsibility. Developing that plan would necessarily have had both a short term and a long term perspective, with special sensitivity to the resilience of any organization and its inherent resistance to change. Clearly, the replacement or sidelining of the existing bureaucracy, which is steeped in the political philosophy and practice of apartheid, must be fundamental to the ANC/CEPD effort to transform education and training and to implement the goals of the RDP and the Policy Framework and the specific objectives of the IPET. If so, then the apparent lack of detailed attention to gaining control over the education bureaucracy must be a major contributing factor to the post-election impasse in advancing the democratic movement's education agenda.

As we noted earlier, the CEPD was to facilitate a participatory process leading to the development of implementation plans for education. To achieve that, the CEPD convened two public conferences to discuss the Policy Framework and IPET. Participants included allied constituencies from the teacher and students sectors, along with departmental officials, school principals, and other educators. However, these conferences seemed not to satisfy the demand for popular participation and transparency in the development of policies and plans, and resulted in some conflict among the ANC Education Department, the NECC, and NECC's constituencies over the nature of a people-driven educational transformation as well as over the Policy Framework and the IPET themselves. We were told that the issue was temporarily resolved through an agreement that policy would remain open-ended and subject to change and would be developed further by the different education constituencies. Transparency would then be the outcome of contributions to policy development by every constituency. But as one observer stressed, the conception of democracy that underlies this view is one that privileges consultation over participation, and thus one which seems to be a dramatic departure from a prior insistence by the democratic movement on participation at the outset and at every stage of policy development.

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the CEPD remains incomplete. Extracting from IPET a limited set of achievable priorities for rapid implementation by the national and provincial education ministries, providing policy support to the ANC inside and outside of government as well as to mass-education organizations, and continuing to play a prominent role in the ongoing contestation over policy (contestation that is often indirect and circuitous and that has no clear endpoints) are fundamental tasks for organizations like the CEPD and the EPUs. We have observed that the immediate past period have seen gains and losses within the democratic movement. Perhaps now even more than during that period it is essential to South Africa's reconstruction for the movement that has played such a critical role in the removal of the apartheid regime to regroup and to collectively develop a strategy to pursue its goal of a non-racial, non-sexist, and democratic education. We believe that a revitalized and restructured CEPD will be a crucial element in the new phase of struggle over the transformation of apartheid education practices and the achievement of the vision of the education democratic movement.

3.4 COSATU Participatory Research Programme

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is the largest trade union federation in South Africa. Its wide ranging activities include assisting its member unions in negotiations, providing union education, researching and developing new adult basic education and vocational training policies, participating in the democratic movement's macro-economic and macro-education negotiations, and more generally playing an active role at the center of the democratic movement.

COSATU is one of the major organizations working to shape adult education and training policy in South Africa. It seeks to do so at several levels: individual firm, industry group, training board, and nationally. COSATU participated in the major education initiatives of the democratic movement (National Education Co-ordinating Committee, Education Delegation, Joint Working Group, National Education Conference, National Education and Training Forum), as well as the National Economic Negotiating Forum, where it assumed the lead in dealing with adult education policy. It has as well held discussions with government agencies and the private sector, for example in the National Training Board and the Industry Training Boards.

COSATU maintains that adult education is fragmented. Accordingly, one of its main goals is to develop a centralized national system of adult education. It proposes a flexible national education and training system in which there are clear links and movement among formal schooling, adult education, industrial training, and other adult education and training systems. In its draft policy guidelines COSATU outlines its objectives for adult basic education: to address class, race, and gender inequalities; to encourage critical thinking; to promote economic development; and to build self reliance.

COSATU's initiative in seeking to integrate education and training is visible in the recent work of the Centre for Education Policy Development and the creation of the NETF (which otherwise might well have been the National Education Forum). In 1993 COSATU, together with the ANC, drafted *A Framework for Lifelong Learning: A Unified Multi-Path Approach to Education and Training*. That document, the focus of workshops organized by the CEPD, sought to provide the foundation for translating general principles into specific policies and concrete programs for a national system of education and training. Both its general orientation and its basic principles were incorporated into the ANC's education manifesto, *A Policy Framework for Education and Training*.

That document also highlights the convergence of several initiatives that have received Swedish education support, all concerned with developing and ultimately implementing a vision of education and training in the reconstruction of South Africa. One path begins with the National Education Co-ordinating Committee and leads through the Education Policy Units and the National Education Policy Investigation. A second path has its roots in the Education Department of the African National Congress, and with links to NECC and NEPI passes through the Education Delegation, the Joint Working Group, and the National Education Conference to the CEPD and the NETF. A third path has somewhat less clearly focused origins in a wide range of local adult education programs, many of which worked through the various institutional bases of the democratic movement to influence national policy on adult education. And a fourth path emerges from the labor movement, is manifested in union proposals and recommendations, takes clearer shape in COSATU's Participatory Research Project, and is crystallized in *A Framework for Lifelong Learning*.

One of COSATU's most recent achievements is the preparation of a new National Training Strategy Initiative. COSATU rejected the earlier National Training Strategy put forward by the apartheid government in 1991. Consequently, a task team including the government, employers, unions, and providers of education and training worked collaboratively and developed a new policy framework for education and training. Published in April, 1994, the new National Training Strategy Initiative has four prominent features: adult basic education is the central focus; it adopts an integrated approach to education and training; it has an explicit focus on linking restructuring the education and training system with restructuring the apartheid labor market; and it proposes changes in the legislative and institutional framework governing education and training.

COSATU's affiliated unions have also achieved some successes. Since 1991 unions have energetically challenged the assumption that the nature of education and training should be determined by management. Some unions have used COSATU's principles and short term guidelines to restructure the industry training boards and are moving towards improving the training provided to workers. Along these same lines, some unions have, with the help of the COSATU short term guidelines, institutionalised unions' influence in literacy and numeracy programs.

In 1991 COSATU accepted the proposals of the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) for a new vocational training policy and established a Participatory Research Project to enable COSATU members to study and develop skills in (1) literacy and adult basic education and (2) training and grading. The project's longer term goals include reorganizing the education and training system; restructuring workplace grading systems, especially to eliminate race and gender segregation; reforming the pay structure to insure not only equal pay for equal work and but also equal pay for work of equivalent value; and facilitating changes in the workplace to respond to new technologies and investment patterns. In this very imaginative project, participants gather information through field interviews, seminars, and reading and then use that information to develop and refine principles, policies, and programs in literacy/adult basic education or training and grading. This interactive process works to maintain effective links between the mass base and those who make policy. As well, it enables COSATU members who might not otherwise have a direct role in the policy process to contribute to it in an informed and critical manner.

Since the initiation of this project some of the COSATU-affiliated unions with bargaining agreements have tabled new vocational training and adult basic education policies during their negotiations. COSATU's own assessment of the original project (now termed Phase 1) is that it has led to a clear and dramatic improvement in its participants' own understandings and skills.

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The most visible result is that there are much more [illegible] by the written documents [illegible]. At the same time, the project has not yet been able to ensure that its results are fully [illegible] into COSATU's political [illegible] and activities. Some [illegible] have been much more [illegible] of this than others.

To date, this project has developed a viable framework for activity. The challenge now, we were told, is to apply this framework to each sector, developing specific approaches, skills and tools as needed. For this, each COSATU union will be asked to assign a full time person, [illegible]. That is, the goal is to shift the participatory research from coordination from the project office to each of its affiliated unions. The [illegible] specified in South Africa's Interim Constitution will also require significant participation at the provincial level.

Swedish assistance to this project has been routed through the Swedish trade union federation, LO [illegible] that has provided an additional [illegible]. COSATU is now seeking external funding to support this project (Second Phase ?). Pending the conclusion of this process SIDA has, we were told, agreed to provide partial, interim funding to permit the project to continue.

In November, 1994, COSATU decided to extend the Participatory Research Project for an additional three years in order to consolidate the work already done, to integrate the project more firmly into COSATU's own institutional relationships, to strengthen capacity building, and to find further funding from within South Africa. Although it is not yet possible to assess the longer term results of this project, its content and its conduct are important in their own right and merit, we believe, continued support.

Although the relationship between COSATU and its Swedish counterpart, LO/TCO, has been largely financial, a recent Swedish visit to South Africa led to useful observations and helpful suggestions on the granting system. This, it would seem, is a relationship that is ripe for enrichment. For that to occur, each partner must perceive there are useful things to be learned through their interactions with South African/Swedish counterparts. For the collaboration to be both mutual and strong, each must see direct benefits for its own activities. Currently, this arrangement is apparently an effective model for directing Swedish assistance through a Swedish organization to a South African organization. Developed further, it could become a model for genuine development cooperation.

9.5 SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS

Sweden has for many years provided bursaries to South African students. Initially, the major purpose of these bursaries was to enable South Africans in exile and others disadvantaged by their political activity or by their race or gender to begin or complete their education. Funding reached students through a variety of channels, often involving Swedish and international institutions as well as South African organizations. Trusts were created to receive, distribute, and administer scholarship funds. As the South African context for that scholarship support has changed dramatically, it is timely for SIDA to evaluate its support to bursary programs. For that evaluation it is essential to consider several of the more general issues related to bursaries and the finance of higher education.

5.5.1 The Evolution of Bursaries in South African Higher Education

Historically, higher education in South Africa has been primarily a public responsibility, with access limited to a very small, and until very recently nearly entirely white, elite. In 1993, from a white population of approximately 5.1 million, more than 150,000 students were enrolled in universities and 54,000 in technikons, while from a black population six times as large, approximately 31.3 million, only two-thirds as many students, 101,000, are enrolled in universities and one third as many, 17,000, in technikons.

Bursaries—funds to pay required fees and related education costs and a maintenance allowance—enabled those poorer students who secured admission to enroll in institutions of higher education. In the context of the struggle against apartheid, some bursaries were specifically directed toward students deemed to have special needs, including those disadvantaged because of their political activity (within and outside the country), their rural origins, or their gender.

In general, bursaries have been directed to individuals and have not been explicitly oriented toward redressing the formal and informal segregation of South African higher education. Since bursaries were intended to permit those who faced severe obstacles in their efforts to join the education mainstream to overcome those impediments, there was a strong tendency to send bursary students overseas or to the white universities within South Africa. That inclination was reinforced by the widespread rejection of the black universities. Those creations of apartheid were dismissed by some as academically inferior and by others as crumbs offered by white rule.

The situation has changed dramatically in several important respects. As the major political opposition has become the leading partner in a government of national unity, there is a declining need for bursaries designed specifically to serve activists and their children. As well, a few of the black universities have emerged from their isolation with recognized academic strengths and an increasingly integrated student population. At the same time, the principal white universities have begun to recruit black students, primarily at the undergraduate level. The smaller bursary organizations have achieved some consolidation and coordination of efforts, especially through the Bursary Council of South Africa.

In terms of bursaries, the most striking and controversial change has been the initiative of the Commission of the European Community and Kagiso Trust (KT) to combine loans with grants. The starting point for those new arrangements is the assumption that it is necessary to transfer more of the costs of higher education from the public treasury to students and their families. The vehicle for that is to replace grants (initially, a part of each grant) with loans. Accompanying that transition is a second major change: the transfer of responsibility for selecting scholarship recipients and administering scholarship programs from bursary organizations to the institutions of higher education, apparently to increase efficiency and reduce the managerial burden on the providers of the funds. Legislation passed in 1993 enables employers to deduct repayments of student loans, which are then deposited (effectively through the income tax system) into a revolving fund. That approach is intended to achieve a significantly better collection rate than is the experience in other countries with similar loan schemes and to transfer recovery responsibility from bursary providers and institutions of higher education to employers and the tax collector. Once repayment begins, that revolving loan fund will in principle support new generations of students without requiring major new allocations of resources. Eventually, we were told by Kagiso Trust's Executive Director, there will be no bursaries; all student support will be in the form of loans. To move toward that goal, the KT and the Independent Development Trust (IDT) established in late 1990 the Tertiary Education Fund of South Africa (TEFSA), with an initial EU allocation of R50 million, and a further EU allocation of R30 million in 1993. Initially KT's Executive Director expected to move TEFSA toward self sufficiency by securing additional contributions of R150 million, with approximately equal shares to come from the government, from Kagiso Trust and the Independent Development Trust, and from foreign agencies. As we explain below, the optimistic expectations of 1993 became dispiriting frustrations by 1994. The projected withdrawal of European Union support to KT puts at risk, we were told, both students who currently receive financial assistance and the loan scheme itself.

Within the emerging national student support plan, students are to receive part of their support as a loan that is to be repaid after the student has secured employment and has an income over a specified threshold. The institutions of higher education are to receive the funds directly, determine which students are to be supported, and monitor students' progress in their academic programs. Not surprisingly, the introduction of these arrangements generated national controversy and protest that continues to the present. Even many of those who are convinced that a loan scheme is necessary have been critical of the manner in which the new policies were introduced. Acknowledging its unpopularity, those responsible for introducing the new scheme insist that there was extensive prior consultation, though not consensus. During the past year, the South African Students Congress has agreed to a loan scheme on the condition that bursaries not be phased out completely.

There have been, we were told, three immediate consequences of the new arrangements. First, students' difficulty in meeting costs incurred prior to the receipt of bursary plus loan (initial fees, expenses of getting to school), widespread confusion about how the scheme is to work, and concern about assuming what may become enormous debts have combined to reduce the number of students enrolled in and applying for admission to institutions of higher education, especially the black universities. Thus, at a time when those institutions expected rapidly increasing applications and admissions, instead they are experiencing a decline, with negative consequences for staffing, scheduling, and the like. Eventually, we presume, it may be possible to address this problem by modifying the terms and timing of fee payments and loans.

Second, the apparently more limited administrative capabilities of most of the black universities have, we were told, effectively restricted the funds they received directly. That, of course, compounds the problem of declining applications and admissions at the black universities. To address the perceived institutional weaknesses, Kagiso Trust has allocated funds for administrative support, primarily to black universities (approximately R1 million in 1992 and 1993).

A review of Kagiso Trust's support to universities over the past two years is instructive. As Table I shows, although both the number of awards and the total amount allocated to black universities increased from 1992 to 1993, the percentage of the total amounts allocated to black—but not white or non-residential—institutions in fact declined. Much more striking is the comparison of per capita awards. In 1992 the average award at white and black universities were R11,418 and R8,150 respectively. That is, supported students at white universities received nearly one and one-half times as much money as their counterparts at black institutions. In 1993 the comparable averages were R9,155 and R4,164 at white and black universities. While the average award declined in both sets of institutions, it apparently went down much more precipitously at black universities, where funded students received less than half as much as their counterparts at white universities. This is not the place to pursue this analysis further. It seems clear, though, that the large and apparently increasing difference in the allocations to students at white and black universities cannot be explained entirely by the differences in the levels of their fees. It seems equally clear that notwithstanding the substantial support to students at black

Table I **Kagiso Trust Awards to Universities, 1992 and 1993**

KAGISO TRUST SCHOLARSHIPS AND LOANS TO UNIVERSITIES, BY UNIVERSITY TYPE, 1992 AND 1993

Number of Awards

TYPE OF INSTITUTION	1992		1993	
	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT
Black Universities[a]	2,678	70.9	6,171	62.3
White Universities[b]	839	22.2	1,537	15.5
Non-Residential Universities[c]	260	6.9	2,194	22.2
Total	3,777	100.0	9,902	100.0

Total Amounts Allocated (South African Rand)

TYPE OF INSTITUTION	1992		1993	
	AMOUNT	PERCENT	AMOUNT	PERCENT
Black Universities[a]	21,826,439	67.8	25,696,281	57.3
White Universities[b]	9,579,832	29.8	14,071,996	31.4
Non-Residential Universities[c]	774,800	2.4	5,073,887	11.3
Total	32,181,071	100.0	44,842,164	100.0

Per Capita Allocations (South African Rand)

TYPE OF INSTITUTION	1992		1993	
	AMOUNT	RATIO	AMOUNT	RATIO
Black Universities[a]	8,150	1.0	4,164	1.0
White Universities[b]	11,418	1.4	9,155	2.2
Non-Residential Universities[c]	2,980	0.4	2,313	0.6

Sources:
Kagiso Trust Education Department, *Project No. 301: Second Interim Report* (Cape Town: 29 August 1992)
Kagiso Trust Bursary Programme for 1993, *Project No. 357: Third Interim Report* (Cape Town: 20 May 1994)

Notes:
[a] The "historically black universities": Bophuthatswana, Durban-Westville, Fort Hare, MEDUNSA, North (Qwaqwa), North (Turfloop), Transkei, Venda, Western Cape, Zululand
[b] The "historically white universities": Cape Town, Natal, Natal Medical, Orange Free State, Port Elizabeth, Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Rand Afrikaans, Rhodes, Stellenbosch, Witwatersrand
[c] Non-residential universities: South Africa, Vista.

institutions, over this two year period these funds have not reduced—and may in fact have increased—the gap between white and black universities.

Recent developments require modifying some of the earlier perspectives about the future of TEFSA. First, to date the government has not contributed directly to TEFSA. Second, the European Union, we were told, plans to redirect its funding. Rather than supporting Kagiso Trust, it apparently intends to channel to the government the funds used for student support. For 1994, that is a very substantial allocation, approximately R45 million, assisting some 22,000 students. Arguing that the government does not have the infrastructure to administer a major bursary fund, KT's Executive Director is concerned that this money will be used to support other activities.

Although the ANC electoral campaign did focus some attention on bursaries, for the present the new government's intentions remain unclear in this regard. We were told that the minister intends to request that IEF provide additional bursary funding directly to universities. If the European Union in fact redirects its student support funding to the government, that may prompt the development of the government's own administrative machinery for bursaries and loans. Yet, believing that it has fulfilled its role in this area, the EU has informed that it intends to phase out bursary funding. Hence, funds allocated for that program will be short term. The government could, of course, take over TEFSA, though many of the people with whom we spoke expect TEFSA to become a parastatal institution, governed by a board that involves representatives of community organizations, universities, technikons, KT, and the IEF. But since it cannot count on EU funds for student support beyond the next few years, whatever the future of TEFSA, the government will be expected to find ways to increase student support. Experience elsewhere suggests that even if the revolving loan fund's recovery rate is high—which seems unlikely in the South African circumstances—it will need periodic infusions of new funds.

However, a third consequence of the new student support arrangements, we were told, is that some of the smaller bursary organizations are no longer receiving funds from KT or external agencies and have had, therefore, to reduce or terminate their scholarship programs. Community based bursary organizations argue that their local roots enable them to be more sensitive to the needs of students and better placed to provide necessary support services. It is common for those organizations to visit students and staff at their institutions to discuss the students' progress and to play a mediating role when disputes arise. They also provide advice, career guidance, counseling, and occasionally emergency supplementary funds to students and their families. Often they play an advocacy role. Both the representatives of the smaller bursary organizations with whom we spoke and others doubt that either a national scheme or the universities can provide comparable services. They are also skeptical about the presumption that a national program will be more efficient. Most important, they are persuaded that a centralized, national scheme will tend to favor those students who are already advantaged and will certainly not undertake affirmative action to recruit black students, especially females and those from rural backgrounds. The outcome: the continued dominance of the historically white universities. In this way, the establishment of a national student support program is intimately linked to the issues of higher education finance. If the new arrangements favor the historically white universities and a minority of the historically black universities, they will reinforce the inclination to rationalize higher education by closing some of the black institutions or some of their departments. In that way those arrangements will contribute to the perpetuation of individual and societal inequalities well into the future, especially since even under the most optimistic assumptions TEFSA will not be able to provide sufficient support to meet the expanding demand and certainly not to redress the inequalities in access to and survival in higher education. Accordingly, many of the people with whom we spoke see a continuing role for the smaller bursary organizations, not only until a new national student support scheme has been instituted but well beyond that.

Table II Swedish Scholarship Support, 1991/92-1994/95

Swedish Scholarships for South Africans, 1991/92 - 1993/94 (Swedish Crowns [SEK] '000,000)								
Organization/Purpose	**Disbursed 1991/92**		**Disbursed 1992/93**		**Disbursed 1993/94**		**Planned 1994/95**	
	SEK	**%**	**SEK**	**%**	**SEK**	**%**	**SEK**	**%**
Directly Funded Internal Bursary Organizations								
Fundani/African Scholarship Fund	5.20	7.0	8.60	13.5	7.20	10.2	12.21	20.0
Batlagae Trust	—	0.0	—	0.0	9.80	13.9	5.00	8.2
Luthuli Memorial Trust	2.50	3.4	2.50	3.9	0.88	1.3	—	0.0
Total	7.70	10.3	11.10	17.4	17.88	25.4	17.21	28.2
WUS-SA Funded Bursary Organizations								
DCLS	—	0.0	0.07	0.1	0.17	0.2	—	0.0
EBF	0.05	0.1	0.09	0.1	0.10	0.1	0.11	0.2
HVAT	0.27	0.4	0.33	0.5	0.33	0.5	0.36	0.6
SALDRU	—	0.0	0.22	0.4	0.22	0.3	0.24	0.4
SAMST	0.14	0.2	0.12	0.2	0.13	0.2	0.14	0.2
SAPET	0.63	0.9	0.68	1.1	0.63	0.9	0.69	1.1
SASET	0.47	0.6	0.55	0.9	0.51	0.7	0.56	0.9
Total	1.57	2.1	2.06	3.2	2.09	3.0	2.10	3.4
External Scholarships								
World University Service–Int	6.60	8.9	6.60	10.4	4.60	6.5	4.0	6.6
African Educational Trust	13.20	17.7	11.90	18.7	11.50	16.3	5.80	9.5
Southern African Adv Educ Project	3.50	4.7	1.75	2.8	3.50	5.0	3.00	4.9
Total	23.30	31.3	20.25	31.8	19.60	27.8	12.80	21.0
Summary								
Total Scholarship Support	32.57		33.41		39.57		32.11	
Total SIDA Education Aid	74.50		63.65		70.43		61.01	
Scholarships as % of Education Aid	32.57	43.7	33.41	52.5	39.57	56.2	32.11	52.6
Directly Funded as % of Educ Aid	7.70	10.3	11.10	17.4	17.88	25.4	17.21	28.2
WUS–SA Funded as % of Educ Aid	1.57	2.1	2.06	3.2	2.09	3.0	2.10	3.4
Externally Funded as % of Educ Aid	23.30	31.3	20.25	31.8	19.60	27.8	12.80	21.0

fifths of that amount is earmarked for WUS–SA, with the balance to fund external scholarships administered by WUS–I. Approximately 86% of the funds received by WUS–SA are to go to its project partners, with the balance to support WUS–SA itself (Table V, page 68).

Several recent reports have evaluated WUS–SA and some of the organizations to which it directs funds (especially, *Overview of the South African Situation and World University Service (WUS) South Africa, Appraisal Report for Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA)*, and *Final Report on the Evaluation of South African Projects Supported by the Swedish International Development Agency*). Accordingly, we took our charge to be to evaluate the goals, priorities, activities, and orientations of WUS–SA more generally and to assess its role as a principal conduit for Swedish education assistance to South Africa.

9.6.1 History and Organization

Until very recently, part of Sweden's aid to education in South Africa was routed through the World University Service–International (WUS–I), based in Geneva, which in turn supported a diverse set of projects and organizations within South Africa. Established in 1990, WUS–SA initially shared responsibility for selecting, administering, and monitoring those projects, while WUS–I remained the funding conduit. In 1992 WUS–SA became a fully independent national agency. Unlike most of the other affiliates of WUS–I, WUS–SA works primarily with community organizations rather than at the university level. Beginning in 1993/94 WUS–SA assumed primary responsibility for receiving SIDA funds and distributing them to the recipient organizations. To manage the major tasks associated with that role, WUS–SA has expanded its staff, particularly employing a Deputy Director and an accountant, and upgrading their skills.

It is important to note two threads in the history of WUS–SA that bear on its current philosophy, orientation, and relations with what its leadership terms its project partners. First, WUS–SA and its project partners were created in quite different circumstances. While many of the WUS–SA project partners emerged in the 1980s as active participants in the anti-apartheid struggle, WUS–SA was established in 1990 during a time when many community organizations were being pressed to reduce or abandon their anti-apartheid programmes in the transition from anti-apartheid to development. (As we indicated at the outset of this report, we find that notion of transition quite misleading and unhelpful, both analytically and politically.) While its project partners were created in response to local needs and demands, notwithstanding its very local focus WUS–SA was in large part the product of the external environment and its South African connections.

Second, at its birth WUS–SA had to deal with a dual inheritance. As a conduit for foreign assistance, it inherited responsibility for supporting organizations that were not of its own choosing and that did not necessarily fully share its goals and priorities. Along with those organizations came SIDA's assumptions about their importance and their appropriate level of funding. In at least some cases, we were told, contrary to SIDA's own commitment to rely on WUS–SA to select organizations to be supported and set their allocations, SIDA has insisted on maintaining the support and the level of support for particular organizations. On the other hand, the recipient organizations inherited WUS–SA. At least some, we were told, believe they have less support and less reliable support than they could secure if they were able to work with SIDA directly.

In large part because of this complicated heritage, there is no simple way to characterize WUS–SA's activities. Formally, it operates four programs: South African Returnee Programme (SARP), South African Internal Programme (SAIP), the Women's Development Programme

(WEP) and the Academic Exchange Programme (AEP). In practice, however, since the SAEP is being phased out, the WEP is a relatively recent initiative, and responsibility for the AEP is being transferred to the Union of Democratic University Staff Associations, nearly all (80%) of what WUS-SA does falls within the NAP. For that reason, and since it is the principal recipient of SIDA funding to WUS-SA, we focus our attention here on the NAP.

In WUS-SA documents, the activities within the NAP are termed projects. Accordingly, the organisations that undertake those activities are project partners. Yet, WUS-SA documents also speak of supporting more than sixty organisations. That is, sometimes the terms "organisations" and "projects" are used synonymously, while at other times they denote different things. Where the project and the organisation are indistinguishable, the funds directly support both. In other cases, however, the recipient organisations undertake several projects and may receive funds from several sources.

Hence, although the terminology does not make that clear, some of SIDA's aid supports specific projects, while other aid supports organisations which, though they are characterised as projects, may modify their project focus and priorities over time. While this ambiguity — support for specific projects or support for organisations that undertake desirable projects — is not necessarily problematic, it does make it more difficult to develop appropriate assessment perspectives and measures.

To characterise the activities within the NAP, WUS-SA has employed several similar but not entirely consistent typologies. As well, where its tables and figures present summary information in those categories, sometimes they show the number of projects, while other times the figures refer to the level of spending. Those discrepancies reflect, we were told, WUS-SA's efforts to describe its projects in the categories required by the funding sources. Our sense is that those discrepancies are also in part a function of the inherent difficulty of determining whether a voter education project, for example, ought to be categorised as literacy, post literacy, adult basic education, skills training, or simply other. Similarly, how to categorise a project intended to empower women who have little or no formal education: literacy or income generation, or skills training or women and gender? What of two projects, one focused on women and gender and the other primarily concerned with out of school, unemployed young adults, that both use the same voter education materials? Again, we do not find these ambiguities fundamentally problematic. The most effective community organisations often have multiple objectives whose priorities are regularly adjusted (usually more informally than formally) to accommodate changing circumstances. But these different ways of presenting WUS-SA's activities make it very difficult to summarise succinctly the main thrust of its current overall program, how that has changed over time, and the priorities it assigns to the different sorts of activities it supports.

Clearly, the ambiguities of the categories are unavoidable. At the same time, the numerous different presentations suggest that WUS-SA is itself still at an early stage in defining its objectives and priorities, even as the settings in which it and its project partners work are changing rapidly. Compounding the confusion is the expectation that WUS-SA will continue to support projects and organisations that may not fit well into the more focused vision that WUS-SA is developing.

Amidst these transitions and ambiguities, however, there are indications that the focus of WUS-SA's activities is becoming clearer. To capture that focus, we employ the categories used in the recent WUS-SA document, "World University Service (WUS-SA) Progress Report and Rationalisation to Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) for the Continuation of Funding to Education and Training NGOs in South Africa" (see Table III).

Table III WUS SA's Project Partners, by Category, 1993/94

WUS SA Project Partners: SIDA Funding and Participants[1]
By Category, 1993/94

Project Partner Categories[2]	Number of Groups	1993/94 SIDA Funds (SA Rand)	1993/94 Total Funds (SA Rand)	1993/94 SIDA % of Total Funds	Number of Participants[3]
Adult Basic Education / Literacy (Learners, Teachers)	23	1,694,440	24,740,818	7.8	24,781 L 998 T
Post Literacy	3	556,150	4,150,878	9.7	88,000
Bursaries	7	2,078,640	7,817,028	26.4	1,218
Other Adult Education	12	1,339,340	24,018,418	5.5	1,341,818
Innovations / Policy	10	1,165,000	6,650,131	17.8	16,840
Other Projects	8	861,070	3,722,885	23.1	7,818
Total	63	7,698,100	69,991,792	11.1	1,481,888

Sources:

World University Service South Africa, *Report to SIDA: Update on Project Partners: Beneficiaries and Funding* (Cape Town: WUS SA, June, 1994)

World University Service South Africa, *World University Service (WUS SA) Progress Report and Rationalisation to Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) for the Continuation of Funding to Education and Training Work in South Africa* (Cape Town: WUS SA, March, 1994)

Notes:

[1] This summary refers to the 63 WUS SA projects that receive SIDA funding. WUS SA currently supports 80 projects, of which 65 are identified as SIDA funded. Apparently 2 of these 65 are not currently receiving funds (WUS SA, *WUS SA Progress Report*, 1994).

[2] Categories as specified in WUS–SA, *WUS SA Progress Report*, 1994.

[3] As noted in the text, organisations describe their participants in very different ways: individuals, trainers, newsletter readers, villages. Consequently, in most categories, a single group that publishes many copies of a newsletter, may report ten times as many participants as all the other groups in that category combined. Further analysis is required to make "Number of Participants" a meaningful indicator.

Although they support a relatively small number of individuals and involve few groups, bursaries continue to claim more than one fourth of WUS–SA's allocations. As Table IV shows, that constitutes a larger share of WUS–SA's 1993/94 allocations than Adult Basic Education and Literacy projects, with more than three times as many groups and nearly twenty times the number of direct participants.

Of WUS–SA's 65 project partners designated to receive SIDA funds, 38 were classified as adult education, including 23 involved in adult basic education and literacy, 3 working on post literacy, and 12 active in other areas of adult education. These adult education project partners received approximately R3.5 million in 1993/94 and reached nearly 1.5 million learners.

Though simple, it would be misleading to use these figures to calculate the expenditure per individual learner, for several reasons. First, the range in learners reached by these organizations is very wide, from 23 to 10,000 per organization. Hence, an overall average would obscure what might be very different expenditures per learner across these organizations. Second, participants in each group's activities are of several different sorts. Some organizations,

Table IV WUS-SA's Activities and Priorities, 1993/94

WUS-SA's Priorities as Indicated by Number of Groups and 1993/94 Allocations[1]

Activity Categories[2]	Groups		Allocations[3]	
	Number	Percent	Amount (ZAR)	Percent
Adult Basic Education / Literacy	23	37	1,664,330	22
Post Literacy	3	5	399,150	5
Bursaries	7	11	2,078,340	27
Other Adult Education	12	19	1,559,640	20
Innovations / Policy	10	16	1,183,660	15
Other Projects	8	13	881,070	11
Total	63	101	7,706,100	100

Sources:

World University Service-South Africa, *Report to SIDA: Update on Project Partners, Beneficiaries and Funding* (Cape Town: WUS-SA, June, 1994)

World University Service-South Africa, *World University Service (WUS-SA) Progress Report and Rationalisation to Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) for the Continuation of Funding to Education and Training NGOs in South Africa* (Cape Town: WUS-SA, March, 1994)

Notes:

[1] This summary refers to the 63 WUS-SA projects that receive SIDA funding. WUS-SA currently supports 69 projects, of which 65 are identified as SIDA-funded. Apparently 2 of those 65 are not currently receiving funds (WUS-SA, *WUS-SA Progress Report*, 1994)

[2] Categories as specified in WUS-SA, *WUS-SA Progress Report*, 1994.

[3] SIDA funds allocated by WUS-SA.

for example, report the number of learners in workshops, while others indicate the number of teachers trained or the number of villages served, and still others estimate the number of readers of their publications. It would be far more confusing than elucidating to compare the per capita expenditure on one group's 8 teachers with the per capita expenditure on another group's 295,000 readers. Related to that difference, third, we have no good way to measure the second level and indirect impacts of an organization's activities. Where the participants in a group's activities are teachers, or community leaders, or curriculum developers, how many additional learners do they reach? Fourth, it is likely that there are important differences in the accounting strategies used by the recipients of WUS-SA funding. For example, the method of allocating central support staff salaries across multiple projects may differ sharply among organizations. In one setting, all or nearly all the director's salary may be associated with a single activity, while in another the director's salary may be divided, evenly or unevenly, among several projects. Though the data are complex, the point here is straightforward. In the absence of very detailed studies of projects and organizations over time, the calculation of expenditure per project participant yields no meaningful information.

WUS-SA's administration has expanded over the past three years to reflect its increasing responsibility for the management and oversight of funds as well as projects. At the same time, SIDA has expressed its concern about the proportion of its overall funding to WUS-SA that is allocated to administration. But exactly what portion of its income does WUS-SA spend on administration? We have explored several approaches to that question, none of which is entirely satisfactory. Several factors complicate the accounting. First, in 1991/92 and 1992/93, WUS-I (Geneva) was responsible for overall financial management and disbursement. Hence, part of the cost of administering the project funds was for services provided in Geneva, some for administration and implementation in South Africa, and some for coordination between the two. Those two years are thus not directly comparable to 1993/94. Second, since WUS-SA receives funds from multiple sources, there are in practice two queries, not one. What percentage of its total receipts does WUS-SA spend on administration, and what percentage of the funds received from SIDA does WUS-SA spend on administration? Third, since in the financial reports provided to us administrative expenses are not directly associated with individual projects, it is impossible to distinguish the two preceding queries. That is, there is no straightforward way to determine, for example, what percentage of, say, the office cleaner's salary is associated with SIDA-funded projects, or with projects funded from other sources. Fourth, WUS-SA's own programmatic expenses (evaluation, policy forums, and capacity building) have increased significantly. That may be quite desirable, but those activities are apparently neither funded as a separate SIDA-supported project nor directly attached to SIDA-funded projects. Some receive funds from other sources. And fifth, we have no reliable information on administrative expenditures by and within each individual organization that receives Swedish support through WUS-SA.

With those complicating factors in mind, let us explore what it costs to administer the project funds routed from SIDA through WUS-SA. Table V provides an overview of the uses of SIDA support to the SAIP. We do not consider here Swedish support sent directly to WUS-I for the activities it continues to administer.

One approach is that pursued by WUS-SA, whose 1994/95 budget notes explain that of the total request to SIDA for support to the SAIP (R8,940,674), R800,000 will be for WUS-SA's administration (listed as "coordination"): 8.9%. In that accounting, projects are to receive 82.1% (72.2% for continuing projects, 9.9% for new projects) of the total allocation, while WUS-SA administration and programmatic activities will account for 17.9%.

A second approach is to include in WUS-SA's administrative overhead all activities that are not directly part of funding projects. From this perspective, WUS-SA's programmatic activities—evaluation, policy forum, and capacity building—are part of the cost of administering the SAIP projects. In this accounting, the administrative overhead for 1993/94 was 19% of the total SAIP allocation.

A third approach would be to examine WUS-SA's total funding and expenditures, rather than SIDA's allocations. According to WUS-SA's 1994/95 budget notes, the funding requested from SIDA will pay 70% of WUS-SA's total administration budget. Depending on whether SIDA funds constitute more or less than 70% of WUS-SA's total income, the portion of that total allocated to administration may be more or less than the 8.9% noted above.

These accounting ambiguities are both a legacy of the apartheid past, when the situation of apartheid required greater fluidity and discretion and less clarity to external observers, and a function of the transfer of responsibilities from WUS-I to WUS-SA. Flexibility and discretionary authority are also required in the present. At the same time, there can be no clear accountability when it is impossible to determine clearly—at either the central level or the project level—what is being spent on administration.

It is timely, we believe, to resolve some of those ambiguities. To achieve that, one strategy would be to include funds for administration in each project or organization grant. In that way, administrative and central programmatic expenses would be clearly identified as a cost of each activity. Rather than funding salaries and benefits separately, each project would in effect use part of its allocation—increased by perhaps 9-10% for that purpose—to pay for the

Table V WUS–SA's Administrative Costs

SIDA Support to the SAIP:
WUS–SA's Administrative and Programme Expenses and Project Funds, 1991/92 - 1994/95[a]
(South African Rand [ZAR] '000)

	Disbursed 1991/92		Allocations 1992/93		Allocations 1993/94		Proposed 1994/95	
	ZAR	%	ZAR	%	ZAR	%	ZAR	%
Implementation/Coordination[b]	175	36	404	30	944	51	800	50
Evaluation	21	4	35	3	85	5	100	6
Policy Forum	93	19	175	13	218	12	300	19
Emergency	196	40	711	54	—	—	—	—
Capacity Building	—	—	—	—	620	33	400	25
Total Administrative and Programme Expenses	485	99	1,325	100	1,867	101	1,600	100
Administration	175	1	404	3	944	10	800	9
WUS–SA Programmes	310	3	921	7	923	9	800	9
Project Funds	11,315	96	11,075	89	7,877	81	7,341	82
Total Allocation	**11,800**	**100**	**12,400**	**99**	**9,744**	**100**	**8,941**	**100**
Administration and Programmes as % of Total Allocation	*485*	*4*	*1,325*	*11*	*1,867*	*19*	*1,600*	*18*

Sources:
WUS–SA and SIDA budgets and financial reports, 1992-1994.

Notes:
[a] The numbers and percentages for these fiscal years are not strictly comparable. Some of the budgeted funds have not yet been, and due to changing circumstances may not ever be, disbursed.
[b] In WUS–SA's presentations, it is this line item, termed Implementation or Coordination, that is considered to be *administration*.

central administration. If WUS–SA's other programmatic activities were funded in the same way, rather than funding separately, say, the capacity building program, each project or organization might contribute 18-20% of its (increased) allocation to support the capacity building program, along with evaluation, policy forums, and other activities undertaken by WUS–SA. The actual percentages could be calculated on the basis of the previous year's experience, or set at different levels for different sorts of projects, or negotiated for each organization. This strategy would make clear to everyone the costs of administrative and other services and institutionalize WUS–SA's accountability to its project partners. One consequence of this approach is that reduced project funding would automatically reduce the resources that finance WUS–SA salaries and office expenses.

A second strategy would be set administrative expenses as a percentage of SIDA's total project funding and then provide separate direct project grants for evaluation, policy forums, capacity building, and similar activities. The annual overhead rate could be set to reflect previous experience or differentiated by types of funded projects.

Other strategies are available, all of them complicated by the fact that WUS SA receives funds from several sources. Our concern here is not to press for any particular strategy for funding administrative and other services or to recommend a specific formula in calculating allocations. Nor are we criticizing the services that WUS SA provides. Indeed, as we note in this section and elsewhere in this report, we believe that WUS SA is making a valuable and effective contribution in South Africa, both as the administrator of Swedish assistance and in its own initiatives. Rather, our point is that the ambiguities in the current situation make it difficult to determine reliably and confidently what percentage of SIDA's funding finances WUS SA's central administration. Equally important, we are convinced that resolving at least some of the funding ambiguities we have noted is a prerequisite for increasing the accountability of both SIDA and WUS SA.

5.5.5 WUS SA's Evolving Role

As we have indicated, WUS SA plays multiple roles and must address the different expectations of the organizations with which it works. Some of its project partners regard WUS SA primarily as a funding agency. They are of course aware that WUS SA is an intermediary redistributing Swedish aid. But they expect WUS SA to be a creative and energetic fund raiser, approaching SIDA and other potential sources to secure continuing support for their projects. These project partners see their own organizations as too small, too unsophisticated, and too inexperienced to be successful fund raisers. Similarly, some recipient organizations, though they might be able to secure their own support, prefer that WUS SA provide administrative services and especially that WUS SA deal with SIDA rather than doing so themselves. Other project partners find this relationship frustrating and complain that WUS SA's funding criteria are not clearly specified and inconsistently applied, to their disadvantage. Better, they argue, that they deal directly with SIDA.

Our discussions with representatives of several organizations in 1994 suggest that WUS SA and its project partners have during the past year built a closer and more cooperative working relationship. Indeed, several characterized that relationship as "exceptional" and "outstanding." The Education and Resource Information Project (ERIP) reported that WUS SA has played a more active and dynamic role during the past year and has become much more efficient in managing its responsibilities. The National Language Project (NLP) complimented WUS SA for prompting its own thinking about race and gender issues. The NLP also noted that WUS SA supports its project partners' own strategic planning. The [illegible] Literacy Project ([illegible]), a rural literacy group, commended WUS SA's support of rural organizations and its provision of much needed training. Especially at a time when funds for NGOs appear to be shrinking, WUS SA's support is critical to some organizations, the National Literacy Co-operation noted. Several organizations stressed that they found WUS SA more accessible, friendlier, and generally easier to work with than other funding agencies.

Complicating this situation is the wide range of organizations that fall within WUS SA's funding umbrella. Some are indeed small community groups with few staff members and a very local focus. Others are national organizations with a history that predates WUS SA, some with staffs that far exceed that of WUS SA. While some of its project partners are involved in a limited set of activities for which there is expertise within WUS SA's staff, others have much broader programs and address issues on which WUS SA's staff has no special expertise.

In this setting, WUS SA's leadership asserts quite firmly its intention to play a developmental and not solely a funding role. They want WUS SA to be recognized for the ways in which it has enhanced, or supplemented, or enriched the efforts of the projects and organizations it supports. They point proudly, and with reason, to the impressive workshops (academic freedom, gender issues) and forums (adult basic education, sustainability and capacity building) they have organized. They note as well their important role in promoting and facilitating communication, coordination, and cooperation among their project partners and other organizations. And they worry that the assertiveness and sheer size of the larger groups may suffocate the smaller, less experienced organizations that are unable to raise their own funds and that find it difficult to present and defend their interests effectively.

Here, too, it is important to stress that it is not necessarily problematic that WUS–SA plays multiple roles or that its project partners have differing expectations. That confusion may provide a seed bed for new initiatives and new ways for community and other organizations to interact with each other. At the same time, that confusion can also breed frustration, suspicion, and distrust. We are puzzled that WUS–SA has not sought more energetically to reduce the dysfunctional ambiguities in its relationships with its project partners, perhaps in conjunction with increasing its accountability to them. Accordingly, we reiterate here an approach we outlined in our initial report. It is timely, we suggest, for WUS–SA to identify several categories of project partners for which it provides different sorts of services. For one set of organizations, WUS–SA might function primarily as a funding conduit, facilitating the transfer of funds from SIDA and other external organizations to projects and groups within South Africa. For a second set of organizations, WUS–SA might provide additional services, including supplementary fund raising, project proposal preparation, financial oversight, assistance with publications, and the like. For a third set of organizations, those with the least professional experience and expertise, WUS–SA might provide an even wider range of services, including project identification and development, staff training, and direct financial management and accounting. It is perhaps for these organizations that WUS–SA might provide the most imaginative and innovative added value to SIDA's funding. At the same time, WUS–SA could work to stimulate new projects and assist local efforts to create the organizations and infrastructure appropriate to their needs. WUS–SA would as well continue to make available to all its project partners its own staff expertise, for example, on issues of women and gender, and involve them all in its networking activities.

Although WUS–SA has undertaken detailed evaluations of the work of its project partners, it is not clear that either WUS–SA or the evaluated organizations have found those assessments very useful in modifying activities or deciding on future courses of action. To date, WUS–SA has not itself assumed the leadership role in developing an appropriate, sensitive, and fruitful evaluation strategy. We think it is now timely, indeed overdue, for WUS–SA to take the initiative in addressing the evaluation of its own and its project partners' activities.

WUS–SA has rapidly become a formidable fund-rasing and conduit organization. Initiative-taking and energetic, it has both aided organizations in their own development and prodded them to address crucial issues of race and gender.

As South Africa's contested transitions unfold, WUS–SA and its project partners are also in transition. Indicative of the reflection and projection of these organizations are the NGO summits convened recently. At the forefront of their discussions have been questions about the future roles for NGOs, the relationships between NGOs and the new government and between NGOs and the RDP, and links among the NGOs. As the roles of community and other non-governmental organizations in South Africa evolve, WUS–SA is well placed to be not only a funding conduit, but also a facilitator and a conscience.

9.8.3 Accountability

Just as WUS–SA has multiple roles, so it has multiple accountabilities. That, too, has advantages and disadvantages.

Internationally WUS–SA is affiliated to WUS–I, whose active role in South Africa has declined as WUS–SA has assumed more direct responsibility for receiving and distributing funds and for overseeing projects. Though something of an anomaly among WUS–I's affiliates, WUS–SA is currently organizing the WUS–I General Assembly, to be held in December, 1994. Building on that meeting's theme, Education and Democracy, WUS–SA will integrate its own policy forum into the WUS–I General Assembly.

At the national level WUS–SA has constituted a National Committee of approximately twelve members who serve for a term of three years. Two annual meetings provide opportunities for WUS–SA staff and committee members to discuss policies, progress, and planning. In addition, WUS–SA has a local Management Committee that consists of the National Committee members resident in Cape Town and a few locally appointed members.

WUS–SA is responsible to its project partners, especially through regular project visits when important issues are discussed and understandings negotiated. WUS–SA's forums also provide a means for project partners to interact with staff. During the pre-election period, WUS–SA was active in the coalition of organizations that constituted the democratic movement, participating in its meetings, thereby confirming, semi-formally and perhaps intermittently, its responsibility to a much broader constituency.

It is possible that participation in the Reconstruction and Development Programme, by both WUS–SA and its project partners, may develop another sort of accountability. As community and other non-governmental organizations assume ownership (practical if not juridical) of reconstruction and development projects, they will develop new relationships with the Government of National Unity and its constituent elements. Where that occurs, a broader, though perhaps more diffuse and less direct, accountability will emerge.

These are all important mechanisms to encourage WUS–SA to remain sensitive to its setting and responsible to its recipients and to the communities it serves. Still, WUS–SA's primary accountability is to its sources of funds. While SIDA is less prescriptive and restrictive than many other aid agencies, ultimately its expectations and preferences, as well as its requirements, carry very great weight. We do not think that is avoidable. We do believe, however, that it is timely for WUS–SA and similar organizations to institutionalize their accountability to those who receive the funds they distribute. SIDA's commendable efforts to foster a policy dialogue are both necessary and insufficient. Only firm, systematic, formally grounded, and reliable links with a mass base can provide a counterweight to the influence inherent in the provision of aid funds. We understand that WUS–SA and its project partners have begun to discuss funding issues. We deem it important and overdue to progress beyond discussions to developing a solid foundation for that accountability.

9.8.4 Organizational Development (Understood Broadly)

Our review suggests that WUS–SA's potentially most important contribution to South African development lies in its efforts to foster the gestation and nurture the maturation of organizations firmly grounded in their local communities. That is not to underestimate the significance of WUS–SA as a conduit for external funds to a wide range of groups that undertake progressive and developmental activities. We presume that will continue. Promoting organizational development carries WUS–SA well beyond that role of funding intermediary.

South Africa's new government confronts not only powerful forces committed to protecting the privileges of the past but also a new elite. While the state will need to play a central role in addressing those pressures, active community organizations are likely to be equally, if not more, important in building a democratic society, than they have in the past. Hence, promoting organizational development is not simply a matter of providing improved services. It is also central to constructing and protecting a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South Africa.

Thus the importance of a key theme of WUS–SA's work: a commitment to building small grassroots organizations. WUS–SA has observed that a transfer of authority from external funding agencies to the larger South African NGOs has either eclipsed or marginalized smaller organizations. As well, pressures for a revised agenda ("from anti-apartheid to development") and improved efficiency have led many smaller organizations to close down or to lose their contacts with local communities. As WUS–SA's Director stressed, the emphasis on efficiency can be disempowering. WUS–SA has responded by adopting a particular role in enabling small, grassroots organizations to assert their voice. WUS–SA is also making a concerted effort to incorporate into the national network the rural community organizations and emerging township groups that tend to be much more isolated than their urban counterparts.

WUS–SA convenes annual policy forums for its project partners at which key issues of organization building are debated. Its 1990 policy forum debated the roles, programs, and practices of mass-based literacy organizations in southern Africa. Held in Namibia, that forum included literacy experts from throughout the region. WUS–SA's 1991 policy forum discussed organization building among community and service organizations. Its 1992 policy forum addressed gender and development. Funding and finance for non-governmental organizations were the focus of the 1993 policy forum. As we noted above, WUS–SA will combine its 1994 forum with the WUS–I General Assembly, with the theme Education and Democracy.

WUS–SA has an appropriately and necessarily broad understanding of organizational development. In addition to staff education and practical skills training, organizational development must also address persisting racism, sexism, and obstacles to democratic practice. Those concerns are relevant within WUS–SA itself and within the staffs of its project partners, as well as among the populations those organizations serve. WUS–SA's staffing reflects its own affirmative action policies.

Indeed, in our conversations we heard of several settings in which it was too easily and uncritically assumed that racism, sexism, and anti-democratic practices were problems of the society at large but not within the organizations of the democratic movement. Staff members in several projects were apparently victimized because they challenged oppressive gender relations within their organizations. WUS–SA's gender coordinator intervened, enabling individual organizations to examine and analyze gender relations within their staffs and to devise strategies for addressing the problems that were identified. Similarly, the Director of WUS–SA reported that racism in community organizations has become an increasingly prominent issue, especially tensions between white executives and their largely black staffs and constituencies. During our recent visit, however, WUS–SA's Director reported that several white community organization directors had stepped down from their positions to create space for black successors.

WUS–SA continues to focus particular attention on issues of women and gender, responding to its observation that its project partners reflect the dominant gender (and racial) hierarchy. As we have noted, WUS–SA's gender coordinator has played an important facilitating role in assisting organizations to deal with particularly problematic situations.

This solid foundation enables WUS–SA, we believe, to expand its national role in two important respects. We have alluded above to the differing expectations and procedures of the many external funding agencies. One strategy for asserting greater South African control over the relationships with funders is for the recipient organizations to develop their own standardized application and reporting procedures and forms. That is, South Africans might develop a model proposal format to be used by all groups that seek funds and by all foreign assistance agencies. Similarly, South Africans might also develop a common end-of-project or end-of-grant reporting format and procedure. Of course, the details of those formats will have to be negotiated among the recipient groups and between those groups and the external agencies. Those negotiations may be rocky and will take some time. But completing them successfully will be a significant step toward transferring the locus of control from outside to inside South Africa. WUS–SA can, we think, play an initiating and leadership role in such an effort.

A second and parallel initiative is to develop a general approach to the evaluation of the work of South Africa's community and other non-governmental organizations. Their unique characteristics and special concerns often disappear in the common evaluation strategies employed by funding agencies. Where the principal focus is on the number of participants in particular activities or per capita expenditures, progress in combatting racism or changing gender relationships may disappear from view. The point is not that external agencies are inherently insensitive to these issues; for many, that is certainly not the case. Those agencies, however, must justify their own aid programs to an audience that may have little familiarity with South Africa or apartheid. One common result is that they incline toward evaluation strategies that can be employed throughout the world and that emphasize quantitative measures. South African organizations often assert that those universal and largely quantitative strategies do not capture the value and significance of their own activities. One way to convert that complaint into a step forward is for South Africans to take the lead in developing evaluation strategies they deem more appropriate. That, of course, is a complex task and will necessarily involve lengthy discussions, negotiations, and pilot efforts among South African groups and external agencies. But even a partial success will justify the effort, since South African organizations can use the procedures they develop whether or not their approach is generally accepted by the funding agencies. In this arena, too, we believe that WUS–SA can make an important contribution.

9.6.5 Adult Education Organizations in Majority Ruled South Africa

As adult education organizations explore their roles in majority ruled South Africa, they work to share their experiences and pool their resources, through network, formal alliances, and mergers. During our 1994 visit, for example, we learned of a merger involving two major adult education organizations.

For the present, then, there are pressures toward broader cooperation and merger. Not surprisingly, there is also confusion and tension about responsibilities, authority, and control over both resources and political access. Currently, there are two major national adult education coordinating organizations: the National Literacy Co-operation (NLC) and the South African Council for Adult Basic Education (SACABE). The NLC is a coalition for mass literacy organizations, while SACABE is a forum established as a shadow statutory body to provide advice on adult education. For both, their future roles remain unclear. Some adult educators believe the government should take over the work currently being done by non-governmental adult education organizations. To accomplish that, the government might directly incorporate into government parts or all of some adult education organisations. Alternatively, the government might contract with NGOs to provide services, as [illegible] adult education organisations are providing literacy programs for local and regional units. Others are skeptical that the government can or will expand rapidly its adult education programs. Accordingly, they favour a shift for the non governmental adult education organisations from training and materials development to direct instruction at an increasingly larger scale. No group has yet managed to do that successfully or to develop a detailed strategy for doing so. Still other adult educators expect their organisations to have an important continuing non-governmental role, monitoring, and as necessary, criticising, challenging, and prodding, the government. As one activist told us, however, "we have been [illegible], but we have no experience lobbying the government."

Adult education organisations are thus at a crossroads. Despite their high expectations that the new government will have a strong commitment to and make a major investment in adult education, the initial indications are not reassuring. While the rhetorical commitment remains strong, priority for human and fiscal resources seems to lie elsewhere. What then for the non governmental organisations? Several trajectories are possible:

- Adult education organisations could hand over their work to new and expanded government agencies and then close down. As we have noted, although many adult educators hoped that this would occur, currently it seems unlikely that government provided adult education will expand as rapidly or as far as was earlier expected.
- Adult education organisations could themselves become part of government, at national, provincial, or local level. Presently, this too seems unlikely.
- Adult education organisations could rapidly expand their own activities, moving from developing materials and educating teachers to direct instruction, presumably with public funding. Several organisations with which we spoke see this as the most desirable course of action in the current situation but remain very unsure on how to proceed.
- A fourth possibility is that adult education organisations continue to do largely what they have been doing, generally at a small scale. Their strength, many people point out, is their ability to innovate, experiment, and undertake pilot studies. [illegible] beneficial, they could provide specific services on contract to the government at national, provincial, or local level, thereby supplementing their income from other sources.
- Different organisations may pursue different paths, indeed all of those outlined above (and others) simultaneously.

9.8.8 Projects Visited

As we explained earlier, we took our charge to be to develop a general overview of WUS-SA and its activities. We did not seek to duplicate the more detailed internal and external evaluations that others have conducted. We did find it useful, however, to visit several projects and to meet with the staffs of others during our visits to South Africa in 1993 and 1994.

In our initial review, we reported on several of those visits and discussions: the Adult Learning Project, Use, Speak and Write English, Eliminate Racism and Sexism in Education, the National Language Project, the Student Services Centre (including the South African Students Education Trust, the South African Medical Scholarships Trust, and the South African Teachers Education Trust), and the Education, Resource and Information Project. Here, we extend those observations, both updating (but not reproducing) our earlier comments and reporting on several additional organizations. As well, we highlight some of the debates in adult education.

Since these commentaries are based on brief visits and discussions, they are presented here to raise issues for discussion and review, not as definitive determinations of the value or effectiveness of particular projects. The organizations and projects visited were selected in consultation with SIDA and especially with WUS–SA and emphasize initiatives in adult education. Unless otherwise noted, the details on participation rates and projected funding are drawn from WUS–SA, *South African Internal Programme: Summaries and Graphs on Project Partner Applications 1993/4 & 1994/5* (1993), *Report to SIDA: Update on Project Partners—Beneficiaries and Funding* (1994,) and *World University Service (WUS–SA) Progress Report and Rationalisation to Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) for the Continuation of Funding to Education and Training NGOs in South Africa* (1994).

9.6.6.1 *Adult Basic Education/Literacy Organizations*

In its latest classification of its project partners, WUS–SA has merged what were previously the adult basic education and literacy groupings into a single category termed adult basic education/literacy. Currently, 23 project partners are listed in this cluster. As we noted above, those adult education project partners received approximately R3.5 million in 1993/94 and reached nearly 1.5 million learners. These organizations serve urban, peri-urban, and rural populations. WUS–SA has made a concerted effort to support rural communities. Serving both employed and unemployed residents, these project partners offer mother tongue and second language literacy and numeracy. Some provide adult basic education or literacy classes, while others provide teacher education, develop curriculum and materials, and facilitate networking.

During our recent visit we met with several adult basic education/literacy organizations. In addition to our individual visits, a seminar organized by WUS–SA whose project partner participants included representatives of several adult education umbrella organizations (Western Cape Literacy Group, National Literacy Co-operation), provided an opportunity to explore pressing issues in the current discussions about adult education and the roles of community and other non-governmental organizations. One critique of those groups is that notwithstanding their initiative and energy, they reach few people. Their response is that they were not organized to do what the government should have been doing. Instead, their objective was to develop curriculum and teacher education strategies that the new government could use on a broader scale.

It is clear that in extraordinarily trying circumstances many of these organizations have made a significant contribution to the development of adult education, both policy and practice, especially through their experiments in materials development and teacher education. WUS–SA has played a pivotal role in this regard. The National Literacy Co-operation, at one stage entirely dependent on WUS–SA support, is currently working to harness the efforts of its affiliates to develop what it hopes will become the new national adult basic education curriculum.

Our 1994 visit permitted us to extend our discussion with three groups we reviewed in our initial report and to meet with several others.

9.6.6.2 *Adult Learning Project*

The main objective of the Adult Learning Project (ALP) is to teach basic literacy. Government repression, combined with criticism from within the literacy community, led ALP to close down in 1989. ALP resumed functioning in 1992 and was last year still in the process of revising its objectives, strategies, methodologies and programmes. In 1992 ALP worked with approximately 140 learners in fourteen groups. In 1993/94 ALP worked with approximately 130 learners in 12 groups. ALP received R100,000 in 1993/94, a 10% increase over its 1992/93 allocation but still a small portion, 18%, of its total budget. Its allocation for 1994/95 is scheduled to increase 10% to R110,000, 17% of its projected total budget.

Apparently responding to the criticism that during the 1980s it politicized its learners at the expense of literacy, ALP adopted, we were told, an "apolitical" approach to teaching literacy. At the same time, ALP continues to characterize its literacy programs as education for citizenship. We saw no indication that ALP had explicitly incorporated anti-racism, anti-sexism, and democracy in its education policies or practices. When asked about its role, the director of ALP said last year that as a small organization, it had no unique contribution in the field of literacy.

We found that response both instructive and puzzling. The repression and censorship of the apartheid past, it seems, will constrain what community organizations do into the future—not as external controls but as values and perspectives that have been internalized within the organizations themselves. We wonder what is to be the role over the long term of small literacy organizations whose orientation does not differ significantly from the larger public and private sector providers of literacy programs. If ALP and similar organizations do not distinguish their contribution by integrating into their learning programs a self-conscious and explicit attention to racism, sexism, and democratic practice, what is the rationale for continuing to support them?

ALP takes issue with our report of its work. It emphasizes personality conflict and organizational problems, rather than government repression, as the primary reason it earlier ceased its activities. As well, it defends its move away from "literacy with a direct 'political' rather than 'educational' role." We are grateful for the clarifications. These most recent of ALP's comments exemplify the ways in which community organizations reduce the uniqueness of their contribution as they seek to depoliticize their activities. To reiterate once again the point that we have made several times, we remain convinced that anti-apartheid and development are not alternatives and that community initiatives that do not actively and explicitly confront apartheid and its legacies cannot be developmental.

During our 1994 visit we learned that ALP is to cease independent operations, merging with Use, Speak, and Write English (USWE), discussed below, and handing over some tasks to ABE Development Services, itself to join USWE. Apparently, since several of ALP's staff members were leaving and long term funding remained insecure, it was deemed desirable to combine efforts rather than to maintain separate organizations.

9.6.6.3 *Use, Speak and Write English*

The main objective of Use, Speak and Write English (USWE) is to teach people to read and write and thereby to enable them to develop critical analytical skills. USWE teaches several literacy classes, and designs curriculum and course materials for literacy classes, trains literacy teachers, and designs training courses for literacy teachers. In 1992 USWE reached some 800 learners in 30 literacy classes in the greater Cape Town area. Extending its efforts, in 1993/94 USWE worked with 24 teachers and 1,000 learners. Its 1993/94 funding of R105,450, a 16%

increase over its 1992/93 allocation, provided 50% of USWE's total budget. Its projected 1994/95 funding, R109,834, a 4% increase, will also provide half of USWE's total budget.

In addition to incorporating ALP (described above), there are plans to merge some of the programs of USWE and ABE Development Services into the regional centre of the National Literacy Co-operation. To pool resources and to rationalise and broaden the impact of curriculum and materials development programs, the NLC itself is to be transformed from a coalition into a national adult basic education organization.

The learners in the USWE literacy class we visited at the Philani Centre in Khayelitsha in 1993 were mostly unemployed mothers of young children. These women were learning English as a second language in the hope of improving their prospects of securing employment in Cape Town. USWE also participates in the Western Cape Literacy Co-operative and the National Literacy Co-operation initiatives in literacy policy reform.

Like ALP, USWE has a distinguished and impressive history. We expect that to continue. At the same time, we were puzzled by two dimensions of the work we observed at the Philani Centre.

First, we were told that the women were required to participate in literacy classes (Xhosa? English? both?) as a condition of their access to the mat weaving that was apparently their principal reason for coming to Philani Centre. That is, women come to Philani Centre to weave mats they can sell to generate income. To be able to do that, they must join literacy classes. We are puzzled that the literacy program does not attract participants on its own. We are even more puzzled to see an element of coerced participation—one of the distinguishing characteristics of most schooling—in adult education. A fundamental premise of most adult education is that programs should provide what learners seek, not require adults to do what someone else thinks desirable.

Second, when we inquired about the anti-racist, anti-sexist, and democratic content in the apparently teacher-centered literacy classes that we were observing, we were told that the curriculum was already so full there was no room to add those elements, though of course teachers could raise those issues during discussions. We find that response unpersuasive. A basic curriculum at any level can be designed to integrate—explicitly and prominently—concerns with racism, sexism, and authoritarianism.

USWE, too, takes issues with our comments. First, the Philani Centre, not USWE, requires the link between mat weaving and literacy instruction. Second, USWE's director pointed out, the curriculum units we were shown and our discussion at the literacy class did not adequately reflect the anti-racist, anti-sexist, and democratic content of the materials USWE develops. We are reassured to learn that USWE's curriculum goes well beyond what was presented to us.

But our task was not to evaluate USWE as a literacy organization or to assess the quality of its curriculum. Rather, our charge is to evaluate Sweden's education assistance program, and in particular SIDA's support to non-governmental adult education organizations. As there emerge large scale government or private adult education programs, and as those programs come to resemble schooling, with examinations, certificates, and the like, what is the continuing role for the smaller adult education groups? If their programs do not distinguish themselves through their community involvement—the antithesis of coerced participation, whoever set the rules—and through their unique to contribution to the construction of a non-racist, non-sexist, democratic society, what is the rationale for continued foreign funding?

9.6.6.4 Education, Resource and Information Project

The main objective of the Education, Resource and Information Project (ERIP) is to enable organizations to develop their capacity to engage in the struggle for democracy. ERIP's activities can be clustered into several major areas: a full time youth development and leadership course; organization development training; and a resource centre. ERIP has had an ongoing commitment to building grassroots community based youth organizations since the 1980s. Its youth development and leadership course has analytical and skills components. Some of the participants in that course have found employment, some have returned to formal schools, and some have returned to their organizations. These courses have also generated a pool of youth trainers. ERIP also contributes to building regional and national youth coalitions by serving as a consultant to the Regional Youth Forum and the National Youth Development Forum steered by the Joint Enrichment Project. ERIP's Fundit course enables community organizations to develop fund raising skills. Interfund has invited ERIP to convene this course nationally.

It is important to note that ERIP's voter education program, discussed in our initial report, was in fact funded by the Olaf Palme Institute.

An energetic and effectively multi-purpose organization that provides services to many constituents of the democratic movement, ERIP is another of the groups that has inherited WUS-SA as a funding intermediary. Last year, ERIP reported that it found that relationship unsatisfactory. Specifically, ERIP indicated to us its dismay that it had not received all of the funding it had sought. ERIP's principal concern in this regard was that it be able to maintain a direct relationship with SIDA (and other funding sources, of which there are several). From ERIP's perspective, WUS-SA may play a useful role as a conduit for funds, but not as a gatekeeper. Happily, during our 1994 visit ERIP reported that its relationship with WUS-SA had improved considerably. ERIP noted that WUS-SA had begun to play a more active and dynamic role and commended WUS-SA for its efficiency.

In 1993/94 ERIP reported reaching 1,005 trainees from youth and community organizations. In that year, ERIP's received R145,450 from WUS-SA, a 7% increase over its 1992/93 allocation and 7% of its total budget. ERIP's 1994/95 allocation from WUS-SA is projected to increase 10% to R160,000, 9% of its total budget of R1,730,308.

9.6.6.5 Centre for Adult and Continuing Education (UWC) and Linköping University

During the period when SIDA did not provide direct assistance to institutions within South Africa, the Center for Adult and Continuing Education (CACE) at the University of the Western Cape sought SIDA support for its activities. Unable to provide that funding, SIDA facilitated the development of a relationship between CACE and Linköping University, the only Swedish university with a program for adult educators. During the past two years, the staffs of these two institutions have participated in exchanges. CACE's Director noted to us that both institutions had been struck by the remarkable similarity between the issues they were addressing. CACE found especially fruitful, she indicated, the recent visit of a Linköping staff member who had assisted the CACE staff in reflecting on their own work and possible future directions. CACE was necessarily so concerned with its immediate context, she pointed out, that it was useful to have an outsider participate in their discussions. CACE's Director was optimistic about the continuing utility of this exchange relationship, though it is too early for its longer term directions to be clear.

CACE also received direct support from WUS–SA for its networking activities in adult education: R60,000 for 1993/94.

3.6.6.6 *Education Resources Project / Emthonjeni-Primary Pathway Institute*

Established within the South African College of (formerly, Committee for) Higher Education (SACHED) in 1987, the Emthonjeni-Primary Pathway Institute (formerly the Education Resources Project) (EDUCRES) targets children described in the South African context as "the lost generation": children for whom the consequence of apartheid was a very limited and very disrupted formal education. Some come from marginalized communities (unregistered settlements and other communities that lack schools). Some were alienated by apartheid education and discouraged from or evicted by apartheid's schools. Some have dropped out for family, financial, or other reasons. All are too old to enter first grade, and most cannot attend formal schools on a continuous basis. Initially, EDUCRES helped people build schools for these children. Currently, however, it seeks to provide on site training and support to women who teach literacy to these children. The literacy classes aim to enable these children to develop sufficient literacy and numeracy to return to school. While EDUCRES' target group continues to be the lost generation, street children are now attending its literacy classes.

EDUCRES' principal premise is that it will simply not be possible for the government to meet the needs of what it estimates to be 2,000,000 out of school children. Instead, EDUCRES argues, communities should identify their out of school children, find or create an appropriate site and propose a community resident for teacher training with an emphasis on working with out of school and older children. Subsequently, those children will enter the education mainstream. EDUCRES hopes that the government will fund the teachers' salaries and that its pilot training project will be located in the Centre for Continuing Education, based at Peninsula Technikon and the Teacher Training Colleges.

In addition to training teachers, EDUCRES has sought to influence education policies and practices. It has applied to the Committee of University Principals to accredit its training course, expected to extend over an eighteen month period. EDUCRES has participated in the CEPD's work on curriculum policy and asserts that it played a pivotal role in focusing policy attention on out of school children and youth by arguing for reception classes for older returning learners.

Since SACHED's focus is adult education, EDUCRES has had to seek its own funding. WUS–SA provided R20,000 from its Capacity Building Fund and R50,000 through the SAIP in 1993/94, 7.5% of EDUCRES' total budget of R932,000. For that year, EDUCRES reported working with 8 teachers and 209 learners. Its projected WUS–SA 1994/95 allocation is to increase 10% to R55,000. EDUCRES has a commitment of funds from the IDT and is actively raising funds from other sources, both within and outside South Africa.

3.6.6.7 *Ilitha Labantu*

Ilitha Labantu, situated in the black township of Guguletu, is a community-based organization that addresses political and domestic violence. It has established four projects: a counseling service for victims of violence, a family enrichment program, a youth program, and a program, Bridging the Gap, to assist women who have left abusive relationships. Through conferences, seminars, and workshops, Ilitha Labantu seeks to educate the community about violence, particularly about violence towards women. Central to its programs is the development

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] and the absence of a green environment.

[illegible]

[illegible]

sees as an outcome of its education the generation of environmentally-educated communities who can influence environmental policy.

As part of its contribution to the RDP, Tsoga's Director, a lawyer who has specialized in environmental law, expects to draft new legislation. In this context, in addition to its own work in Langa, Tsoga has been asked to assist other communities with their environmental projects.

Since Tsoga does not fit the usual description of an education NGO, its work was deemed not to qualify for SIDA funding. Its support from WUS–SA, therefore, is for capacity building, R20,000 for 1993/94. To date, Tsoga has found that most other funding organizations consider the environment to be a low priority problem in poor communities and have therefore been unwilling to support Tsoga's projects. Its principal and most sustained funding, initially in the form of donated cargo containers, has come from a South African shipping firm.

9.6.6.9 *Women's College*

Begun in 1992 with encouragement from the ANC Women's League, the Women's College has one full-time staff member who is its coordinator and administrator. Since its inception, the Women's College has established three major projects: learner driver's license, oral history, and women and governance. All three of these projects, aimed exclusively at women, seem to be in their early stages of development. A fourth activity is to create a database of cooking and sewing courses in the Cape Town area. Notwithstanding its name, the Women's College's leaders see its role as of a center for women's activities rather than a formal educational institution. Eventually they hope to work toward some sort of certification for the activities they organize.

The learner driver's license project has involved 40 women from Khayelitsha, Guguletu, Mowbray, and Crossroads, teaching them road signs and rules. For the next stage of this project, the Women's College is seeking the assistance of car owners in order to teach the participants to drive. The oral history project is currently in the form of a major proposal with multiple components and expansive aspirations. The women and governance project, still in its formative stages, aims to demystify economic development, develop cross-national comparisons, and examine the interim constitution and the national budget, thereby building women's confidence to participate effectively in national, regional, and local political activities. It expects to work with women in parliament and to help women develop lobbying and advocacy skills. Through this project, the Women's College has been exploring how the parliament functions and examining the situation of women in relation to proposed new gender legislation.

The Women's College appears to be making very slow progress, despite allocations of R100,000 in 1993/93 and R70,000 in 1993/94 (32% of its total budget of R220,720), when it reached only 80 women. A 10% increase in its allocation, R77,000, is projected for 1994/95. Compared to most of the other projects supported by WUS–SA, this funding seems extraordinarily large for an organization with one full-time employee, very limited progress on its major projects, and relatively few participants in its activities.

Especially in the current context of contested transitions, a Women's College in general and developing women's advocacy and lobbying skills in particular, could make a valuable contribution. From that perspective, it is difficult to understand the emphasis on enabling women to secure a learner driver's license, even more so where there is no clear and feasible plan to enable them to proceed to the actual driver's license. Nor did we find evidence of a demonstrable need for additional drivers in the targeted communities, or of increased income-generating prospects for female drivers, or even of the vehicles that they might eventually drive. Becoming a licensed driver may well promote a sense of independence and self-reliance, though for that too we did not find empirical grounding. Apparently not firmly rooted in any of the communities in which it seeks to work, the Women's College—from our clearly limited review of its activities—did not manifest the clarity of purpose or coherence of program that would justify further substantial funding. Currently the Women's College presents itself more as an organization, energy, and funds in search of purpose and focus rather than the other way around.

9.6.7 SIDA Support to WUS–SA

There can be no doubt that activities supported by Sweden through WUS–I and WUS–SA have contributed and continue to contribute significantly to the struggle against apartheid, to mobilizing and empowering local communities, to educating adults generally ignored by the national education system, and to constructing a new South Africa. Swedish assistance has been critical, timely, and provided in a genuinely collaborative framework. That is not to say that all projects have been entirely successful, or that there have been no problems in the aid relationship. To expect unqualified success and untroubled interactions would be naively short-sighted and would breed frustration, not cooperation. Rather, it is to conclude that on balance Swedish support to and through WUS has enabled South Africans to set and achieve important objectives. To do so is fundamentally liberating.

Section 12.2 includes our recommendations on continued SIDA support to WUS–SA.

9.7 *EXCHANGE OF IDEAS*

A small portion of SIDA's education assistance for South Africa has been used to facilitate interchanges among South African and Swedish individuals and institutions. These funds have permitted Swedes and others with relevant expertise, for example, to participate in South African seminars and workshops. They have also supported exchange visits, for example between Linköping University and the Centre for Adult and Continuing Education at the University of the Western Cape. From their descriptions, these seem to us to be worthwhile projects for which funding should continue to be available.

As we shall suggest below, it seems desirable that international exchanges and direct links between South African and Swedish institutions become a larger part of SIDA's program in South Africa. Developing these relationships may take some time. Hence, the modest initiatives funded to date may well contribute to a richer and enduring collaboration.

More generally, we deem it essential to reserve some aid funds for small allocations to finance important activities that arise on short notice and that cannot be readily accommodated in other categories of assistance. This framework, exchange of ideas, may be an appropriate location for that support.

Funds from this category were also used, we were told, to support a World Bank initiated study of education finance. There is, we presume, a shared interest in high quality research. There are as well circumstances in which cooperation among external agencies is particularly useful. At the same time, we wonder whether using these funds in this way dilutes the focus of SIDA's assistance to the education of South Africans. As we noted earlier, SIDA has a well deserved reputation for its early and continuing support of the struggle to achieve majority rule in South Africa, for its willingness to work with a wide range of organizations, including some whose objectives SIDA shared but that were illegal within South Africa, and for its sensitivity and flexibility in working with its South African counterparts. The World Bank, notwithstanding its energetic program of development advice and assistance, is fundamentally a lending institution. It will, we presume, negotiate and reach agreements with the government of South Africa as soon as that is feasible, rather than with NGOs and community organizations. Hence, SIDA and the World Bank have somewhat different roles, the one providing grants to NGOs as well as government, the other lending to government. Although those roles may occasionally overlap, it seems desirable that SIDA maintain the clarity of its focus and operating style, and that, therefore, it reserve these limited discretionary funds for other uses.

9.3 QUARTERLY REVIEW OF EDUCATION

Beginning in 1993, SIDA commissioned the Education Policy Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand to prepare a quarterly review of education and training. We understand that the principal purpose of that periodic review is to contribute to the evaluation of Sweden's South Africa education support program and to the consideration of its future directions and that it is therefore outside the scope of our own charge.

We have found the quarterly reviews prepared to date to be informative, insightful, and instructive. Clearly, they provide timely information and commentaries that are otherwise unavailable to an external audience, and indeed to many people within South Africa. It would be useful, we think, to explore how they might reach a broader readership.

10. SIDA SOUTH AFRICA EDUCATION SUPPORT: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROBLEMS

In our initial report we developed a preliminary summary assessment of Swedish support to the education of South Africans. Our subsequent work has generally confirmed those conclusions.

The intervening year has been a transitional period for SIDA as well as for South Africa. Several previously supported programs have been concluded or have continued to phase out. Other than the Centre for Education Policy Development and the quarterly review of education and training, no new or expanded initiatives have been undertaken. Hence, our overall evaluation is necessarily based on our earlier work and on our re-visit to the most active of the supported programs.

It is important to recall here that the diversity of Swedish aid and the necessarily diffuse nature of the projects and organizations assisted make it impossible to present either a simple summary or an uncomplicated assessment. Sweden's support to the education of South Africans had its roots in the anti-apartheid struggle. It is essential to understand that struggle broadly. What was (and continues to be) at issue were not solely specific acts of a white parliament but the entire economic, ideological, political, and social fabric of a country that disenfranchised the majority of its population. Providing education opportunities to those who were (and are) excluded because of their race is a part of that struggle as is facilitating the development of new education policies. Empowering the impoverished is central to that struggle and to the development of South Africa. Swedish support to the education of South Africans, including all of the activities discussed in the remainder of this section, has thus contributed and continues to contribute substantially to efforts to combat apartheid and promote development.

[illegible]

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- **Developing individual abilities.** Historically, much of Sweden's education assistance has enabled individuals to begin or continue to complete their studies. Further, most bursary (scholarship student) [illegible] they are enrolled in South African institutions.
- **Establishing and building community organizations.** A major share of Sweden's education assistance, routed through the [illegible], has enabled South Africans to develop and strengthen the community organizations that are responsive to local needs and interests. The [illegible], breadth, and influence of these organizations are striking. An especially important feature of the Swedish aid program in this regard has been its flexibility, permitting adaptation to changing local circumstances.
- **Organizational development.** Once established, community organizations must become better at what they do and at the same time maintain effective and responsive links with their constituencies. Here, too, the flexibility of Swedish assistance has proved especially valuable.
- **Adult education.** Sweden's broad and encompassing view of adult education has supported a very wide range of activities, including literacy programs, efforts to combat racism and sexism, career guidance, and more.
- **Education for democratic participation.** Sadly, only very recently were most South Africans able to exercise the rights of citizens in their own country. The government they have known has been discriminatory, authoritarian, repressive, and brutal. In that setting the anti-apartheid struggle has fostered exciting experiments and innovations in democratic practice. Swedish support has nurtured that process in important ways, assisting local communities in asserting control over their schools and taking the initiative in specifying the education agenda.
- **Making education policy.** Although the South African government continued to play the central role in making education policy during the period prior to the 1994 majority rule election, Swedish education aid assisted the democratic movement in developing alternative policies and strategies for influencing the policy process. Swedish aid proved useful in both the shorter and longer term facets of policy making. It supported creative interventions in South Africa's crisis ridden education system. It supported as well the development of

research and research abilities needed to make an effective contribution to policy making over the longer term. That Swedish funding for policy development was essentially unconditional enabled the directions, reference points, and accountability for alternative education policy to remain within South African control. In that very important respect, Swedish aid has been fundamentally empowering.

- **Confronting racism and sexism.** Swedish education assistance has supported local initiatives designed to address racism and sexism in education and in South African society more generally. Increasingly, it has also prompted the organizations that receive Swedish aid to review and improve their own practices.
- **International exchanges.** Although accounting for only a modest portion of total Swedish assistance, international exchanges play an important role in overcoming the isolating consequences of apartheid and in the present era in maintaining and extending contacts in an increasingly interdependent world.

10.2 PROBLEMATIC DIMENSIONS OF SWEDISH EDUCATION ASSISTANCE

Only a few years ago, Sweden's aid to the education of South Africans was the pacesetter among its peer agencies. In addition to the bursaries that enabled political activists and refugees excluded from South African schools to continue their education, Sweden also supported a broad range of innovative and progressive education initiatives, many rooted in local communities. At critical junctures Swedish funding assisted the democratic movement in analyzing and developing education policy and in organizing students, teachers, workers, and university staff to confront apartheid education, to envision alternatives, and to work toward making those alternatives a reality. That is a record of which Sweden should be proud.

Yet, by 1994, as other assistance agencies are rapidly expanding and extending their assistance programs, Sweden's role seems to be shrinking. SIDA is no longer the pacesetter among the agencies it convenes periodically in Pretoria. We are unable to comment on the specifically Swedish factors that have contributed to this declining role. But we do think it important to highlight two observations about SIDA's education assistance program in South Africa.

- **The division of responsibility between the SIDA offices and personnel in Stockholm and Pretoria seems to have become increasingly dysfunctional.** Earlier when the ANC was a banned and persecuted movement operating in exile and when Swedish representation in South Africa was very limited, it was necessary to manage SIDA's education assistance to South Africa from outside the country. Once the ANC and other organizations returned from exile that pattern of distant management became more and more troublesome. Already difficult by 1992 or 1993, the situation seems to have deteriorated further by 1994. Two examples of what is problematic in this arrangement came up regularly during our recent visit. First, current and prospective recipients of Swedish assistance complained that they did not know to whom to address their inquiries and who could, in fact, speak for SIDA. Apparently, some found that they received different responses from SIDA/Pretoria and SIDA/Stockholm (from Stockholm or during visits to South Africa). Would the encouraging comments they received from SIDA/Pretoria, they wondered, be supported or rejected by SIDA/Stockholm? Second, SIDA/Pretoria seemed to find it difficult to secure from SIDA/Stockholm in a timely manner the basic information—for example, clear indication of funding commitments and disbursements—needed to manage the assistance program effectively. At the same time, SIDA/Stockholm stressed the difficulties of managing that program at a distance. We understand that this division of responsibility will change as a senior SIDA official takes up his post in Pretoria. The delay in modifying that arrangement, however, seems to have weakened Swedish assistance to South African education.

- ***Perhaps in part because of this division of responsibilities, the relationships between SIDA and key education decision and policy makers and organization activists seem to have deteriorated.*** Our work during the past year does not permit us to document the nature of these relationships over, say, the 1980s. But we have learned that the frequent contacts and interchanges of the earlier period—often collegial and collaborative as well as professional—have become less regular, and for some organizations have nearly ceased. That serves neither SIDA nor South Africa. Communications decay for many reasons, some of them surely not within SIDA's control. Nonetheless, to take just one example, it is very puzzling that there seems to have been very little direct communication during the first half of this year between SIDA/Pretoria and the senior education leadership of the ANC, or between SIDA and the individuals likely to have the most influence on education decisions in the majority rule government. With whom will SIDA negotiate, both formally and informally, education assistance to the South African government? We trust that SIDA's strengthened presence in South Africa will reverse this decline in contacts.

During the course of our visits to South Africa we encountered, of course, both positive and critical reactions to the SIDA's support programs. It is important therefore to note here what were suggested to us as problems in Swedish assistance to the education of South Africans. In this, we see our role as that of the presenter, recording the concerns we have heard expressed. We do not fully share these concerns, though we believe each merits attention.

- ***The aid relationship, even Sweden's progressive version of it, nurtures dependence.*** Like other development assistance, Swedish education support may function to undermine rather than extend self reliance. As most support programs are currently structured, for example, there is little reason for organizations to decrease their reliance on foreign aid.
- ***Swedish preferences prevail over local judgments.*** Notwithstanding its commendable sensitivity and responsiveness to local concerns, SIDA does believe that some programs ought to be funded and that some activities ought to have higher priority than others. At times, those within South Africa charged with receiving, managing, and redistributing Swedish aid would make other decisions or assign other priorities, but find themselves constrained to implement SIDA's, that is, external rather than local, determinations.
- ***Swedish assistance has favored the African National Congress, often to the exclusion of other political movements.*** The historical reasons for this decision are, we believe, clear and persuasive. Some of the people we interviewed argued that Sweden might have nurtured a broader set of activities and thereby become less ensnared in the internal problems of the ANC had SIDA supported other political movements and ideologies.
- ***The overall education assistance program has apparently paid limited attention to gender issues, notwithstanding SIDA's policy statements that assign them a high priority.*** Not surprisingly, many people do not regard gender differentiation as a pressing problem in a society that has been racially segregated, that until very recently denied citizenship to the majority of its population, and that has been governed by repression. The democratic movement, however, has regularly reiterated its commitment to constructing a non-racial, *non-sexist*, democratic society. Within that context, some people look to SIDA to play a more assertive role in insisting that gender issues have very high priority for attention and funding.

- The organization of the aid program imposes excessive demands on the time, attention, and personnel of recipient organizations. The detailed proposals, budgets, and reports that SIDA requires, periodic requests for additional information, and regular visits by SIDA staff become, cumulatively, a distraction from aid recipients' major objectives and responsibilities. This problem is especially acute for the staff of organizations that receive funds from several sources as each funding agency requires its own reports and schedules its own field visits.

11. GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR SWEDISH AID TO EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Circumstances have changed dramatically since the adoption of the guidelines that currently orient Swedish support to education in South Africa (presented above in Section 4). Their review is thus timely.

Four major premises inform the guidelines we propose.

First, the overarching framework for Swedish education assistance should be the starting point of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, which seeks to:

> mobilise all our people and our country's resources toward the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future. (§1.1.1)

Second, while special circumstances may require continuing humanitarian assistance, the fundamental principle of the post-apartheid aid program ought to be cooperation, not charity. Collaboration in working toward goals deemed to be mutually beneficial provides a far more solid basis than charity for a sustained relationship. The excitement and rewards of working together, even the shared frustration and pain from unsuccessful initiatives, promote respect and accountability and diminish the tendency for aid programs to be patronizing and imperious.

Third, during the protracted transition from apartheid education to whatever is to be its successor many things will remain unclear. Even where there seems to be agreement on basic principles, ambiguities will abound. Progress toward particular objectives may crawl for a while, then accelerate rapidly, and then stop altogether. Accordingly, aid guidelines must envision broad and longer term goals, must be durable enough to sustain the buffeting of the contested transitions, and must be sufficiently flexible to permit addressing changing priorities and unanticipated opportunities.

Fourth, though substantial, Swedish assistance to education in South Africa is and will remain a very small part of total spending on education and training. Therefore, SIDA's programs will be most effective in areas where Sweden's experience and expertise enable it to make a unique contribution and where relatively limited funding can stimulate the generation and release of additional funds.

From these starting points, we propose the following guidelines. Where appropriate, we make specific recommendations associated with particular general guidelines.

11.1 *Support to broad participation in the conception, development, and implementation of education and training policy*

In our initial report we described the development of alternative and critical education policies in several centers created by and located within the anti-apartheid movement. Most important among these were the Education Policy Units and the National Education Policy Investigation, both established in the mid and late-1980s by the NECC, the African National

Congress Education Department and Department of Human Resources Development, and the Center for Education Policy Development, established by the ANC in 1992.

Two intersecting themes inform this discussion of support to the development of education and training policy in South Africa. First, just as they have in the past, primary initiative, influence, and authority are likely to reside with the government. As well, notwithstanding the installation of a new democratic government, the enduring legacies of apartheid embedded in the materials, values, and personnel of the education bureaucracy which will continue to have major responsibility for managing the education system make an unimpeachable case for supporting alternative centers of policy formulation. Second, making education policy is a far less orderly and rational process than is commonly assumed. Important initiatives may well occur far outside the formal policy process and long before specific policies are explicitly considered. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that some support to the conception, consideration, and communication of ideas about what education can and should be will not lead directly to immediately implementable policy proposals. NEPI is a clear case in point. While some critics characterize NEPI's work as insubstantial and irrelevant, in practice nearly everyone acknowledges that current thinking about reconstructing the education system is informed by and relies heavily on that work.

What, then, is the current situation of the principal alternative education policy centers in South Africa? The EPUs find it difficult to respond to the increasing demands for education policy development, stressing their limited staffing. Even more important to this discussion is the apparently deteriorating relationship between the EPUs and the NECC and its constituent organizations. The EPUs were established initially to improve the policy-making capacity of South African organizations opposing the apartheid regime. They have thus been central to the policy-making ability of the NECC and community organizations, and their changed relationship to these organizations will likely diminish this capacity. As the EPUS have become more attached to their host universities, the distance between the EPUs and the organizations they serve and thus local communities has increased. This problem is compounded by the deterioration of the NECC, which in its current form apparently neither commands the respect of the EPUs nor is able to influence significantly their priorities and agendas. That in turn may limit the ability of community organizations to translate their goals and visions into concrete policies, thereby reducing their effectiveness in monitoring, criticizing, and influencing government policies. This university-EPU-community relationship, conceived and developed under conditions of repression and restriction, requires review in this period of transition.

South Africa's new constitution introduces (at least) two additional complexities. First, while principal responsibility for education has been located at the provincial level, it will be some time before it becomes clear exactly how that will function. To whom, for example, should those who seek to influence education policy—in practice as well as on paper—address their concerns? Second, South Africa's new National Assembly has a Standing Committee on Education, currently chaired by an education activist and former Director of the EPU at the University of Natal. Clearly, it will take some time for the members of that committee to work out an appropriate role, especially since the previous parliament and its committees were generally passive. Elected on national lists, members of the current parliament do not have local constituencies to which they must be directly responsive. Whose interests, then, will receive primary attention on the Standing Committee on Education? Will it become an important vehicle for articulating the concerns of students, instructors, academic staff, and local communities? What will be its relationship to the Minister of Education and to the Members of the provincial Executive Councils responsible for education?

SIDA has sought to empower anti apartheid organizations, thereby helping them influence policies in a concrete and direct manner through the development and consideration of alternative and critical policies. Indeed, without that assistance, some groups might well have been excluded entirely from the policy process. We are convinced that support will be needed for some time to come.

To summarize, we focus attention here on two distinct but related sets of activities that warrant Swedish aid. The first has to do with empowering those who are expected to create a new democratic and non racial government and education and training system. Sweden has facilitated the development of relevant understandings, skills, and experience through support for the ANC Education Department, the CEPD, the EPUs, and the NEPI. The second has to do with enabling the broad range of individuals and groups that are committed to bringing about democracy and non-racialism to be able to pursue that goal, both inside and outside of government. It is with this second process in mind that we are particularly concerned that changes in the CEPD and the EPUs may have diminished the capacity of local and mass-based organizations to influence policy. It is essential, we believe, that groups that operate within the NECC and community organizations in general continue to be active and effective in promoting democracy and non-racialism in education. For these organizations to achieve this goal, they will need the capacity to develop their commitment to democracy and non-racialism into concrete alternative and critical education policies. That may involve both close collaboration with and explicit challenges to the new government of national unity. For these organizations to be able to play such a dynamic and constructive role, they will need the capacity to develop policies for change.

Our analysis of this situation leads to several specific recommendations concerning Swedish support for the development of innovative and critical education policy.

11.1.1 ***In general, support to the NECC should be for programmatic activity, including developing links with and among its affiliated organizations, though related institutional development may also warrant funding. The NECC should be expected to complete the work for which it has already received funds.***

11.1.2 ***SIDA should consider positively policy initiatives—both those that seek to develop policy making capacity and those that seek to craft and influence policy directly—from the NECC's affiliated organizations and from community groups associated with it.***

11.1.3 ***For the immediate future, SIDA should continue its support for the work of the CEPD. Since the role of the CEPD may change radically within the near future, this support should be reevaluated regularly.***

11.1.4 ***For the immediate future, there are solid grounds for Swedish support to the Education Policy Units, currently routed through SAREC. Should SAREC determine that the activities of the EPUs no longer fall within its charge, SIDA should include the EPUs in its education support program.***

11.1.5 ***If SIDA resumes support to the Education Policy Units, that support should in general take the form of funds for specific activities (for example, research and development on anti-racist and anti-sexist curriculum or on education for democratic participation), rather than general and untargeted assistance.***

11.1.6 ***Resumed support to the EPUs should correspond with their changing institutional locations and linkages. If the EPUs become more integrated into their host universities, then assistance to the EPUs should become part of an integrated higher education assistance program (discussed in Section 12.1). If the EPUs become more closely allied with community organizations, then assistance to the EPUs should be channeled through***

those organizations. In this way, both the development of alternative and critical education policies and support for it will be more directly accountable and more effectively related to community needs and initiatives.

11.1.7 *SIDA should encourage, facilitate, and support a national process, perhaps initially in the form of a national conference, intended to explore and evaluate policy formation and to assess the specific roles of the NECC, the EPUs, the CEPD, and other organizations.*

11.2 *Support to the development of policies, strategies, methodologies, and programs for adult education*

In our initial report we highlighted the narrow range of education opportunities for South Africa's adults. Existing programs are simply too few, too constricted in conception, and too limited in scope to meet adult learners' aspirations or to enable unschooled and under-educated adults to become more effective contributors to their society's development and participants in their country's governance.

Recent events provide grounds for both pessimism and optimism in this regard. Optimism because the principal initiatives for new education policies — from NEPI to the analyses, agendas, and implementation plans prepared by the CEPD and the ANC — reflect a stronger commitment to a reconstructed system of adult education that will have expanded access and expanded horizons. Clearly, COSATU has played a central role in focusing policy attention on adult education. At the same time, pessimism because notwithstanding the policy drafters' commitment to adult education, the new democratic South African government will be pressed to reallocate education resources toward schools at primary and secondary levels. As well, upgrading the black institutions of higher education will, and should be, a high priority. In that setting, adult education is likely to remain underfunded, since its political constituency is generally less well organized and less easily mobilized than are school and university students, their parents, and influential decision makers who attribute their access to power to their own successful schooling.

The ambiguities of the current transitions compound the difficulty of assessing directions and making interim recommendations. What priority will the government assign to adult education? Assuming that priority is higher than at present, will the new government radically expand its own role in adult education or, alternatively, will it expect other institutions to assume primary programmatic responsibilities? How, exactly, will the adult education sections in the nineteen separate education authorities be simultaneously divided among the nine provinces and at the same time integrated into a single unit within the new national ministry? What is the likely division of responsibility, authority, and funding between national and provincial governments, and between the government itself and parastatals and other quasi-governmental entities? Can education and training be combined effectively into a single program for developing human resources? If so, who will be responsible for accomplishing that? What will be the content of adult vocational training, and how will it be governed and administered? In the midst of these ambiguities, one can readily imagine several very different scenarios, ranging from a continuation of the present pattern to a radical transformation of adult education.

Currently, community organizations and the trade unions, especially COSATU, are proposing that the new government manifest a serious commitment to adult education by radically altering the apartheid government's adult education policies and programs, creating an extensive national system of adult education that redresses existing inequalities and that provides for future adult education needs, and allocating sufficient resources both to protect and upgrade existing programs and to expand access substantially. It seems clear that this pressure will be needed for some time to come. For the reasons outlined above, it seems unlikely that the new government can respond fully to adult education needs and demands. Hence, there will be important ongoing roles—both provider and advocacy—for community organizations and trade unions in adult education.

There are two distinct but related issues here. One challenge for the future is to provide vastly expanded access to adult education. The second challenge is to enrich and extend adult education as a strategy for individual, collective, and national liberation and development. For example, community organizations and trade unions have taken the lead in developing adult education programs designed to challenge authoritarianism, racism, and sexism in South African society. Since those legacies of apartheid remain features of South Africa's present, and since it cannot be assumed that the new government's adult education programs will have a similar emphasis, community organizations and trade unions will need to continue their adult education activities, both providing programs and orienting them toward reconstructing society. To achieve that, community organizations and trade unions will need to provide education and training programs for their own staffs.

Community organizations and trade unions have also played prominent roles in developing new curriculum and instructional materials. They have experimented with innovative approaches to learning and teaching in their adult education programs. Those local and firmly grounded initiatives, too, will have important contributions to make in coming years.

As well, local organizations and their umbrella institutions (for example, NECC and COSATU), have also made contributions to national policy development in adult education. The arenas and forums have of course changed over time, but the continuity of their presence and persistence, including in the deliberations and negotiations of the National Education and Training Forum are striking. As they have been active in those settings, they have also played broader roles in observing and monitoring political developments, disseminating information, and providing channels of democratic participation and accountability.

We stress, once again, that the current situation is transitional and that both policy and practice may move in directions that cannot adequately be predicted in the present. Our specific recommendations, therefore, address this transitional period and seek to enable SIDA to support the development of a solid foundation for a radical transformation of adult education in the future.

11.2.1 SIDA's adult education assistance should in general be characterised by active advocacy for adult education programs and related activities.

11.2.2 SIDA should continue to support COSATU's participation in developing alternative adult education policies.

11.2.3 In the expectation that SIDA will provide support for adult education to and through the new democratic South African government, that assistance should be directed toward
- ***sustaining and expanding existing adult education programs;***
- ***establishing and extending literacy programs; and***
- ***supporting the adult education activities of community organisations, trade unions, and other non-governmental groups.***

11.2.4 SIDA should continue to provide direct support to community organisations and trade unions involved in adult education for:
- ***direct provision of adult education programs;***
- ***active development of policy and policy making ability and expertise;***

- *meetings, conferences, local, regional, and national coalitions, and other networking activities;*
- *programs focused on challenging racism, sexism, and authoritarianism, both within their organizations and in the larger society; and*
- *activities intended to develop non-sexist and anti-racist environments within their own organizations, including employment, maternity leave, and wage policies*

11.2.5 *SIDA's adult education assistance should include explicit attention to gender issues, understood to include but to go beyond female access to adult education programs, organizations, and related activities.*

11.2.6 *If requested by the adult education community, SIDA should support a national conference, colloquium, or other initiative intended to assess the current situation of adult education (perhaps including direct observation and monitoring and/or a formal study) and to develop and refine the agenda for its further development.*

11.3 *Support for innovative projects and initiatives, experimental education endeavors, and pilot studies, especially to institutions and organizations outside government*

Much of the discussion about the future of education policy and practice in South Africa is preoccupied with uncertainty and speculation about changes in the education system's infrastructure. Two related questions are prominent.

First, what will be the new institutional configuration of education and training? How, exactly will the separate education departments and authorities be integrated into a single education ministry at the same time that most of their functions will be assumed by the provinces? Will existing institutions—perhaps regrouped and renamed—for the most part retain their responsibilities and resources? Will provincialization permit the current poles of power to preserve their influence and advantage? Will education reformers have the institutional leverage to undertake and implement systemic transformation? Can radical reconstruction overcome the resistance of a large and entrenched education bureaucracy? In short, who—in practice as well as in name—will be in charge, and how will the new institutional arrangements facilitate or obstruct a genuine transition?

Second, what is to become of the community and other non-governmental organizations that have come to play a major role in education and training? Can the new government subsume all of their activities? Will community activists become government employees? Will the new government focus energy and resources on the sorts of activities that currently have low priority, for example adult education?

Important as these questions are, it seems unlikely that they can be resolved satisfactorily soon. Quite simply, the evolution of the education infrastructure will be guided by a political process, not the result of a few key decisions.

Anti-apartheid struggles have given rise to grassroots organizations that have been at the forefront of struggles for social transformation. Not only did they oppose the apartheid state, but they also actively created forums for the discussion and negotiation of new public policies. Parallel to these community based organizations there has also emerged an array of non-governmental organizations involved in the development and implementation of local and national projects. Critical for the successful reconstruction of South Africa will be the continued healthy existence and active participation of these organizations in making, contesting, and implementing policy.

Although there has been and will continue to be an effort to tame these organizations, nearly everyone agrees they will continue to play important roles well into the future. At the same time, many of those organizations are fearful that as foreign assistance is routed directly to government, they will no longer be able to innovate and experiment, or even to sustain their existing programs. Indeed, several organizations reported to us that they were forced to eliminate or reduce major programs for that reason.

Hence, as Sweden moves toward a program of development cooperation with the new democratic government of South Africa, there will continue to be an important role for community and other non-governmental organizations.

That is so for several reasons. First, even where there are national decisions to reorient priorities—recall that these are contested transitions—it will take some time for new directions to be translated into institutional reorganization, administrative instructions, and resource reallocations. As well, the massive need to expand and rehabilitate schools and the institutional legacies of apartheid combine to limit the ability of the government to undertake radical innovations. In the short term, for example, community groups will need to continue to play both an educational and advocacy role for adult literacy. Second, the current education establishment has limited capability to address some of the strong commitments of the democratic movement. Extra-governmental organizations will need to provide the inspiration, impetus, ideas, and the actual programs for educational campaigns against racism and sexism. Third, community organizations will be central to expanding the responsiveness and accountability of an education system that historically has precluded the participation of most of the population. Finally, and perhaps most important, to transform what has been the privilege of a minority into the right of all will require the imagination, resilience, and local roots of the rich web of South Africa's community organizations. Indeed, that network of activists and experts is a national resource. As its institutional configuration is redefined during this transitional period, it ought to be nurtured and protected.

11.3.1 SIDA should negotiate promptly the education component of its development cooperation with the new democratic government of South Africa.

11.3.2 Since for the foreseeable future community and other non-governmental organizations will continue to play a major role in South Africa's education system, SIDA's education assistance program should include provisions for continued support to those organizations.

11.4 Support for the conception, development, and implementation of policies and programs to increase sensitivity to gender issues and to facilitate their incorporation into the education and training system, both governmental and non-governmental

Over many years the democratic movement has been firm in its commitment to a post-apartheid South Africa that is democratic, non-racist, and non-sexist. In South Africa race and gender oppressions are intimately connected. On the positive side that linkage facilitates organizing workshops and programs to address both and their interconnections. At the same time, since racism has been the principal focus of struggle, there is an inclination to argue that addressing sexism will need to wait until racial segregation and its destructive influence on society have been eliminated.

Indeed, in a recent appraisal of WIN SA, evaluators found that many of WIN SA's project partners reflected the dominant gender and racial hierarchy. They are not unique. Many anti-apartheid community organizations have paid little attention to gender issues. Very few have gender-sensitive constitutions, decision making processes, employment practices, and education policies and programs. At the same time, several of the organizations with whose leaders we spoke noted their own focus on gender issues and indicated they hoped that SIDA would play a stronger role in this arena.

There has been some increase in innovative gender education programs within the democratic movement. Generally, these programs have taken the form of anti-sexist workshops that enable women to identify sexism, to develop an understanding of its roots and durability, and to challenge it both within and outside their own organizations. Although most gender education programs do not exclude men, they have been directed almost entirely to women. Few have sought to situate the repression and oppression of women in the broader context of attention to gender and society more generally.

In its development assistance programs globally SIDA has been imaginative and persistent in its attention to the causes and consequences of sexual discrimination. SIDA has as well played a leadership role in broadening the perspective on that discrimination, insisting that only by understanding it in terms of gender and socially defined gender specific roles can it be effectively addressed. Drawing on its experiences in many countries, SIDA is both prepared and positioned to make an important and unique contribution in this domain.

11.4.1 *Specifically, SIDA should reinvigorate its attention to gender issues in all of the activities it supports.*

11.4.2 *Consistent with SIDA's general policy in this regard, usually concern with gender issues should be integrated into supported activities, rather than added to or undertaken in parallel with them. In particular circumstances, it may be appropriate to allocate dedicated funds to support innovative programming.*

11.4.3 *In collaboration with its recipient organizations and other South African colleagues, SIDA should play an educational as well as funding role. In particular, SIDA and its partners should work to (a) broaden the understanding of the importance of gender, distinguishing it from the important but narrower focus on the status of women, (b) combine the struggles against discrimination and inequality of all sorts, and (c) link programs to combat racism and sexism with efforts to build and protect a democratic society.*

11.5 Support for international exchanges of ideas and experiences, especially to facilitate and sustain organizational development, both governmental and non-governmental

Although listed last, this guideline in fact underlies all of the others. If development assistance is to be organized as cooperation rather than charity, then its standard form ought increasingly to be linkages between South African institutions and counterpart Swedish institutions.

There are several advantages to organizing at least a part of the assistance program as institutional linkages. First, a wide range of Swedish institutions could be drawn into exchanges with their South African counterparts, thus involving Swedish individuals in concrete and specific projects with which they could directly identify and [illegible]. Second, broad ranging institutional linkage programs can facilitate combining individual projects into an integrated support program with [illegible] support activities. Third, institutional capacity development and other longer term goals can be addressed in tandem with efforts to meet immediate needs. Fourth, rather than being encapsulated in a relationship between aid agency and funding recipient, the provision of support would involve direct interactions among peer South African and Swedish institutions. Fifth, a multiplier effect can be achieved as additional resources from Swedish and South African individuals and institutions are drawn in with development aid.

Linkage programs can take many forms. Support to [illegible]'s Participatory Research Programme through the Swedish trade union federation is one current example. Relationships between Swedish and African universities (Tanzania and perhaps soon South Africa), governmental agencies (Botswana), and non-governmental organizations (many countries, including South Africa) offer other models.

For such linkages to be viable and sustainable, it is essential that South African institutions and their communities retain the primary initiative and responsibility. Experience in South Africa and elsewhere make clear that this orientation will not be easy to maintain. Whether or not intentionally, funding agencies commonly come to have the dominant voice.

Linkage programs take time to develop, especially where the principal initiative is to be from South Africa. Initial steps include exchanges of ideas and personnel, reciprocal site visits, organization of and participation in seminars and workshops on topics of common interest, and more generally enhanced information about and access to activities in each country.

11.5.1 *In addition to institutional linkages, modest funding should be reserved for small allocations to support activities that arise on short notice and that cannot be readily accommodated in other categories of assistance.*

12. OTHER SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SWEDISH AID TO EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Along with proposed guidelines for Swedish support to the education of South Africans, we noted in the preceding section several more specific recommendations associated with those guidelines. We make here several additional recommendations that are consistent with those guidelines but that are not explicitly associated with any one of them.

12.1 SCHOLARSHIPS AND SUPPORT TO HIGHER EDUCATION

Much of Swedish education support for democracy and non-racialism in South Africa has taken the form of assistance to individual students routed through bursary organizations. It is timely, we believe, to begin to incorporate student support into an integrated program of assistance to higher education.

In our initial report we reviewed the Swedish education assistance channelled to several local and international independent bursary organizations. Our conclusion in that review was that some independent bursary organizations will have a useful role to play for the next several years. We argued that those groups that are successful in targeting categories of students who are poorly served by the recently established national Tertiary Education Fund of South Africa (TEFSA) will make an important contribution during the transitional period. We also argued that neither a national program nor the universities will in the short term be able to provide the sorts of specialized support services which are available through the independent bursary organizations. It was on that basis that we recommended continued SIDA support to independent bursary organizations over the next few years to allow current bursary recipients to complete their courses. The advantage of continuing along this route (rather than through contributing to the TEFSA) is that SIDA assistance can be more effective in reaching disadvantaged students and supporting affirmative action through those organizations. In addition, in the expectation that recipients of SIDA supported bursaries will be selected among the least affluent South Africans, there is little point in shifting from grants to loans. We now take our earlier recommendation further by suggesting a transition from support to individuals and separate organizations to an integrated higher education support program.

A part of Swedish support to the education of South Africans, we suggest, should be directed toward specifically targeted black universities, technikons, and teacher training colleges. These institutions have for long suffered from apartheid education funding. Discriminatory resource allocation and hiring policies have combined with political repression to result in the intentional organizational and academic underdevelopment of most of these institutions. In our earlier report we noted that it was likely that although black universities would educate the overwhelming majority of black and disadvantaged students, their limited administrative capabilities would result in their receiving the smallest share of funds from a national loan scheme. Whatever the trajectory of change, these institutions will continue to educate most black South Africans. At the same time, the new government will be pressed to increase substantially the resources allocated to the lower levels of the education system, eventually to enable all South Africans to reach matriculation level.

In these circumstances, a carefully directed program of academic and organizational development can offer to a selected number of post-secondary institutions (including colleges of education and technikons as well as universities) valuable resources which a new government will be hard pressed to provide. In the light of the vast number of post-secondary education institutions which may be considered for such a program, we suggest that the initial phase focus on black universities. To broaden the impact of this program, assistance could be preferentially directed toward those universities that include neighboring post-secondary institutions as partners in their proposals. We believe that institutions that are directly involved in rural and other local development activities should receive priority. Also, those institutions which have demonstrated their ability to improve the access, retention and success of female students across the disciplines and professional programs should receive priority.

In short, we are suggesting a transition in thinking: *from a focus* on the particular needs of individual students disadvantaged by apartheid to a broader concern with the development of post-secondary education that includes a continuing *focus* on those who have borne the brunt of apartheid. Along with student assistance, an integrated program could include support for curriculum reform, innovative pedagogies, academic and professional staff development, inter-institutional linkages, and direct involvement in community activities. We believe that SIDA support in this form, directed at developing the organizational and academic capacity of these institutions, will help them extend and enhance their contribution to developing the human resources of South Africa while at the same time providing educational opportunities to those most disadvantaged by apartheid.

An integrated support program of this sort might include a wide range of activities. Since it is our consideration of the evolution of Swedish bursary support, rather than a direct focus on higher education (which we were not asked to address explicitly and which, we understand, lies at least partly within the domain of SAREC rather than SIDA), we cannot develop a detailed proposal here. It may be useful, however, to note a few examples of how Swedish aid might be used. Bursaries could target particular groups (for example, rural and female students) and program areas (for example, public health and nutrition, engineering, education, and agriculture). That student support program could then be combined with the placement of students in development projects during their formal education and after their graduation. Those program areas could then be assisted in their own development, with funds allocated to the creation of new academic units (for example, rural development or women's studies) and new curriculum, or advanced education for relevant faculty, or appropriate research projects, or links with other institutions with similar or complementary programs.

It is important to note that an integrated support program of this sort may not be able to address the immediate needs of those students who seek to enroll in courses of study not currently available at South Africa's black institutions. We are convinced that over the longer term those students and their successors will be well served by the systematic and sustained development of these institutions. For an interim period, however, it may be appropriate to direct a small portion of Swedish education assistance toward such students, perhaps managed by one of the existing bursary organizations.

12.1.1 *SIDA should continue its bursaries to currently supported individual students to enable them to complete their studies. It seems reasonable to expect that nearly all currently supported students will have completed their studies by the end of the 1996 academic year.*

12.1.2 *After currently supported students have completed their studies, SIDA should discontinue funding bursary organizations. Instead, scholarship support should be integrated into SIDA financed programs, including but not limited to tertiary education.*

12.1.3 *SIDA should reconstitute its current program of assistance to individuals through separate bursary organizations as an integrated multi-component higher education support program, implemented through links between black higher education institutions (universities, technikons, and colleges of education) and counterpart Swedish institutions. This program should be organized such that the South African institutions retain primary initiative, responsibility, and accountability, negotiating goals, components, and evaluation criteria with their counterparts and with SIDA as the program evolves.*

12.2 WORLD UNIVERSITY SERVICE–SOUTH AFRICA

If Sweden is to continue to support a significant number of relatively small education organizations in South Africa, it will likely do so through one or more intermediary assistance agencies. Even with additional SIDA staff in South Africa, it will not be feasible for SIDA to work directly with all current and prospective recipients of Swedish assistance, address their unique programmatic orientations and particular problems, and administer a large number of relatively small allocations. For the present, the World University Service–South Africa is the principal South African organization playing that intermediary role.

In our initial evaluation we reported that neither WUS–SA nor its project partners were entirely comfortable with WUS–SA in that role as it is currently defined. Several problems became clear during the course of our 1993 visit. The tasks to be undertaken by the funding intermediary threatened to overwhelm WUS–SA's professional and support staff. As a result, the responsibilities of serving as the funding intermediary at times seemed to distract from and thereby jeopardizing WUS-SA's own initiatives. Responsibilities for selecting the organizations to be supported and determining the size of their allocations remained ambiguous. Not entirely clear about the extent of its authority, WUS-SA was concerned that its decisions would be undermined or overridden by SIDA, which WUS-SA perceived to have a preferred list of organizations. At the same time, some recipient organizations believed they would receive more funds and more secure support by negotiating directly with SIDA. While some project partners expected WUS-SA to find funding for them, help them develop their institutional capacities, facilitate networking with other organizations, and perhaps manage resources, other project partners maintained that WUS-SA should be primarily a conduit for funds. And SIDA preferred that WUS-SA's own operations depend less on Swedish funding.

Happily, we can now report that many of these problems seem to have been resolved or are on their way to resolution.

There are thus strong grounds for extending SIDA's current relationship with WUS-SA. To date, WUS-SA has been able to find workable compromises among its multiple responsibilities. In doing so, it has facilitated the activities of a broad range of community and other non-governmental organizations. For some of those groups, WUS-SA has provided managerial and administrative assistance as well as funds. For all of its project partners, WUS-SA has laid the foundation for improved communication, coordination, and cooperation. Ultimately, of course, WUS-SA will need to make its own determination about how it wishes to proceed.

As well, there remain ambiguities in the relationships among SIDA, WUS-SA, and its project partners. While some of these ambiguities may reflect fruitful fluidity, others appear to constrain the developmental impact of what has become the largest part of SIDA's education aid program in South Africa.

In our initial report we considered changes that WUS-SA might make to improve its effectiveness and institutionalize its accountability. In particular, we suggested that WUS-SA might move toward providing two or three different levels of services to its project partners and thus to have quite different relationships with subsets of them. For some, its responsibility would largely be to pass on funds. For others, WUS-SA would play a much more active developmental role. Still others may be better served by alternative funding arrangements, perhaps through Swedish counterpart organizations (like the funding for COSATU's Participatory Research Programme). As WUS-SA becomes a more active service provider itself, offering expertise, experience, and efficiency, recipient organizations are likely to find WUS-SA's own contribution increasingly valuable. Over the longer term, the appropriate mechanism for revising the relationship among SIDA, WUS-SA, and the recipient organizations and for institutionalizing accountability is direct consultation and interaction among them.

From SIDA's perspective, it may be useful to incorporate its expectations explicitly into its negotiations with WUS-SA.

12.2.1 ***Negotiations for [illegible] to extend WUS-SA's support should include explicit discussions about WUS-SA's future agenda, about how the relationship between SIDA and WUS-SA can be most effectively evaluated (a focus distinct from the evaluation of WUS-SA's project partners and their activities), and about undertaking such an evaluation in time to inform discussions about subsequent extensions.***

It is also timely to address directly the different expectations about the extent and forms of WUS-SA's reliance on SIDA support. For that, it is useful to distinguish among funds that support WUS-SA's own development initiatives, payments for WUS-SA's administrative and other services, and allocations through WUS-SA to other organisations.

12.2.2 ***SIDA should consider favorably a request from WUS-SA for support for its own programmatic activities (for example, its policy forums). Just as it does for other organisations, SIDA may require that its support not exceed 50% of WUS-SA's budget for its programmatic activities.***

12.2.3 ***SIDA should consider favorably a specific request from WUS-SA for short-term assistance to develop its own managerial, administrative, and fund raising capabilities. Support of this sort should have clear and explicit purposes and uses and should be understood as limited funding available during a relatively brief transitional period.***

12.2.4
12.2.5 ***In their negotiations, SIDA and WUS-SA should clarify each agency's expectations about the extent to which WUS-SA will be expected to raise funds from other sources, both to support its own development initiatives and staff development and to assist its project partners.***

WUS-SA's creation of a Women's Development Programme provides fruitful ground for collaboration between SIDA and WUS-SA in an arena where each agency has a good deal to learn from the other.

12.2.6 ***SIDA should establish and maintain direct interaction with WUS-SA's Women's Development Programme, seeking to understand better the South African context for SIDA's gender initiatives. These interactions can help to clarify for all involved, including WUS-SA's project partners, the important distinction between attention to the situation of women and a gender-aware and gender-sensitive approach to the reconstruction of South African society.***

12.3 *EVALUATION*

Although WUS-SA has undertaken detailed evaluations of the work of its project partners, it is not clear that either WUS-SA or the evaluated organisations have found those assessments very useful in modifying activities or deciding on future courses of action. To date, WUS-SA has not itself assumed the leadership role in developing an appropriate, sensitive, and fruitful evaluation strategy.

Evaluation is most effective—informative and useful—when it is an integral part of the activities to be evaluated. After all, the most important audience for an evaluation is the group undertaking the activity. To facilitate their own work they must be able to ask: Are we proceeding toward our objectives? What indicates that our progress is in the desired direction? What rate of progress is reasonable in the current circumstances? How will we know when we have reached intermediary, or even final, objectives?

All too often, however, evaluation is undertaken as an after-the-fact review, sometimes based on criteria and priorities unknown to those being evaluated when they initiated their activities. Although that approach may yield some useful information, it also generates unnecessary and avoidable apprehension. As well, even when providing useful feedback, it may be disruptive of on-going activities (or even impossible to undertake where activity sites are distant and where programs take place at times when evaluators are unavailable).

Far too frequently, evaluation follows a prescribed, though not necessarily appropriate, recipe. Evaluators arrive with a list of questions and then draw their conclusions from the responses to their queries. Even with some prior discussions, those questions may not adequately capture what is intended, what is happening, and why. When that occurs, the findings may be systematic and quantitative, and at the same time quite irrelevant.

We reiterate: to be most effective, evaluation must be organized as a process that is part of each activity, that is on-going rather than episodic, and that involves participants in the evaluated activity. Our concern here, therefore, is not to insist on a particular type of evaluation but rather to recommend incorporating evaluation into each supported activity.

12.3.1 An explicit understanding about evaluation should be included in all SIDA education assistance programs. Recipient institutions and organisations should make clear at the outset their evaluation criteria and procedures and should include the results of their evaluations in their periodic and final reports and in their requests for continued or extended funding.

12.3.2 Similarly, WUS–SA should include an explicit understanding about evaluation in all agreements with its project partners. Recipient institutions and organisations should make clear at the outset their evaluation criteria and procedures and should include the results of their evaluations in their periodic and final reports and in their requests for continued or extended funding.

12.4 ACCOUNTABILITY

The South Africa of recent years—even in the midst of the extraordinary coercion, repression, and violence in which the state has played the central role—has been an amazing crucible for democracy. Ironically, innovations in democratic practice are vulnerable to the interventions of the providers of foreign assistance, including those most committed to nurturing democracy.

The intensity and scale of opposition to the state have drawn large sections of the black population into collective action, leading to the development and practice of new forms of democracy. Commonly, elected representatives must regularly seek mandates from their constituents at local, regional, and national meetings. All policy decisions are expected to be subjected to popular discussion before implementation. Throughout the discussion critical analysis of options and collectively made decisions are emphasized. Leadership is held accountable for the implementation of decisions and required to provide regular report-backs on the steps taken to advance the interests of the collective. It is not uncommon to find that executive committee decisions and recommendations have been revoked because democratic procedures were not followed. Policy making of this sort is both participatory and transparent.

These democratic practices—representation, accountability, seeking mandates, clarification, critical analysis, popular discussion, collective decision-making, and transparency—have been critical to the success of anti-apartheid organizations and struggles. Successful transition to a free South Africa will depend on sustaining and protecting them against old and new enemies.

Foreign assistance, even that provided by the most ardent advocates of democracy, is corrosive of these practices in two important ways. First, where the South African democratic crucible is disorderly and spasmodic, the managers of external aid are inclined to insist on rationalization and routinization. Endless debates about fundamental principles, after all, do not quickly (or ever?) lead to focused agendas, clear programs, systematic implementation and evaluation, and efficient management. The current discussions of national education and training policy provide a clear case in point. The democratic movement has managed to facilitate a broader and more inclusive discussion of policies, principles, and practices than has ever been the case in South Africa and than is the case in most of the rest of the world. Those responsible for foreign assistance, however, need concrete proposals, trained staff, and audited accounts. The challenge for SIDA, we believe, is to find ways to accommodate both the cacophony of democratic consultation and the orchestration of specific projects and programs.

Second, by its very nature external aid certainly obscures and often undermines accountability. The proliferation of trusts in South Africa provides clear examples. Foreign agencies transfer funds to trusts, which in turn use those funds to reach objectives negotiated between the external agencies and organizations within South Africa. The external agencies are accountable to the government and ultimately to the voters in their home countries. The South African organizations can be held accountable by their members and eventually, we presume, by the South African electorate. But how are the trusts to be held accountable? The situation for other conduits for foreign funding is similar. To whom and in what ways is WUS–SA, for example, directly accountable? In practical terms, to whom should project partners who are unhappy with decisions by the WUS–SA leadership address their concerns? And how can the participants in, say, literacy classes, who may have experience in holding to account the leaders of their local civic association, demand a comparable accountability from the providers of the literacy program, let alone from WUS–SA?

We do not see a simple resolution of this problem. That the population using the services is not the principal source of the funds needed to support those services both obscures and blurs accountability. At the same time, it is clear that like evaluation, accountability is most effective when it is an organic part of organizations.

12.4.1 SIDA should address accountability explicitly in its negotiations with the institutions and organizations that receive Swedish funds. In that regard, SIDA's principal concern should be accountability of recipients within South Africa and to South Africans, rather than to SIDA itself.

12.4.2 SIDA should develop procedures that enhance and enrich the participation of South Africans in monitoring Swedish aid to South Africa.

13. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Four major premises inform the guidelines we propose

- The overarching framework for Swedish education assistance should be the starting point of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, which seeks to "mobilise all our people and our country's resources toward the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future."
- While special circumstances may require continuing humanitarian assistance, the fundamental principle of the post apartheid aid program ought to be cooperation, not charity.
- Aid guidelines must envision broad and longer term goals, must be durable enough to sustain the buffeting of the contested transitions, and must be sufficiently flexible to permit addressing changing priorities and unanticipated opportunities.
- Though substantial, Swedish assistance to education in South Africa is and will remain a very small part of total spending on education and training. Therefore, SIDA's programs will be most effective in areas where Sweden's experiences and expertise enable it to make a unique contribution and where relatively limited funding can stimulate the generation and release of additional funds.

From those starting points, we propose the following guidelines. Where appropriate, we make specific recommendations associated with particular general guidelines.

- Support to broad participation in the conception, development, and implementation of education and training policy
  - *In general, support to the NECC should be for programmatic activity, including developing links with and among its affiliated organisations, though related institutional development may also warrant funding. The NECC should be expected to complete the work for which it has already received funds.*
  - *SIDA should consider positively policy initiatives—both those that seek to develop policy making capacity and those that seek to craft and influence policy directly—from the NECC-affiliated organisations and from community groups associated with it.*
  - *For the immediate future, SIDA should continue its support for the work of the CEPD. Since the role of the CEPD may change radically within the near future, this support should be reevaluated regularly.*
  - *For the immediate future, there are solid grounds for Swedish support to the Education Policy Units, currently routed through SAREC. Should SAREC determine that the activities of the EPUs no longer fall within its charge, SIDA should include the EPUs in its education support program.*
  - *If SIDA resumes support to the Education Policy Units, that support should in general take the form of funds for specific activities (for example, research and development on anti-racist and anti-sexist curriculum or on education for democratic participation), rather than general and untargeted assistance.*
  - *Resumed support to the EPUs should correspond with their changing institutional locations and linkages. If the EPUs become more integrated into their host universities, then assistance to the EPUs should become part of an integrated higher education assistance program. If the*

EPUs become more closely allied with community organizations, then assistance to the EPUs should be channeled through those organizations. In this way, both the development of alternative and critical education policies and support for it will be more directly accountable and more effectively related to community needs and initiatives.

  - *SIDA should encourage, facilitate, and support a national process, perhaps initially in the form of a national conference, intended to explore and evaluate policy formation and to assess the specific roles of the NECC, the EPUs, the CEPD, and other organizations.*

- **Support to the development of policies, strategies, methodologies, and programs for adult education**

  - *SIDA's adult education assistance should in general be characterized by active advocacy for adult education programs and related activities.*

  - *SIDA should continue to support COSATU's participation in developing alternative adult education policies.*

  - *In the expectation that SIDA will provide support for adult education to and through the new democratic South African government, that assistance should be directed toward: sustaining and expanding existing adult education programs; establishing and extending literacy programs; and supporting the adult education activities of community organizations, trade unions, and other non-governmental groups.*

  - *SIDA should continue to provide direct support to community organizations and trade unions involved in adult education for: direct provision of adult education programs; active development of policy and policy making ability and expertise; meetings, conferences, local, regional, and national coalitions, and other networking activities; programs focused on challenging racism, sexism, and authoritarianism, both within their organizations and in the larger society; and activities intended to develop non-sexist and anti-racist environments within their own organizations, including employment, maternity leave, and wage policies.*

  - *SIDA's adult education assistance should include explicit attention to gender issues, understood to include but to go beyond female access to adult education programs, organizations, and related activities.*

  - *If requested by the adult education community, SIDA should support a national conference, colloquium, or other initiative intended to assess the current situation of adult education (perhaps including direct observation and monitoring and/or a formal study) and to develop and refine the agenda for its further development.*

- **Support for innovative projects and initiatives, experimental education endeavors, and pilot studies, especially to institutions and organizations outside government**

  - *SIDA should negotiate promptly the education component of its development cooperation with the new democratic government of South Africa.*

  - *Since for the foreseeable future community and other non-governmental organizations will continue to play a major role in South Africa's education system, SIDA's education assistance program should include provisions for continued support to those organizations.*

- **Support for the conception, development, and implementation of policies and programs to increase sensitivity to gender issues and to facilitate their incorporation into the education and training system, both governmental and non-governmental**

  - ***Specifically, SIDA should reinvigorate its attention to gender issues in all of the activities it supports.***
  - ***Consistent with SIDA's general policy in this regard, usually concern with gender issues should be integrated into supported activities, rather than added to or undertaken in parallel with them. In particular circumstances, it may be appropriate to allocate dedicated funds to support innovative programming.***
  - ***In collaboration with its recipient organizations and other South African colleagues, SIDA should play an educational as well as funding role. In particular, SIDA and its partners should work to (a) broaden the understanding of the importance of gender, distinguishing it from the important but narrower focus on the status of women, (b) combine the struggles against discrimination and inequality of all sorts, and (c) link programs to combat racism and sexism with efforts to build and protect a democratic society.***
- **Support for international exchanges of ideas and experiences, especially to facilitate and sustain organizational development, both governmental and non governmental**
  - ***In addition to institutional linkages, modest funding should be reserved for small allocations to support activities that arise on short notice and that cannot be readily accommodated in other categories of assistance.***

To supplement the recommendations listed above, we make several additional recommendations that are consistent with those guidelines but that are not explicitly associated with any one of them.

- **Scholarships and Support to Higher Education**
  - ***SIDA should continue its bursaries to currently supported individual students to enable them to complete their studies. It seems reasonable to expect that nearly all currently supported students will have completed their studies by the end of the 1996 academic year.***
  - ***After currently supported students have completed their studies, SIDA should discontinue funding bursary organizations. Instead, scholarship support should be integrated into SIDA financed programs, including but not limited to tertiary education.***
  - ***SIDA should reconstitute its current program of assistance to individuals through separate bursary organizations as an integrated multi-component higher education support program, implemented through links between black higher education institutions (universities, technikons, and colleges of education) and counterpart Swedish institutions. This program should be organised such that the South African institutions retain primary initiative, responsibility, and accountability, negotiating goals, components, and evaluation criteria with their counterparts and with SIDA as the program evolves.***
- **World University Service–South Africa**
  - ***Negotiations for to extend WUS–SA's support should include explicit discussions about WUS–SA's future agenda, about how the relationship between SIDA and WUS–SA can be most effectively evaluated (a focus distinct from the evaluation of WUS–SA's project partners and their activities), and about undertaking such an evaluation in time to inform discussions about subsequent extensions.***
  - ***SIDA should consider favorably a request from WUS–SA for support for its own programmatic activities (for example, its policy forums). Just as it does for other organizations, SIDA may require that its support not exceed 50% of WUS–SA's budget for its programmatic activities.***

- SIDA should consider favorably a specific request from WIN SA for short term assistance to develop its own managerial, administrative and fund raising capabilities. Support of this sort should have clear and explicit purposes and time and should be understood as limited funding available during a relatively brief transitional period.
- For each project or organization funded through WIN SA, SIDA should allocate funds directly to WIN SA for the administrative and other services it provides. The levels of these allocations, presumably a percentage of the support funds channeled to project partners, should be negotiated by SIDA, WIN SA, and the supported organizations. Alternatively, the appropriate level of funding for administrative and other services may be calculated as a percentage of SIDA's total allocation to WIN SA. WIN SA should be expected to report on and account for the use of these funds to both SIDA and its project partners.
- In their negotiations, SIDA and WIN SA should clarify each agency's expectations about the extent to which WIN SA will be expected to raise funds from other sources, both to support its own development initiatives and staff development and to assist its project partners.
- SIDA should establish and maintain direct interaction with WIN SA's Women's Development Programme, seeking to understand better the South African context for SIDA's gender initiatives. These interactions can help to clarify for all involved, including WIN SA's project partners, the important distinction between attention to the situation of women and a gender aware and gender sensitive approach to the reconstruction of South African society.

- **Evaluation**
  - An explicit understanding about evaluation should be included in all SIDA education assistance programs. Recipient institutions and organizations should make clear at the outset their evaluation criteria and procedures and should include the results of their evaluations in their periodic and final reports and in their requests for continued or extended funding.
  - Similarly, WIN SA should include an explicit understanding about evaluation in all agreements with its project partners. Recipient institutions and organizations should make clear at the outset their evaluation criteria and procedures and should include the results of their evaluations in their periodic and final reports and in their requests for continued or extended funding.
- **Accountability**
  - SIDA should address accountability explicitly in its negotiations with the institutions and organizations that receive Swedish funds. In that regard, SIDA's principal concern should be accountability of recipients within South Africa and to South Africans, rather than to SIDA itself.
  - SIDA should develop procedures that enhance and enrich the participation of South Africans in monitoring Swedish aid to South Africa.

14. APPENDICES

14.1 ABBREVIATIONS

ASP	Academic Exchange Programme (WUS SA)
ALP	Adult Learning Project
ANC	African National Congress
ASF	African Scholarship Fund
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organisation
AZASM	Azanian Student Movement
CBO	community based organisation
CCLS	Centre for Community and Labour Studies
CEC	Commission of the European Communities
CEPD	Centre for Education Policy Development
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
COSAS	Congress of South African Students
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CUMSA	Curriculum Model for South Africa
DBSA	Development Bank of South Africa
DET	Department of Education and Training
DHRD	Department of Human Resources Development (ANC)
EBF	Ecumenical Bursary Fund
EC	European Community
ECS	Education Co-ordinating Service
EDT	Education Development Trust
EDUCRES	Education Resources Project / Emthonjeni-Primary Pathway Institute
Edupol	Education Policy and System Change Unit (Urban Foundation)
ERASE	End Racism And Sexism through Education
ERIP	Education, Resource and Information Project
ERS 1	*Education Renewal Strategy: Discussion Document* (1991)
ERS 2	*Education Renewal Strategy: Management Solutions for Education in South Africa* (1992)
ESAT	Education Support and Training Project (USAID)
EU	European Union
FABCOS	Federation of African Business and Consumer Services
HVAT	Henk van Andel Trust
IDRC	International Development Research Centre (Canada)
IDT	Independent Development Trust
IEB	Independent Examinations Board
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IPET	Implementation Plan for Education and Training
ITB	Industry Training Board
JET	Joint Education Trust
JWG	Joint Working Group on Education

KERIC	Khayelitsha Education Resource and Information Centre
KLP	Klawervlei Literacy Project
KT	Kagiso Trust
IMSSA	Independent Mediation Service of South Africa
NACTU	National Council of Trade Unions
NAFCOC	National African Chamber of Commerce
NAPTOSA	National Association of Professional Teachers Organizations of South Africa
NECC	National Education Co-ordinating (formerly, Crisis) Committee
NENF	National Economic Negotiating Forum
NEPI	National Education Policy Investigation
NETF	National Education and Training Forum
NGO	non governmental organization
NLC	National Literacy Co-operation
NLP	National Language Project
NP	National Party
NTB	National Training Board
NTS	*An Investigation into a National Training Strategy for the RSA (1991)*
NTSI	National Training Strategy Initiative (NTB, 1994)
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers
NUMSA	National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa
ODA	Overseas Development Authority
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
PASO	Pan Africanist Student Organisation
PRAESA	Project for the Study of Alternative Education in South Africa
PRISEC	Private Sector Education Council
PTSA	Parent-Teacher-Student Association
PWV	Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging, the core of the Transvaal area and one of South Africa's nine new provinces
RDP	*The Reconstruction and Development Programme*
RESA	Research on Education in South Africa (Sussex University)
SABER	South African Basic Education Reconstruction Project (USAID)
SACABE	South African Council for Adult Basic Education
SACCOLA	South African Committee on Labour Affairs
SACHED	South African College of (formerly, Committee for) Higher Education
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADF	South African Defence Force
SADTU	South African Democratic Teachers Union
SAIF	South African Institute of Fundraising
SAIP	South Africa Internal Programme (WUS-SA)
SALDRU	Southern Africa Labour and Development Unit
SAMST	South African Medical Scholarships Trust
SANCO	South African National Civic Congress
SANSCO	South African National Students Congress
SAPET	South African Prisoners Education Trust
SAREC	Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries
SARP	South African Returnees Programme (WUS-SA)

SASCO	South African Students Congress
SASET	South African Students Education Trust
SAYCO	South African Youth Congress
SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority
SSC	Student Services Centre (Cape Town; incorporating [illegible], [illegible], and [illegible])
STEP	Support to Tertiary Education (USAID)
TEAM	The [illegible] Action Movement
TEFSA	Tertiary Education Fund of South Africa
TELL	Training in English Language and Literacy
TELP	Tertiary Education Linkages Project (USAID)
TEPS	Tertiary Education Program Support (USAID)
TSN	Training [illegible] [illegible]
UCT	University of Cape Town
UDUSA	Union of Democratic University Staff Associations
UDW	University of Durban Westville
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USWE	Use, Speak and Write English
UWC	University of the Western Cape
WDP	Women's Development Programme (WUS-SA)
WOSA	Workers for Socialist Action
WUS-I	World University Service International (Geneva)
WUS-SA	World University Service South Africa

14.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE

A Study of Sweden's Support to Education in South Africa.

1. Background

Swedish support to the education sector in South Africa was initiated in the 1970's as part of the overall humanitarian assistance programme to southern Africa.

In the 1980's, when the schools in South Africa went into disarray and widespread boycotts of the Bantu education by the black students took place, there was a substantial increase of support to the education sector through a number of voluntary organisations working against apartheid. Thousands of women and men were given scholarships financed by Sweden through organisations inside and outside of South Africa.

With the unbanning of the ANC and other organisations Swedish support was re-organised to fit the new political situation. In 1991 Sweden formulated a partly new strategy for educational support to South Africa and the following guidelines were set by SIDA for assistance to the education sector during the transitional period in South Africa:

1. Support to preparatory reform work and policy development of the anti-apartheid movement.
2. Support to innovative projects and initiatives directed towards future educational reforms.
3. Support to development of strategies, methodologies and programmes for adult education.
4. Support to scholarship programmes. The external scholarship programmes are being phased out and should not be covered by this study. The internal bursary/scholarship programmes however is part of guidelines No 3, Adult Education.

- Reform/Policy Work

During the present transitional period Sweden is giving much attention to the work of the democratic movement to formulate an education policy of the new South Africa. Support is given both **bilaterally**, to organisations such as the ANC, NECC and NEPI, or through other organisations such as WUS.

* **African National Congress,** Departments of Education and Human Resources are both supported by Sweden.

* **World University Service,** WUS is channeling support to Education Policy Units at the University of Witwatersrand, the University of Natal and the University of Fort Hare. Some other organisations also receive assistance for their activities within this area.

* **National Education Coordinating Committee,** NECC is running several programmes. Support is given to the People's Education Programme.

* **National Education Policy Investigation,** NEPI was supported by Sweden through the Education Development Trust.

* **Centre for Education Policy Development,** CEPD has been included by SIDA for planned support from Sweden for 1993/94.

- Innovative Projects

Only a small portion of Sweden's support has been directed to innovations, mainly through WUS.

- Adult Education

SIDA has a broad definition of adult education. A substantial part of this support has been channeled through **WUS** to around 50 South African NGOs for their work in the fields of literacy, post-literacy, bursaries and other adult education projects.

COSATU receives Swedish funds for developing a policy on adult basic education.

Africa Scholarship Fund, Batlagae Trust and Luthuli Memorial Trust are all partly funded by Sweden for bursary/scholarship programmes in South Africa.

The process of negotiations and democratization implies that the channels and type of external support need to be reviewed. A question raised is whether the ongoing Swedish support to education in South Africa will continue to be relevant and adequate in a new political situation after elections.

A number of organisations are engaged in the formulation of a new education policy for a democratic South Africa. Some of the main actors such as the ANC, NECC, NEPI and EPUs at different universities are partly supported by Sweden.

Education policy formulation is by its nature an ongoing process characterized by both **cooperation and consultation** between the different actors and **research work**. The aim of the work of the mentioned organisations is the construction of education policies for a new democratic state rather than to help the service organisations that have been involved in the struggle to counter the effects of the Bantu education system.

2. General purpose

The overall purpose of the study is to review Swedish support to education in South Africa in the context of the process of change in South Africa, in particular on the basis of an analysis of recent developments in the education sector. It should make proposals to SIDA on possible future areas of support under a democratic Government.

The following parts should be covered:

first to **make a summary description** of support given by Sweden to education/policy reform work, innovations and adult education in South Africa;

second to **assess** the value of the above support both in terms of SIDA's guidelines and in terms of the objectives by the receiving organisations;

third, to **identify** concrete outcomes and unanticipated outcomes, both positive and negative;

fourth, to **suggest recommendations for guidelines** with respect to possible future involvement of Sweden within the education sector against the background of an overview of main trends and expressed needs within the sector.

3. Specific Tasks

The study will be carried out in three phases. During the first phase (five weeks in July/August 1993), the Swedish support given during the period 1991/92 – 1992/93 will be reviewed in terms of both SIDA's guidelines and objectives of the receiving organisations. A first visit to South Africa will be made by the consultants. During the second phase (September 1993 – February 1994) political as well as overall educational developments will be studied and analyzed through reporting from an Educational Policy Unit and other contacts. The purpose of phase three (March/April 1994) finally is to formulate recommendations to SIDA on possible

Swedish educational support to South Africa after 1993/94. A second visit will be made during this phase.

The following specific tasks should be included:

* Describe the education sector in an overall and problem oriented way.

* Assess the effects of Sweden's support within the areas of reform/policy work, innovations and adult education, giving concrete examples when possible.

* Discuss what the education policy work of the ANC has achieved so far and to what extent its work has been hampered by factors out of its control.

* Describe the nature of cooperation and present division of work between the ANC (departments of education and human resources), NECC, NEPI and the EPUs regarding policy development, and recently the role of CEPD.

* Assess to what extent the education policy work of these organisations has had an impact on the ongoing policymaking process in the field of education.

* Assess a few of the cooperating partners of WUS in terms of the effects of their activities.

* Assess the role of WUS in relation to its cooperating partners regarding capacity building.

* Due to historic reasons the WUS office in Cape Town is totally dependent on SIDA funds for its administration which makes the organisation very vulnerable. The study should therefore give recommendations on how to decrease WUS' dependence on SIDA funds for its administration.

* Speculate about the possible future role of WUS once a democratic government is in place.

* Describe the bursary/scholarship situation in South Africa including different ways of funding for this specific area and the capacity of universities in South Africa.

* Describe in what way gender aspects have been included in the activities supported by Sweden.

* Assess the future needs for Swedish education support to strategic areas in the light of major trends in the sector and plans of other donors.

* Give recommendations on future Swedish support within a few well defined areas and within the framework of a limited number of well defined recipients.

4. Reporting

By September 30, 1993 a draft report on the first phase should be presented for comments by the Swedish Legation in Pretoria and by SIDA's Education Division.

The written report on the first phase should constitute the background for the second phase of monitoring the political and educational events in South Africa. The first two phases will then feed into the final phase.

The final report should include the findings from the first and second phase and recommendations for possible future Swedish support to the education sector in South Africa.

Depending on the political situation in South Africa it might be necessary/useful to work on different future scenarios which would then be reflected in the recommendations for Sweden's support after 1993/94.

The draft final report should be presented to SIDA's Education Division not later than April 30, 1994 and should thereafter be discussed at a seminar in Stockholm.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

14.3 SIDA SUPPORT TO EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA (SUMMARY OVERVIEW)

Table VI *Swedish Education Assistance, 1991/92–1994/95*

Swedish Humanitarian Support to the Education of South Africans, 1991/92 - 1993/94
(Swedish Crowns [SEK] '000,000)

Organization/Purpose	Disbursed 1991/92		Disbursed 1992/93		Disbursed 1993/94		Planned 1994/95	
	SEK	%	SEK	%	SEK	%	SEK	%
Policy/Reform								
CEPD	—	0.0	—	0.0	4.50	6.4	4.50	5.0
NECC	1.80	2.4	1.50	2.4	1.00	1.4	1.00	1.0
Adult Education								
Batlagae Trust	—	0.0	—	0.0	9.00	12.9	6.00	6.7
COSATU (through LO/TCO)	1.00	1.3	2.00	3.1	—	0.0	1.00	1.0
Fundaaf/African Scholarship Fund	5.20	7.0	8.60	13.6	7.20	10.2	12.21	26.0
World University Service-SA	20.80	27.9	22.40	34.2	23.00	33.4	22.00	24.1
External Scholarships								
World University Service-Int	6.60	8.9	6.80	10.4	4.60	6.6	4.5	4.9
African Educational Trust	13.20	17.7	11.00	16.7	11.40	16.2	5.80	9.5
Southern African Adv Educ Project	3.50	4.7	1.75	2.8	3.50	5.0	3.90	4.5
Other Activities								
Exchange of Ideas	0.40	0.5	0.60	0.9	0.06	0.1	2.40	2.6
Quarterly Review (Wits EPU)	—	0.0	—	0.0	0.83	1.2	0.30	0.4
Sector reporting; Evaluation	—	0.0	—	0.0	0.15	0.2	0.30	0.4
Terminated Programmes								
ANC: Education	15.00	20.1	3.90	6.1	2.91	4.1	—	0.0
ANC: Human Resources Dev	4.00	5.4	1.40	2.2	—	0.0	—	0.0
Luthuli Memorial Trust	2.50	3.4	2.50	3.8	0.90	1.3	—	0.0
NEPI	0.50	0.7	0.50	0.8	—	0.0	—	0.0
TOTAL	74.50	100.0	65.65	100.0	70.40	100.0	91.01	100.0
Total SIDA support to South Africa	310.00		276.00		240.00		220.00	
Education as % of total support	24.03		23.16		29.33		22.75	

NOTE: *The numbers and percentages for 1994/95 are planned, not actual, allocations, and are thus not strictly comparable with the three preceding years.*

Margareta Husén, Senior Programme Officer, Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority *(1993.07.08-09)*.

Jonathan Jansen, Advancing Basic Education and Literacy *(1993.08.05)*.

Mike Kahn, Policy Analyst, Centre for Education Policy Development *(1993.08.02)*.

Peter Kallaway, Faculty of Education, University of Cape Town *(1993.08.11)*.

Horst Kleinsmidt, African Scholarship Fund and Kagiso Trust *(1993.08.05)*.

Nombulelo Kotyi, African National Congress, Khayelitsha *(1993.08.12)*.

Sara Lindgren, Administrative Assistant, Swedish Legation to South Africa *(1993.08.02)*.

Buyiswa Magadlela, African National Congress, Khayelitsha *(1993.08.12)*.

James Maseko, General Secretary, National Education Co-ordinating Committee *(1993.08.04)*.

Nomfundo Mayosi, Gender and Development Coordinator, World University Service–South Africa *(1993.08.09)*.

Mary Metcalfe, Policy Analyst, Centre for Education Policy Development *(1993.08.02)*.

Meshack Mochele, Finance, Student Services Centre *(1993.08.10)*.

Eric Molobi, Executive Director, Kagiso Trust *(1993.08.05)*.

Papie Moloto, Consultant Human Resources, Department of Human Resources Development, African National Congress *(1993.08.03)*.

Ismail Moss, Project Co-ordinator, Student Services Centre *(1993.08.10)*.

Beyers Naudé, African Scholarship Fund *(1993.08.05)*.

Robert Ness, Deputy Director, South Africa, The British Council *(1993.08.02)*.

Phumzile Ngcuka, Educational Consultant and Former Director, World University Service–South Africa *(1993.08.09)*.

Rahmat Omar, Congress of South African Trade Unions *(1993.08.05)*.

Sharif Pindar, Director, Khayelitsha Education Resource and Information Centre *1993.08.12)*.

Tahir Salie, Director, The Careers Research and Information Centre *(1993.08.11)*.

John Samuel, Head, Education Department, African National Congress *(1993.08.02)*.

Laura Schultz, Director, Student Services Centre *(1993.08.10)*.

Birgita Sevefjord, Regional Secretariat for Southern Africa, Swedish International Development Authority *(1993.07.08)*.

Bernadette September, Psychologist *(1993.08.10)*.

Ron September, Teacher and Community Activist *(1993.08.10)*.

Claudine Souchon, Administrator, South Africa Internal Programme, World University Service–South Africa *(1993.08.09)*.

Nkululeko Sowazi, Deputy Director–Projects, Kagiso Trust *(1993.08.05)*.

Garth Strachan, Education Resource and Information Project, University of the Western Cape *(1993.08.10)*.

Sindiswa Tafeni, Use, Speak and Write English *(1993.08.10)*

Nick Taylor, Deputy Director, Joint Education Trust *(1993.08.04)*.

Leon Tikly, Research Officer, Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand *(1993.08.04)*.

Mohammed Tikly, Director, Batlagae Trust *(1993.08.03)*.

Susan Westcott, Adult Learning Project, *(1993.08.09)*.

Lennart Wolgemuth, Assistant Director General, Swedish International Development Authority *(1993.07.09)*.

Harold Wolpe, Director, Education Policy Unit, University of the Western Cape *(1993.08.12)*

14.5 PEOPLE CONSULTED (MAY-JULY 1994)

Trevor Abrahams, South African College of Higher Education (SACHED) *(1994.07.25)*.

Yusuf Adam, Kagiso Trust Bursary Fund *(1994.07.25)*.

Pete Arendse, The Ecumenical Action Movement (TEAM) *(1994.07.25)*.

Nozipho January Bardill, Director, World University Service-South Africa *(1994.07.20,25-26)*.

Tosca Berucco, Italian Embassy, South Africa *(1994.07.20)*.

J. François Bill, Coordinator, Fundani Bursary Trust *(1994.07.21)*.

Keith Bingle, Fundani Bursary Trust *(1994.07.21)*.

Kate Birch, Treasurer, Women's College *(1994.07.26)*.

Graeme Bloch, Joint Education Trust *(1994.07.19)*.

Tamara Braam, Director, End Racism and Sexism in Education (ERASE) *(1994.07.26)*.

J. H. P. Brand, Director, Western Cape Area, Department of Education and Training *(1994.07.29)*.

Peter Buckland, Senior Policy Analyst, Education Policy and System Change Unit, Urban Foundation *(1994.07.14)*.

Coco Cachalia, Independent Author and Editor *(1994.07.17,20)*.

Cheryl Carolus, National Executive Committee, African National Congress *(1994.07.25)*.

Sipho Cele, General Secretary, National Education Co-ordinating Committee *(1994.06.23,25, 07.07)*.

Linda Chisholm, Director, Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand *(1994.07.18,19)*.

Fay Chung, Chief, Education Cluster, United Nations Children's Fund, and former Minister of Education, Zimbabwe *(1994.07.13)*.

Trevor Coombe, Director, Center for Education Policy Development, and member, Interim Strategic Management Team, Ministry of Education *(1994.07.15)*.

Nigel Crawhall, Director, National Language Project (NLP) *(1994.07.26)*.

Roelf du Preez, Acting Director General, Ministry of Education, and Acting Director General, Department of Education and Training *(1994.07.20)*.

Brian Dublin, Training Unit, Director, Education and Resources Project (EDUCRES) *(1994.07.26)*.

Ahmed Essop, Center for Education Policy Development *(1994.07.13,17,20)*.

Judy Favish, Center for Education Policy Development *(1994.07.18,19,22)*.

Richard Fehnel, Ford Foundation, South Africa *(1994.07.20)*.

Charmaine Fortuin, Co-ordinator, Women's College (Administration) *(1994.07.26)*.

Gertrude Foster, Co-ordinator, Women's College (Women and Governance) *(1994.07.26)*.

Shaamielah Francis, *Training Course Organiser, Use, Speak and Write English (USWE) (1994.07.26).*

Isabel Gabashane, *European Union, South Africa (1994.07.20).*

Heather Garner, *Use, Speak and Write English (USWE) Adult Basic Education Project (1994.07.25).*

Ran Greenstein, *Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand (1994.07.18).*

Ingemar Gustafsson, *Head, Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority (1994.05.20).*

Shari Hamilton, *Co-ordinator, Training in English Language and Literacy (TELL) and Treasurer, National Literacy Co-operation (NLC) (1994.07.25,26).*

Henrik Hammargren, *Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority (1994.05.20).*

Myra Harrison, *Overseas Development Authority, South Africa (1994.07.20).*

Harold Herman, *Faculty of Education, University of the Western Cape (1994.07.27).*

Nomathemba Hlatshwayo, *Information Officer, Tsoga (1994.07.26).*

Margareta Husén, *Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority (1994.05.20).*

Miranda Isaakidis, *British Consulate, South Africa (1994.07.20).*

Jonathan Jansen, *Faculty of Education, University of Durban-Westville (1994.07.22-24).*

Stephanus Jooste, *Teacher, Klawervlei Literacy Project (KLOP) (1994.07.25,26).*

Peter Kallaway, *Faculty of Education, University of the Western Cape (1994.07.27).*

Francois L. Knoetze, *Executive Director, Cape Education Department (1994.07.29).*

Marcia Kuhn, *Receptionist/Secretary, World University Service–South Africa (1994.07.26).*

Sheila Lapinsky, *Women's College (Oral History) (1994.07.26).*

Sara Lindgren, *SIDA, Embassy of Sweden, South Africa (1994.07.20).*

Patrick Mabude, *National Committee, World University Service–South Africa (1994.07.25,26).*

Alastair Machin, *COSATU Participatory Research Project on Human Resource Development (1994.07.19).*

Zakile Madikane, *International Relations, Congress of South African Students (1994.07.15).*

Clarissa Malgas, *Teacher and Administrator, Klawervlei Literacy Project (KLOP) (1994.07.25).*

Chabani Manganyi, *Director, Joint Education Trust (1994.07.11,21).*

James Maseko, *Member of National Assembly (1994.06.28).*

George Mashamba, *Member of Senate (1994.06.25).*

Aubrey P. Matlole, *National Education Officer, South African Democratic Teachers Union (1994.07.15).*

Nomfundo Mayosi, *Women, Gender, and Development Programme Coordinator, World University Service–South Africa (1994.07.25,26).*

Papa McCarthy, Programme Officer, World University Service South Africa *(1994.07.25,26)*.

M. M. Shepherd Mdladlana, Member of National Assembly *(1994.07.29)*.

M. C. Mehl, Education Director, Independent Development Trust *(1994.07.29)*.

Mary Metcalfe, Member of Executive Council for Education, PWV Province *(1994.07.14)*.

Rita Mfenyana, Women Energy Group, Tsoga *(1994.07.26)*.

Nobethu Mfobo, Ilitha Labantu *(1994.07.26)*.

Murray Michell, Acting Director, Education and Resource Information Project (ERIP) *(1994.07.26,27)*.

Zanele Mkwanazi, Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand *(1994.07.18)*.

Phumzile Mlambo Ngcuka, Member of National Assembly *(1994.07.29)*.

Nazeema Mohamed, ANC Education Department and Education Policy Unit, University of the Western Cape *(1994.07.26)*.

Eric Molobi, Executive Director, Kagiso Trust *(1994.07.18)*.

Vuyiswa Moko, The Ecumenical Action Movement (TEAM) Literacy Project *(1994.07.25)*.

Mandisa Monakali, Ilitha Labantu *(1994.07.26)*.

Tselane Morele, University Development Programme, FRD *(1994.07.20)*.

Sam Morotoba, Training Coordinator, COSATU Participatory Research Project on Human Resource Development *(1994.07.19)*.

Wally Morrow, Dean, Faculty of Education, University of the Western Cape *(1994.07.27)*.

Lavuyo Mosena, Assistant General Secretary, National Education Co-ordinating Committee *(1994.06.23,25, 07.07,15)*.

Enver Motala, Director, Education Policy Unit, University of Durban-Westville *(1994.07.22)*.

Shireen Motala, Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand *(1994.07.18)*.

Vuyisile Mawell, Deputy Director, World University Service–South Africa *(1994.07.25,26)*.

Ephantus M. Mugiri, United Nations Children's Fund, South Africa *(1994.07.13)*.

A. M. Muller, Executive Director, Department of Education and Culture, (former) House of Representatives *(1994.07.29)*.

Prem Naidoo, Faculty of Education, University of Durban-Westville *(1994.07.22,23)*.

Noni Ndama, Bookkeeper, World University Service–South Africa *(1994.07.25,26)*.

Nomandla Ngombane, Secretary, Tsoga *(1994.07.26)*.

Vuyiswa Nolove, Board Member, Tsoga, and Welfare Department, ANC *(1994.07.26)*.

Helen Nordenson, Programme Officer, Swedish International Development Authority *(1994.07.12-21)*.

Mosiphiwe Ntongana, South Africa Internal Programme Assistant, World University Service South Africa *(1994.07.25,26)*.

Blade E. Nzimande, Member of National Assembly *(1994.07.29)*.

Martha Olckers, Member of Executive Council for Education, Western Cape Province *(1994.07.29)*.

Rahmat Omar, COSATU Participatory Research Project on Human Resource Development *(1994.07.19)*.

G. Naledi M. Pandor, Member of National Assembly *(1994.07.29)*.

Jean Pease, Director, Education and Resources Project (EDUCRES) *(1994.07.26)*.

Robinson Ramaite, Personal Assistant to the Member of the Executive Council for Education, PWV Province *(1994.07.14)*.

Kerstin Rosencrantz, Education Division, Swedish International Development Authority *(1994.05.20)*.

Tahir Salie, Director, The Careers Research and Information Centre *(1994.07.28,29)*.

Alioune Sall, United Nations Development Programme, South Africa *(1994.07.20)*.

Angela Schaffer, Independent Evaluator of Programmes and Organisations *(1994.07.26)*.

Laura Schultz, Director, Student Services Centre *(1994.07.26)*.

Bernadette September, Psychologist *(1994.07.29)*.

Ron September, Teacher and Community Activist *(1994.07.29)*.

Mala Singh, Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Durban-Westville *(1994.07.22, 24)*.

Barry Smith, Interfund, South Africa *(1994.07.20)*.

David Serokwane, National Organiser, Congress of South African Students *(1994.07.15)*.

Xoliswa Sibeko, Women's College (Oral History) *(1994.07.26)*.

Lindikhaya Sipoyo, Financial Administrator, World University Service–South Africa *(1994.07.25,26)*.

Zibusiso Sokhela, Finance Manager, National Education Co-ordinating Committee *(1994.07.15)*

Claudine Souchon, Senior Programme Officer, World University Service–South Africa *(1994.07.25,26)*.

Crain Soudien, Trustee (Chair), Education and Resources Project (EDUCRES), and Faculty of Education, University of Cape Town *(1994.07.26)*.

Janice Stuurman, Field Worker, Tsoga *(1994.07.26)*.

Nick Taylor, Joint Education Trust *(1994.07.19)*.

Thobeka Thamage, Director, Tsoga *(1994.07.26)*.

Desmond Thompson, Information Officer, National Education Co-ordinating Committee *(1994.07.15)*.

Leon Tikly, Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand *(1994.07.18)*.

Tom van Oorschot, Netherlands Embassy, South Africa *(1994.07.20)*.

Randall P. Z. van den Heever, Member of National Assembly *(1994.07.29)*.

Susan Westcott, Adult Learning Project (ALP) *(1994.07.25)*.

Brian Whittaker, Education Policy and System Change Unit, Urban Foundation *(1994 07 19)*

Harold Wolpe, Director, Education Policy Unit, University of the Western Cape *(1994 07 27)*

Eiichi Yoshida, Japanese Embassy, South Africa *(1994 07 20)*

14.6 FOREIGN AGENCY CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION

The information below on other foreign agency contributions to South African education is extracted and adapted from *Donor Cooperation and Coordination in Education in South Africa*, prepared by Baudouin Duvieusart and Joel Samoff for the Division for Policy and Sector Analysis (BER/PSA), UNESCO (Paris: 31 May 1994), and supplemented through our meetings with agency representatives in South Africa and our review of their documents. Since the information in that report on Sweden's support to South African education summarizes what is discussed at greater length in this report, it is not included here.

Even with very labor intensive data collection strategies, an exhaustive review, either of the external agencies that support South African education or of their projects, is still not possible. Hence, the principal concern of this overview is to illustrate the importance of external assistance to education reform and development.

Five major national and multinational agencies provided more than 85% of the aid to South African education during 1993: the European Union (EU), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Overseas Development Authority (ODA), the Swedish International Development Authority, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Several other initiatives warrant a brief comment.

14.6.1 The European Union

Although discussions on the topic have already begun, South Africa is not yet considered as one of the ACP (African, Caribbean or Pacific) countries, and cannot therefore receive development assistance through the European Development Funds programs which are the usual channels for European external aid. A special program for South Africa, the largest of its type within the European Union development cooperation policy, was established in 1985 to assist the victims of apartheid. It has been recently reoriented towards supporting development and meeting the challenges that are emerging in the new political setting. The European program constitutes the biggest single overseas development assistance in South Africa, amounting to US$ 110 million in 1993. A little less than half of it is devoted to education.

Until 1991 this program was exclusively implemented by four non-governmental organizations: the Kagiso Trust, the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, the South African Council of Churches, and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Since that date, other NGOs have been accepted as implementing agencies.

An analysis of the 1991/93 disbursements for education shows that two thirds were allocated to bursaries for African students at universities and technical colleges. Priority areas of studies include: management and economics, the natural sciences, mathematics, health, agriculture, teacher training, engineering, technology, and specific courses like town planning. During 1993, over 7,000 students were supported by the European Union through the Kagiso Trust. We were informed that the European Union intends to reduce this support through Kagiso Trust in order to provide development assistance directly to government.

From the remaining third of its education resources, the European Union has invested one quarter in research, administration and management, and capacity building, and another quarter in adult basic education. Other projects deal with preschool education, math and sciences education, primary and secondary teacher training, distance learning, and vocational training.

The European Union assistance is supporting education reforms through the development of innovative and replicable models in various sub-sectors, especially in adult and preschool education. Curriculum improvement in math and sciences pursues the same objectives. The European Union assistance is also reinforcing changes in education policy by financing sub-sector studies in vocational training, sciences and math, and adult basic education. The European Union also influences policy changes through other modalities: the emphasis recently put on loans to higher education students to replace fellowships.

Finally, the assistance for research, management, and capacity building for community organizations (for example, funding an independent examinations board, or assistance to faculty and institutional development in the historically black universities) is intended to support the emergence of development-oriented structures and to make innovations sustainable.

14.6.2 The United States Agency for International Development

In order to mitigate the effects on the population of the sanctions voted against South Africa by the Congress in 1986, U.S. authorities authorized assistance in five areas, among which human rights and education were the most important. This authorization formally excluded any co-financing of Government activities. USAID's global assistance amounts to US$ 80 million a year (identical in 1992 and 1993), within which education receives an average of US$ 35 million, which makes the US assistance the second largest program in South Africa. When President Clinton signed the bill in November 1993 lifting the sanctions against South Africa, he instructed federal agencies to consider new initiatives to assist the country once non-racial elections took place. On 5 May 1994, President Clinton announced a package to promote trade, aid, and investment. As an application of this decision, USAID will provide US$ 528 million over the 1994-96 period, including US$ 136 million in 1994. This new assistance program now allows for support to public institutions.

Until 1990, most African-led activist organizations were banned in South Africa. USAID therefore implemented its programs through NGOs which received 85% of the funds allocated, 11% of them going to American contractors assisting South African partners (for example, Advancing Basic Education and Literacy and the Tertiary Education Support Project), and 4% serving for project management. After 1990 USAID has relied more and more on South African community-based organizations (CBOs) for implementing its program.

Since the absorptive capacity of these organizations was perceived to be low, 60% of the funding has been devoted to "investments in individuals" through intensive scholarship schemes, training undergraduates in South African universities, sending graduates to American higher education institutions, and organizing short term training, mainly within South Africa.

While earlier U.S. aid focused largely on developing black leadership, particularly in policy and management at tertiary level, it has now shifted towards improving quality at pre-primary and primary levels with the Education Support and Training Program, undertaken with NGOs like the South African Basic Education Reconstruction Project and the Learning Technologies for Basic Education Project, the latter focusing on the use of interactive radio for Basic English instruction. The objective is subsequently to include basic math instruction and enrich the program in order to overcome resistance to schooling by encouraging children to enjoy learning. Through similar actions, USAID has funded NGOs with the objective to instil innovations in the education system. One of the tasks for future development assistance will certainly be to help rationalize NGOs' work and to integrate their activity into the new government education system.

The United States also sought to play an important role in education policy by commissioning several sector studies in primary and tertiary education and in skills training and by supporting the development of simulation models, particularly [illegible] and education finance (for example, [illegible], developed by the Research Triangle Institute). Several additional models are being developed with U.S. support, including a teacher salary simulation ([illegible]) with support of the Urban Foundation, a governance model, a tertiary education model, a study of alternative sources of income for education, and the initial steps toward a geographical information system.

One of USAID's three strategic objectives focuses on "helping to establish a more equitable educational system." Future areas of USAID assistance will include: pre-school education; support to innovations in basic education, particularly through the supply of low cost science material kits; non formal skill training, geared at enhancing productive capacity for South Africa which will be re-entering the world market; support to tertiary education, with an important linkage project for historically black universities and technikons; capacity building in public management for new civil servants; policy analysis and support to reform implementation; development and supply of multi-racial material, an area where the U.S. feels it has a comparative advantage; and support to fight gender bias.

USAID's focus on higher education in South Africa is a major exception to the agency's policy for Africa, where basic education is the first priority. The Tertiary Education Linkage Project (TELP) will be one of the most important initiatives in this area, intended to link historically black U.S. Colleges and Universities with historically black universities and technikons in South Africa to build skill level through technical assistance, training, and funding pilot activities. A major rationale for this project is that historically white universities are thought to have enough resources for future development, and that very few South Africans of African origin will be inclined to attend these institutions. Therefore reinforcing the historically black universities and technikons is a way to transform the roles of the different communities in the country.

14.6.3 The Overseas Development Authority

The United Kingdom's Overseas Development Authority's program in South Africa is over £11 million a year (US$ 16.5 m), to which should be added a similar amount representing the British contribution to the European Union assistance. More than 60% of ODA's program is devoted to education: policy and management (7.5%), primary education (39.9%), secondary education (40.6%), and university bursary grants (12.0%).

In primary education, the main focus has been on curriculum and teacher development in English, science, and math, particularly with the Molteno Trust. This NGO supports basic literacy for black primary pupils, beginning in their home language and continuing in English. This brings differential attention to marginalized groups and leads to a pluricultural South Africa. At secondary level, improvement of English and science includes training of teachers in the UK, follow up within South Africa, and provision of text books. ODA intends, through supporting NGOs like the Molteno Trust or the Science Education Project (SEP), to strengthen a pool of institutions which will be in a position to influence the establishment of a national curriculum in the new political setting.

Since 1989, 1,800 black students have received scholarships to attend universities and technikons under the British Awards Scheme. With a new government in place and the major barriers to higher education for Africa students partly removed, funding undergraduate students

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Swedish International Development Authority

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Canadian International Development Agency

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

14.6.6 Other Initiatives

While other agencies have also assisted in developing South African education through investing in bursary funds, or in supporting individual schools, universities or projects (for example, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Kellogg and Ford Foundations), the characteristics of their programs are not fundamentally different from those described above. We limit ourselves here therefore to several innovative initiatives that serve to illustrating the wide range of roles external agencies are playing in South Africa.

DANIDA, Denmark's development assistance agency, began a transitional aid program in 1994 for a total of DK 120 million per year (US$ 18.4 million). Priority areas are education, democratisation, and human rights, land reform and small scale black enterprises and employment. In the area of education, DANIDA is supporting the CEPD led Implementation Plan for Education and Training.

The Kellogg Foundation has been active in South Africa since 1986, focused primarily on scholarship and academic support. Currently, ten universities receive Kellogg scholarship funds. The Kellogg Foundation reports to have committed US$ 48.5 in grants from 1987 to March 1994, which makes it the largest private bursary funder in South Africa. Its new program for education contemplates 31 projects in various fields, expected to average approximately US$ 1.2 million a year. In addition, Kellogg's health program supports medical education. One of the first concerns within this component is to try to link medical education with the health profession. At present, most of the health personnel are narrowly focused on technical aspects of their tasks; very few Africans received advanced training, and the health system serves mainly the white clientele. The aim of this project is to create links between the medical training institution and their surrounding communities and to redirect attention from acute to primary and preventive care. For that purpose, the Kellogg Foundation is now supporting seven community partnerships where the medical institution (generally universities) tries to respond to the community's needs by creating a local clinic, doing practical work, and providing extension services like health education which benefit the community directly. Kellogg's support includes direct funding to organizations, study grants, travel support, and institutional development.

The Bernard Van Leer Foundation, a private Dutch institution, supports six projects initiated by partner NGOs in the area of early childhood development and education with just under US$ 1 million a year. The foundation believes that the new South African government will have to focus such substantial attention and resources on improving quality in primary education that it will not be able to invest significantly in pre-primary formal schooling. This explains why the foundation's Country Programme Statement, presented in December 1993 to the board of trustees, proposes a five year project intended to identify, support, and build on initiatives in the area of caring for and educating young children. In choosing activities initiated and run by black South African community groups, the foundation will try to support and develop sustainable and replicable models for future development that other funding partners will be invited to help disseminate in order to address the problem of the 93% of black children who do not currently have access to early childhood education and care. The intention is to reinforce and encourage people's voluntary initiatives as an alternative to the center-based formal actions that the public authorities will in any case probably be unable to finance.

Interfund is an international fund-raising agency which has supported for the past seven years development projects in South Africa. Some are direct education projects, while other are more grass-root development oriented actions; the majority have an education or human resources development component. Financial contributions come mainly from the Scandinavian states and NGOs, and from Canada and the United Kingdom. Beyond more classical initiatives, two projects are worth mentioning. The Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA), using its experience of mediation and arbitration in industrial disputes, initiated in 1991 a program to train mediators to help resolve community conflicts. Prospective mediators undergo a formal training process and become accredited mediators attached to an IMSSA panel who can be contracted out to mediate in conflict situations. IMSSA has some 120 panelists and also provides training in mediation skills to community-based organizations. Another program, Education Through the Media, is training black video and film makers from the democratic movement, as well as aspirant journalists from rural community newspapers in a range of skills (writing, layout, and design, poster and T-shirt production). The objective for both groups is to support former opposition organizations to express their views and thereby participate directly in the transition to a democratic society.

Multilateral assistance, outside the European Union discussed earlier, and the Commonwealth Secretariat which has a US$ 1 million a year scholarship program, is very small in terms of direct funding. Due to the General Assembly's resolutions on apartheid, the United Nations family has only a few programs, particularly through the World Food Programme and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, in addition to the US$ 17 million assistance given to the National Liberation Movements between 1987 and 1991. The United Nations Development Programme opened its office in Pretoria in May 1994 and is to prepare very soon a program for the country. The World Bank and the African Development Bank are likely to play an important role in the future, the former having already commissioned several pre-investment studies. It is however not at all sure that the new government will put the highest priority on a loan, at relatively high interest rates, for its education system.

There are also hundreds of grants from foreign foundations and other organizations that contribute to the development of education in South Africa. The Institute of International Education in New York has published several working papers identifying European and Canadian NGOs, Foreign Missions, IGOs, and U.S. independent sector initiatives which are allocating or administering funds for development activities. The most recent publication of the series, *Foreign Assistance to South Africa*, March 1994, provides brief descriptions of 217 organizations active in South Africa. The majority of them refer to education, training or human resources development as one of their centers of interest.

Finally, U.S. foundations are reported to have contributed US$ 25 million to South Africa in 1992. Part of that sum supports education. A search of the Foundation Grants Index, a major electronic database, showed a total of US$ 9.6 million for 1991. While the comparable total for subsequent years seems to be incomplete, the general finding is clear: a very large number of foundation grants, some from very small institutions, support education in South Africa.

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NOTE: We list here only the materials we received and reviewed. We have not sought to develop a bibliography of the general writing on South African education, which is informed, critical, and extensive. Note as well that this list is inclusive, incorporating the materials reviewed during the preparation of Anti-Apartheid and Development *and listed in Section 8.4 of that report.*

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